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Sentiment Eects in
Professionally Traded Markets:
Evidence from Oil and Emissions Futures
Peter Deeney
Abstract
This thesis shows that sentiment has inuence in professionally traded oil and emis-
sions markets. The sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) is adapted for the oil
markets and is used to show that sentiment has a positive eect on WTI and Brent
crude oil prices. Having established the value of this index in the oil markets it is
extended to include the wider energy markets and used to show that sentiment also has
an eect in the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). It is found that there is some
evidence that decisions of the European Parliament (EP) are associated with a drop in
emission allowance (EUA) prices particularly when these decisions occur at times of low
sentiment, low news exposure and when they come from non-party political sources. It
is found that an increase in volatility of EUA returns is associated with EP decisions
made at these times.
In order to investigate further the eect of sentiment in the EU ETS, sentiment
measured from tweets concerning the emissions market is shown to predict price level
and volatility using intra-day data. Bi-directional Granger causality is found between
changes in emissions market sentiment and EUA returns, this is especially true for
negative sentiment. There is only very weak evidence of an association between climate
change sentiment and the EUA returns showing that the EU ETS is not very high in
the consciousness of people posting tweets about climate change. Finally, there is some
evidence that energy commodity prices and stock market returns can explain, but not
predict, EUA prices. This suggests that the EU ETS is ecient with regard to this
fundamental information but that in general the Ecient Market Hypothesis does not
provide a complete description of the market dynamics.
This thesis therefore shows not only that the Ecient Market Hypothesis does not
provide a complete description of market dynamics but that sentiment does not rely
on uninformed traders to have a real and substantial eect in the emissions and oil
markets.
xv
.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The central contribution of this thesis is that sentiment is found to explain returns and
volatility in the professionally traded energy futures markets, specically the WTI and
Brent crude oil, and the EU emissions allowance markets. Baker and Wurgler (2006)
nd that sentiment is an important inuence on stock prices in the equity markets,
particularly for stocks which are hard to value. The inuence of sentiment in the
equity markets has been explained because there are many uninformed traders and
there is some diculty obtaining information about each individual asset. This inuence
persists because there are limits to arbitrage such as market frictions, the cost of capital
and often there are diculties in short selling due to a lack of available shares. The
energy markets are dierent from the equity markets. These markets are professionally
traded, have more transparency, it is easier to take short positions and borrowing is
possible on the corporate bond market. Given these factors the eect of sentiment on
prices may be unexpected. However, there is still uncertainty about future events and
some important information is not publicly available such as estimates of oil, coal and
gas reserves. In addition there are limits to the positions traders may take. These lesser
conditions are sucient to permit sentiment to have an eect in the oil and emissions
markets. This thesis shows that the decisions of oil and emissions traders are, to a
limited extent, explained and even predicted by sentiment.
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The Aect Infusion Model of Forgas (1995) tells us that the inuence of emotions on
judgements is more pronounced for judgements requiring open constructive thinking,
than for judgements made by following previously well-established patterns. This is
applicable to the energy market because open and constructive thinking is required
from traders as they deal with new developments such as Brexit, unexpected outcomes
from OPEC meetings or political violence. Hence, the arguments in Forgas (1995)
suggest that sentiment has an eect on decisions made by energy traders.
In this investigation we nd that the conditions in the energy market, namely limi-
tations on information availability and limitations on position sizes, and in the case of
the emissions market, inattention, are sucient for sentiment to have a lasting and sub-
stantial eect on prices and volatility. This is an important contribution to behavioural
nance which has, in the case of equity markets, depended heavily on the presence
and activity of uninformed traders to explain market ineciencies, however there is a
growing literature establishing the activity of behavioural biases in professional traders.
1.2 Motivation and Context
A behavioural nance approach has been used to explain the dierences between ob-
served price dynamics and the theoretical price dynamics expected from the Ecient
Market Hypothesis (EMH). We see from Coval and Shumway (2005), Coates and Her-
bert (2008), O'Connell and Teo (2009), Coates (2012), Palao and Pardo (2012), Cum-
mins et al. (2015) and, Dowling et al. (2016) that even in professionally traded markets
there are behavioural biases. In this thesis we propose that sentiment, which has been
seen to have an eect in the equities markets, may be observed in the energy futures
markets, specically the WTI and Brent crude oil markets, and the EU emissions al-
lowance market. The sentiment of a community about a subject is the collection of
positive, negative and neutral opinions held by that community concerning the sub-
ject. In Chapters 2 and 3 sentiment is measured using nancial proxies, in Chapter
4 it is measured from tweets. Information from Twitter contains sentiment because
the people who posted the tweets express their opinion in these posts. This has been
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recognized widely in the sentiment analysis literature, see Thelwall et al. (2010), Bollen
et al. (2011), Corea and Cervellati (2015), Siapera et al. (2015) and Yang et al. (2015)
among others.
There are several reasons to explain why sentiment would have an eect in asset
pricing: the presence of uninformed traders, see Shleifer and Summers (1990), Brown
(1999), de Long et al. (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Barberis and Thaler (2003),
Tetlock (2007), Verma and Verma (2008) and Kaufmann (2011); lack of attention, see
Barber and Odean (2008); and a lack of reliable fundamental information or information
asymmetry, see Baker and Wurgler (2006).
There are also explanations put forward to explain why the eects of sentiment
would not be removed quickly by arbitrage: short selling constraints, see Baker and
Stein (2004), and Baker and Wurgler (2006); market frictions, see Barberis and Thaler
(2003); and the cost and risk of arbitrage, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and, Barberis
and Thaler (2003).
These are certainly good explanations for the action of sentiment on thinly traded
stocks in the equity markets where it may not be possible to short some stocks, but
these problems are not present to the same extent in the commodity futures markets
where, there are few if any uninformed traders, liquidity can be extremely high leading
to a high degree of market attention and low market frictions. (In spite of this we
nd evidence of market inattention in the emissions market.) In addition there is
considerable information available concerning the oil and emissions markets. Access
to the corporate bond market means that energy companies are able to raise money
relatively cheaply, and so the cost of holding on to an arbitrage position should not be
sucient to explain the continued eect of sentiment. There are however limitations
to taking short positions imposed by asset managers in terms of position sizes and
margin calls, rather than by the availability of shares. These limits do have eects in
the market, see Acharya et al. (2013). Thus we propose that even with professional
trading, greater information availability, and in the case of the oil markets massive
liquidity, there is an eect due to sentiment and this eect is not removed quickly by
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arbitrage as would be suggested by the Ecient Markets Hypothesis (EMH).
The EU carbon market is populated largely by professional traders working for large
electricity generators, steel producers, cement producers, airlines and other large in-
dustries, see Mizrach and Otsubo (2014), Grin et al. (2015) and Palao and Pardo
(2017). While the market in EUAs is much less liquid than the oil market there were
still 446,506 EUA prompt December futures transactions during the year from 17th De-
cember 2012 to 16th December 2013 analysed in Chapter 4. In classical nancial theory
the EU ETS would be a rational market where prices reect fundamental information
very quickly according to the EMH. Instead we nd that market sentiment can explain
prices and volatility.
Sentiment is measured in two ways in this thesis, rst as the sentiment of the market
measured from suitable proxies selected from the market data and second, as the senti-
ment of tweets about climate change and the emissions market. The volume of trades,
volatility, the level of speculative activity and the put-call ratio are all considered to be
activities associated with the sentiment of market participants and are used as proxies
for market sentiment. The second method of measuring sentiment is to examine the
text of tweets concerning the emissions market using the sentiment analysis provided
by DataSift1, a leading supplier of news and data analytics. Twitter sentiment is not
the same as market sentiment since not all those who post tweets are traders, therefore
it provides a very useful alternative source for measuring sentiment. Using Twitter
gives the advantage that it measures sentiment from a dierent perspective than from
a proxy based index. In this way we verify that sentiment inuences the markets.
The contexts of this study are the oil market and the EU emissions trading scheme
(EU ETS), both of which are very important and interesting contexts for such a study.
Oil is the world's primary energy source for transportation, a major source of energy
for heating and electricity generation, a raw material for many chemical industries and
the most traded of all commodities. The oil markets are the subject of Chapter 2.
The EU ETS is the principal area of interest for this thesis being the subject of
1Datasift has provided the tweets and analysis of these tweets for several published studies as outlined in Section
4.2.3.
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Chapters 3 and 4. The EU ETS is a particularly interesting subject for the inuence of
sentiment because prices are determined not just by the wider energy market but also
by regulatory issues. The EU ETS is important for many reasons. The EU ETS is the
EU's principal method to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases2. There has been
much discussion and action regarding the need to reduce the quantity of greenhouse
gases (GHG) in the atmosphere in order to reduce climate change. The EU ETS puts a
price on GHG emissions so that rms may benet nancially from reducing their GHG
emissions. The price of the emission allowances (EUAs) depends on supply and demand.
The supply is agreed in advance by the EU states and the EU ETS; however there is
the possibility of regulatory changes. The demand depends on the amount of GHG
emitted by the regulated installations across the EU, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway,
this too can be subject to regulatory changes such as the recent inclusion of aviation. In
addition to its importance in reducing GHG emissions, there is a considerable quantity
of trade in the EUA market. For example during the nal year of the December 2015
futures contract there was ¿25.8bn traded, during the same period the December 2016
contract had ¿6.6bn traded and the 2017 contract had ¿2.5bn traded. The 2016 cap
for emissions is 2.084 trillion tonnes, which at the present price of ¿5.81 per tonne3 is
¿12.108 trillion. The cost of EUAs has been part of the EU economy since 2005. A
third reason why the EU ETS is important is that it is the largest emissions trading
scheme in the world. Research into this scheme is paving the way for many other
schemes, in particular the Chinese national emissions scheme which is due to begin in
2017.
The oil market was chosen as a testing ground to verify that a sentiment index
based on Baker and Wurgler (2006) would be of use in energy commodity markets.
This was necessary due to the novelty of investigating sentiment in the relatively new
asset class of emission allowances. Thus Chapter 2 establishes the method of creating a
sentiment index which is used in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3 it was necessary to address the
eect of regulatory changes in the emissions market because the price changes caused
2http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm [Accessed on 11th May 2016]
3Price at the close of business on 14th October from Intercontinental Exchange for the Dec 2016 futures contract.
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by regulatory decisions are quite large. Thus in Chapter 3 we look at the eect of
European Parliament decisions on EUA prices with dierent sentiment, news exposure
and party-political / non party-political sourcing for the decisions. After establishing
that sentiment was eective in the energy commodity markets (Chapter 2) and in
particular in the EU emissions market (Chapter 3), the nal, largest and most novel
aspect of the thesis, the use of tweets, is presented in Chapter 4. In this chapter we
measure sentiment from a very dierent source, namely tweets, and show it to inuence
both the EUA returns and their volatility. Thus we have presented very strong evidence
that sentiment measured in two quite distinct ways, has an inuence in both the oil
and emissions markets both of which are professionally traded.
It is evident that this research is topical and relevant. Chen, He and Yu (2015)
concerns the use of the OVX 4 for prediction of oil futures level and volatility; Lee
and Ko (2016) examines predictability in stock markets; Yin and Yang (2016) looks
at the prediction of oil prices and Maslyuk-Escobedo et al. (2016) examines sentiment
and jumps in oil prices. These four papers cite Chapter 2 which was published Deeney,
Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015). Zhu et al. (2015) examines changes in the
EUA market and has cited Deeney et al. (2016a) which was published from Chapter 3.
The research in this thesis deals with important and current topics and makes a real
contribution to the literature.
1.3 Contribution
This thesis contributes to the literature by demonstrating the inuence of sentiment
in professionally traded markets, namely in the oil markets and in the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Sentiment is shown to have a signicant eect on prices and
volatility in these markets. We see from Baker and Wurgler (2006) that lack of reliable
information, and from Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and, Acharya et al. (2013) that the
limits imposed on traders by portfolio managers, are among the explanations which
4The CBOE Crude Oil ETF Volatility Index (OVX) measures the market's expectation of 30-day volatility of crude
oil prices by applying the VIX® methodology to United States Oil Fund, LP options spanning a wide range of strike
prices.
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account for the initial action and the continued eect of sentiment. In addition we nd
in Chapter 3 that market inattention is a factor facilitating the eect of sentiment in the
EU ETS. This makes a contribution to the literature because these markets are almost
exclusively traded by professionals, see Mizrach and Otsubo (2014), Grin et al. (2015)
and Palao and Pardo (2017), and in these markets arbitrage is less restricted than in
the equity markets. In addition to this contribution, this is the rst study of the eect
of sentiment in the emissions markets and the rst study of the eect of energy and
equity market inuence on emissions at intra-day frequency as well as being one of only
a few studies of sentiment in the energy commodity markets5. It is also one of very few
studies to use a multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) framework to take account of the
multiple comparisons problem. The multiple comparisons problem occurs when many
hypothesis tests are conducted simultaneously. Some false rejections of null hypotheses
are likely to occur in these situations merely as the result of chance and not because of
an underlying eect. This is discussed in more detail in Sections 2.4.2, 3.4.1 and 4.5.4.
The individual contribution of each of the three central chapters is now discussed.
1.4 Chapter Outline
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 look at the eect of sentiment in the oil market, the interaction
of sentiment with the regulatory decisions of the EU ETS and the eect of Twitter
sentiment on EUA prices and volatility. Chapter 2 shows that the method of Baker
and Wurgler (2006), which was used successfully to construct a sentiment index for the
equity markets, may be adapted to the oil markets. Chapter 3 shows that sentiment
has an eect in the emissions market in terms of the reception of European Parlia-
ment decisions and Chapter 4 demonstrates that sentiment measured from tweets does
inuence EUA price and volatility.
1.4.1 Chapter 2, Sentiment in Oil Markets
This chapter establishes that oil market sentiment may be measured by adapting the
5Maslyuk et al. (2013) uses the cumulative sentiment index from Thomson Reuters News Analytics to examine price
discontinuities in energy spot and futures and Borovkova (2011) uses the same source to examine the shape of the forward
curve for oil futures prices, and Lechthaler and Leinert (2012) uses this source for oil markets.
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method of Baker and Wurgler (2006) and shows that the resulting sentiment measure
is associated with contemporaneous price movements in Brent and WTI crude oils.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) select the following proxies for sentiment from the nancial
data, these proxies are considered indicative of market sentiment, they are: the NYSE
turnover, the closed end fund premium, the number and average rst day returns of
IPOs, the share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues, and the dividend
premium. To extract a common sentiment signal these proxies are used in a principal
component analysis. For the oil market we measure sentiment using the following
proxies: the volume and volatility of prompt month oil futures, the put-call ratio of
options on these futures contracts, the ratio of non-commercial futures and options to
oil supply and a local volatility index. The volume of oil trades is analogous to the
NYSE turnover, volatility is recognized as an indicator of fear, see Whaley (2000), the
put-call ratio is also recognized as an indicator of market fear, see Bathia and Bredin
(2013), and the ratio of non-commercial trades to oil demand is a measure of speculation
see Coleman (2012), (Table 2.1). These monthly proxies are combined using principal
component analysis. The ndings are that the expected fundamental drivers of oil price
such as oil inventory level, OPEC spare capacity and world economic activity indicators
are indeed signicantly associated with oil prices. When the sentiment indices for WTI
and Brent are added to these models they are found to improve them both statistically
and economically. The key contribution of this chapter is that oil market sentiment is
seen to inuence both WTI and Brent oil prices, despite the oil market being largely
professional with reasonably easy shorting availability and extremely high liquidity.
Chapter 2 Key Findings:
 Models comprising stock markets, currencies, world economy activity indicators,
US oil inventory, world oil supply, OPEC surplus and the proportion of oil supplied
by OPEC form useful fundamental models for WTI and Brent oil prices. These
models are improved when a sentiment index is added. The sentiment index for
WTI and Brent uses volume of trades, historic volatility, put-call ratio, ratio of
speculative trades to oil supply and the stock market implied volatility.
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 The improvement obtained by adding the sentiment indices is statistically signi-
cant.
 The size of the coecient of the sentiment index is larger than any of the other
coecients in a standardized model, indicating that it is as least as important as
any of the fundamental variables.
1.4.2 Chapter 3, Inuences from the European Parliament on EU Emis-
sions Prices
Having established a method for measuring sentiment in the oil market by adapting the
Baker and Wurgler (2006) index in Chapter 2, this method of measuring sentiment is
applied to the EU ETS. The price of EUAs is highly dependent on regulatory changes
as well as the energy market. This chapter looks at the way in which decisions made
by the European Parliament (EP) change EUA prices. As the EU ETS only exists
due to regulations it is expected that even the suspicion of changes in these regulations
would have an inuence on EUA prices. We examine the eects of EP decisions across
dierent levels of sentiment and market awareness as well across dierent sources for
the legislation. This investigation uses the method established by the rst chapter
to produce a sentiment index for the interlinked emissions and energy markets. The
key contribution of this chapter is the nding that sentiment, among other inuences,
does have an inuence in the market's reaction to decisions made by the European
Parliament.
Chapter 3 Key Findings:
 Regulatory decisions of the European Parliament play a crucial role in the price
development of EUAs. There is weak evidence that European Parliament deci-
sions generally lower the EUA price and very strong evidence that these decisions
increase the volatility of EUA returns.
 The level of awareness or interest before decisions, the level of energy market sen-
timent and the source of the legislation are considered as cross-sectional eects
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because these factors are likely to inuence the behaviour of the European Parlia-
ment. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are conscious of their voters'
interests and so the level of media exposure and energy market sentiment would
be likely to be inuential. The source of the legislation is considered because
MEPs are likely to act dierently to proposals from inside or outside their polit-
ical groups, and furthermore, the political groups may publicize their intentions
more eectively than non-political sources of legislation.
 There is a more pronounced drop in EUA prices and an increase in volatility after
decisions of the European Parliament when the level of sentiment is below its
median.
 When a decision does not originate from one of the European Parliament's political
groups there is a larger eect on the market.
 If the level of market attention is lower than the median, the change to the EUA
price and volatility after a decision of the European Parliament is greater.
 There is need for clearer forward guidance to be given by the European Parliament
to the market, so that decisions do not surprise the market and add to volatility.
1.4.3 Chapter 4, Twitter Sentiment and the EU Carbon Market
Since it is found that energy market sentiment, as well as political origin and media
exposure aects the receptivity of the EUA market to regulatory changes, we now
examine the direct eect of sentiment, and do so at intra-day frequency. This chapter
looks at the ways in which we might extract meaningful information from the sentiment
measured from tweets which express people's opinions concerning climate change and
the EU emissions market. The use of Twitter allows sentiment to be measured at
intra-day frequency which is used with intra-day nancial data to examine the eect
of sentiment on EUA returns and volatility. An important advantage in using Twitter
rather than other social media platforms such as blogs or commercial media, is that the
messages which are to be analysed are short, less than or equal to 140 characters. This
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brevity makes it unlikely that subject drift would occur. Furthermore there is ample
literature already showing that Twitter is a useful source of sentiment information.
Tweets are used extensively in the literature to evaluate the sentiment of large num-
bers of people concerning various subjects including nancial markets. In order to get a
comprehensive sample of tweets we search for tweets containing particular search terms,
such as climate change, emissions trading etc. (see Table 4.1). Having selected an
initial list of 44 search terms these are tested in a scoping exercise to check for subject
accuracy. Using these results we reduce the list to 17 search terms which span the topics
of climate change and the emissions market. A further reduction produces a list of 5
search terms specically for the emissions market. These are then used to nd tweets
posted from Europe in English during the nal year of the 2013 EUA futures contract,
which was from 17th December 2012 to 16th December 2013. These tweets are gathered
and analysed by DataSift. This year is selected as it includes the backloading decision
of the European Parliament on 16th April 2013 which was highly inuential for EUA
prices as seen in Chapter 3.
To test the accuracy of the Tweet sample it is necessary to read the text of hundreds
of the tweets. This will indicate whether relevant tweets have been captured. Since we
are restricting our analysis to English tweets from within the EU, it is not surprising
that we nd that the most frequent time zones for carbon market tweets are London
(38%) , Amsterdam (25%) and Brussels (14%).
Vector Auto Regression (VAR) and Granger causality analysis were used to test
for an association between the sentiment from the emissions market tweets and EUA
returns, and between sentiment from the climate change tweets and EUA returns. The
results are that there is bi-directional Granger causality between changes in emissions
market sentiment and EUA returns, and that strong (weak) emissions market sentiment
is associated higher (lower) levels of EUA volatility. There is only very weak evidence of
an association between changes in climate change sentiment and EUA returns. There is
a similar pattern of strong evidence of an association between stronger (weaker) climate
change sentiment and higher (lower) EUA volatility. Finally there was some evidence
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that the EU ETS responds quickly to energy market information, in that there was
some evidence of contemporaneous association between EUA returns and gas, oil and
FTSE returns, but no evidence for a one hour predictive model.
Chapter 4 Key Findings:
 There is bi-directional Granger causality between changes in the sentiment of
tweets concerning the emissions market and EUA returns.
 No reliable evidence was found that tweets concerning climate change had an
association with EUA prices.
 There was very strong evidence of an association between strong (weak) senti-
ment from both the emissions market and climate change tweets, and high (low)
volatility of EUA returns.
 There was some evidence that the energy market can explain but not predict
EUA prices, this indicates that the carbon market assimilates information from
the energy market very quickly.
1.5 Research dissemination
Chapter 2, Sentiment in Oil Markets, has developed after initial versions were pre-
sented in 2013 at the Irish Accounting and Finance Association Conference (Deeney
et al.; 2013a), the Irish Society for New Economists Conference Deeney et al. (2013b),
the Inniti International Finance Conference (Deeney et al.; 2013c) and the 53rd meet-
ing of the Euro Working Group for Commodities and Financial Modelling (Deeney
et al.; 2013d). Chen, He and Yu (2015), Maslyuk-Escobedo et al. (2016), Lee and
Ko (2016), Yin and Yang (2016), Batten et al. (2017), Hung (2017) and Byrne et al.
(2017) have already cited the paper produced from this chapter which was published
in the International Review of Financial Analysis as Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and
Bermingham (2015).
Chapter 3, Inuences from the European Parliament on EU emissions prices , has
been cited in Zhu et al. (2017), Chang et al. (2017) and Lou et al. (2017), and published
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as Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Smeaton (2016a) in the journal Energy Policy. It was
presented in 2014 at the Irish Accounting and Finance Association Conference (Deeney
et al.; 2014a), the Irish Society for New Economists Conference (Deeney et al.; 2014b),
the Academy of International Business Doctoral Colloquium (Deeney et al.; 2014c) and
the 55th meeting of the Euro Working Group for Commodities and Financial Modelling
(Deeney et al.; 2014d).
An early version of Chapter 4 has been presented in 2015 at the Irish Accounting and
Finance Association Conference (Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Smeaton; 2015a) and
the Energy Finance Conference in London (Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Smeaton;
2015b). A more developed version has been presented at the Energy and Commodity Fi-
nance (ECOMFIN) Conference (Deeney et al.; 2016b) the Inniti International Finance
Conference (Deeney et al.; 2016c) and the Irish Accounting and Finance Association
Conference (Deeney et al.; 2016d). These were held in May and June 2016.
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Chapter 2
Sentiment in the Oil Markets
2.1 Introduction
Sentiment is shown to inuence both West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent futures
prices during the period 2002 - 2013. This is demonstrated while controlling for stock
indices, exchange rates, nancial costs, inventory and supply levels as well as OPEC
activity. Sentiment indices are developed for WTI and Brent crude oils using a suite of
nancial proxies similar to those used in equity research where the inuence of sentiment
has already been established. Given the novel nature of this study, a multiple hypothesis
testing technique is used to ensure that these conclusions are statistically robust.
This research is motivated by evidence that sentiment inuences the behaviour of the
stock markets. We show that sentiment inuences prices in the professionally-traded oil
markets by measuring sentiment using indices constructed from a suite of appropriate
nancial oil market proxies. These indices for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and
Brent crude oils signicantly improve a fundamental model of oil prices for each oil
during the period January 2002 - December 2013 using monthly data. We choose the
prompt month futures markets as these are much less subject to short term shocks which
are present in spot markets. Examples of such shocks are unexpected short periods of
cold weather and temporary shipping delays. Thus we are likely to avoid the immediate
eect of the cash market (Pindyck; 2001) and actually be more inuenced by the
storage market, since futures are eectively a nancial oil storage mechanism. This
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has the eect of smoothing out some of the volatility of the spot market and thus makes
the choice of futures more useful for the examination of sentiment. Financialization of
the commodity markets since 2005 has provided a mechanism by which sentiment can
have an increased inuence on commodity prices by introducing a large highly liquid
market in commodity derivatives which drives spot prices, see Silverio and Szklo (2012)
and Bhardwaj et al. (2015). There is a question as to whether nancialization has
caused spikes in commodity prices. There is support 1 for this hypothesis as well as,
possibly greater, evidence against 2 it. The futures markets are of interest not only to
traders wanting to purchase or sell oil, but to investors wishing to hedge oil risks and
to speculators. Wu and McCallum (2005), among others, agree that the futures prices
contain very useful information for the future spot market. For the purposes of this
investigation we focus on futures as they are highly liquid assets and since they look
forward, are more susceptible to sentiment and less susceptible to short term shocks.
Sentiment is not only a phenomenon observed by professional traders but sentiment
inuences professional traders. O'Connell and Teo (2009) demonstrate trader over-
condence; Coates and Herbert (2008) show a link between testosterone levels and
trading outcomes; Froot et al. (2011) show that current trading decisions are subject
to sensitivity to past portfolio losses, while a study by Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2011)
of 118 UK-based professional traders in equity, bond, and derivatives markets nds
that traders allow emotions to inuence their trading decision-making in a manner that
deviates from purely rational decision-making, see Dowling et al. (2016).
Sentiment is known to exist in the equity markets. The work of Baker and Wurgler
(2006) shows that sentiment is most inuential on rms which are dicult to value. This
conrms the work of Barberis et al. (1998) which shows that decisions made regarding
investment are at times biased and subject to systematic errors. Schmeling (2009)
reports that sentiment has a signicant inuence on stock market returns across many
industrialized countries and has a greater eect on countries which have less market
1Masters (2008), Masters (2009), Robles et al. (2009), de Schutter (2010), Herman et al. (2011) and, Cheng and
Xiong (2014) give support for the Master's Hypothesis that nancialization was responsible for commodity price spikes.
2Irwin et al. (2009), Pirrong (2010), Wright (2011) and Dwyer et al. (2012) do not nd evidence that nancialization
was responsible for commodity price spikes, in particular the following focus on the oil markets and fail to nd evidence
that nancialization drives prices Buyuksahin and Harris (2011), Irwin and Sanders (2012), Fattouh et al. (2013),
Aulerich et al. (2013) and, Brunetti et al. (2016)
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integrity and more herd-like behaviour from investors. These eects are not removed by
arbitrage due to the limits to arbitrage encountered in the equity markets as described
by Barberis and Thaler (2003).
Wang (2001) shows that sentiment is active in the agricultural commodity markets.
Borovkova (2011) demonstrates the inuence of sentiment in the oil markets by showing
that the shape of the forward curve is inuenced by very strong or very weak sentiment
as measured by the Thomson Reuters NewsScope product.3 Dowling et al. (2016) show
evidence for the existence of psychological price barriers in the crude oil markets, as
does Palao and Pardo (2012) in the EU emissions market. Both Borovkova (2011) and
Dowling et al. (2016) explain that sentiment is inuential in the oil markets, but these
papers do not consider the whole range of sentiment but look at very high or very
low periods of sentiment. We show that sentiment can be quantied as a continuous
variable and can be used to explain price movements. In this investigation we use
sentiment in oil price models for WTI and Brent and treat it as an additional variable
to the chosen fundamental variables. In doing so we add to the literature showing that
sentiment does not just have an inuence in extreme or in specic circumstances but
has a widespread measurable eect.
We propose that there is sentiment in the oil markets because of the need for spec-
ulation and because of information asymmetry between oil producers and the other
market participants. Hedging pressure theory proposes that long and short hedging
activity in the oil markets is not balanced and therefore there is a need for specula-
tors, see Hirshleifer (1990). This theoretical insight is supported by empirical evidence
from de Roon et al. (2000) who examined 20 futures markets and used data on traders'
positions to nd evidence to support hedging pressure theory. This analysis took ac-
count of market risk which, according to Cheng and Xiong (2014), would be expected
to inuence the behaviour of hedgers. Further support for hedging pressure is found in
the empirical work of Bessembinder (1992) who nds that the net holdings of hedgers
inuences the returns in foreign exchange and agricultural commodities. In general we
nd that oil producers are vulnerable to unexpected changes in the price of oil and need
3Thomson Reuters Newscope measures the sentiment of the text in news reports using a proprietary sentiment engine.
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short hedging positions. However, oil consumers are less vulnerable as they have many
other costs in addition to oil prices and so have less need for long hedging positions.
This is in keeping with hedging pressure theory from Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1975).
Thus we have a situation where speculators provide insurance to producers by taking
the excess long positions not taken by consumers, but only producers have access to all
the information regarding oil reserves and supply issues.
Kaufmann (2011), Coleman (2012), Fan and Xu (2011) and Cifarelli and Paladino
(2010) all show that speculation is an important driver of oil prices. In the equity
markets there are limits to arbitrage in particular there is often a lack of available
shares to take short positions. While this is not such an issue in the futures markets,
there are limits such as the size of the positions traders are permitted to take and the
size of the margin calls which traders will incur while they wait for their prots to
materialize. Acharya et al. (2013) make it clear that the limits imposed by margin
calls can make arbitrage partially ineective in the oil markets. Therefore arbitrage is
limited in its ability to remove the eect of sentiment.
Following the methods applied by Baker and Wurgler (2006), Lemmon and Portni-
aguina (2006) and Baker et al. (2012) in their analysis of the equity markets, we build a
similar oil sentiment index and compare the performance of a fundamental model before
and after this sentiment index has been included. Prompt month futures of WTI and
Brent crude oils are used from January 2002 to December 2013 at monthly frequency.
The expiry of these futures contracts is approximately two weeks after the dates used
in our data, thus any increased volatility due to the Samuelson hypothesis is avoided.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) used the following sentiment proxies in an equity context:
volume of trades, market volatility, closed end fund discount, IPO number and opening
returns, and the put-call ratio. None of these was, on their own, a simple measure of
sentiment; each had an idiosyncratic component but a principal component analysis
(PCA) was applied to extract the common signal. In this investigation we use: the
volume of the oil futures traded, the historic volatility of the oil price, the put-call ratio
of oil options, the ratio of speculative trades to oil demand and the implied volatility
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of a local stock market index, namely the S&P 500 for WTI and the Euro Stoxx 50
for Brent. None of these is a pure measure of sentiment but, we use a PCA process to
extract the common signal similar to Baker and Wurgler (2006).
The selected proxies for WTI or Brent crude oil are entered into a principal compo-
nent analysis, the rst principal component of which is dened as the sentiment index
for each oil. It is established that low correlations exist between changes in the senti-
ment indices and changes in a range of key fundamental economic variables, showing
that the eectiveness of these indices is not a consequence of fundamental information.
As these sentiment indices are extracted from proxies for sentiment, similar to proxies
used in equities research, it is reasonably argued that these indices are measuring oil
market sentiment.
To test the inuence of the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent crude oil, each
index is added to a benchmark oil price model consisting of non-sentiment variables.
The eect of sentiment on oil prices is then evaluated statistically while explicitly con-
trolling for key fundamental variables that are known to drive oil prices. Hamilton
(2009b) adds that there are many fundamental inuences and an increasing eect of a
scarcity premium, though his prediction in Hamilton (2014) was inaccurate it, states
that oil prices are driven by: the emerging economies; oil production and geopolitical
disturbances. These inuences are part of the complex pattern of oil price discovery,
we therefore choose the following key fundamental drivers:
1. broad economic performance as measured by stock index movements, we use the
S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50, Hang Seng and Nikkei which represent the US, the
Eurozone, China and Japan the world's four largest consumers of oil, following Li
and Lin (2011);
2. the US dollar exchange rates for the stock indices used previously in (1), namely the
Euro, Japanese Yen and Hong Kong dollar following Reboredo (2012), Beckmann
and Czudaj (2013) and Brahmasrene et al. (2014) who indicate a direct connection
between foreign exchange rates and oil prices;
3. the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), the cost of shipping dry goods by sea, following Kilian
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(2009) and Coleman (2012);
4. the cost of corporate debt, where we use Moody's Aaa as a benchmark corporate
bond rate, following Coleman (2012);
5. the US oil inventory and the World oil supply, and
6. OPEC's spare capacity and proportion of world production following Kaufmann
(2004), Hamilton (2009b), Lin and Tamvakis (2010) and Coleman (2012).
To informally measure the improvement to the fundamental model we calculate the
R2 and F-test results; the likelihood ratio test is used to formally test whether the
improvement to the models after the inclusion of the sentiment indices is signicant or
not. As we perform 120 simultaneous hypothesis tests, it is necessary to address the
multiple comparison problem. That is, when many hypothesis tests are being carried
out simultaneously there is a probability that some null hypotheses may be rejected
falsely. This is addressed with a generalized version of the multiple hypothesis testing
procedure of Holm (1979).
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 2.2 explains the selection
of the proxies and the method by which principal component analyses are used to form
the oil sentiment indices for WTI and Brent. Section 2.3 shows the methods used
for building the fuel price benchmark models against which the sentiment indices are
tested. Section 2.4 presents the empirical results for WTI and Brent crude oils and
demonstrates the robustness of our nding that sentiment inuences oil prices, while
using a multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) framework. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Creating an Oil Sentiment Index
In this section the method of constructing an oil sentiment index is described. The
construction involves combining proxies for sentiment using PCA, as used by Baker
and Stein (2004), Baker and Wurgler (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), and
Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) who examine sentiment in the equities markets.
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The proxies used for the oil markets are selected so as to be similar to those which have
been used building sentiment indices in equity research.
2.2.1 Selecting the Oil Sentiment Proxies
Equities research uses a wide variety of proxies for sentiment. None of these proxies are a
perfect measure of sentiment but they are combined using principal component analysis
(PCA) to produce useful sentiment indices. In the same way proxies for sentiment are
chosen from the oil market data and are combined using PCA to form two sentiment
indices, one for WTI crude oil and one for Brent crude oil.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) use the following proxies: NYSE turnover, closed end
fund discount, number and average rst day return of IPOs, share of equity issues in
total equity and debt issues, and dividend premium. These are combined in the PCA
process to produce a sentiment index. Baker and Wurgler (2006) explain that while each
proxy will contain an idiosyncratic as well as a sentiment component, the PCA isolates
the common sentiment component. We chose appropriate oil market proxies based on
sentiment research in equities which measure market activity, oil price volatility, market
fear, speculation and general stock market volatility. These choices are supported from
within the literature as set out below and in Table 2.1. The proxies selected to build
the oil sentiment indices are specic to each crude oil as follows:
1. the trading volume of the prompt-month futures contract;
2. the 30-day historical volatility of the prompt-month futures price;
3. the put-call ratio for options on oil futures;
4. an oil speculation indicator, namely the ratio of non-commercial futures and op-
tions positions to oil demand, and
5. a geographically appropriate implied volatility index (VIX for WTI and the volatil-
ity of the Euro Stoxx 50 for Brent).
Volume of trades are used as a proxy for investor sentiment by Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003), Baker and Stein (2004), Baker and Wurgler (2007) and Canba³ and
21
Measure Equity Proxy Oil Proxy Literature
Market
Activity
Volume of trades in
the stock market
Volume of trades of oil
futures
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003),
Baker and Stein (2004),
Baker and Wurgler (2006),
Canba³ and Kandr (2009)
Asset
Volatility
Volatility of historic
market return
Volatility of historic
futures returns
Whaley (2000)
Market Fear Put-call ratio for
equity options
Put-call ratio for oil
options
Bathia and Bredin (2013)
Speculation IPO volume and initial
returns
Ratio of non
commercial trading
volume to oil demand
Coleman (2012),
Bunn and Chen (2013),
Kolodziej and Kaufmann (2013)
Market
Volatility
An implied volatility
index
An implied volatility
index
Simon and Wiggins III (2001),
Whaley (2000, 2009)
Table 2.1: Comparison of Proxies for Sentiment in the Equity Markets and the Oil Markets
Kandr (2009). While it is clear that the volume of trades is a direct measure of market
activity, the literature shows that it is also an indicator of market sentiment.
Volatility is considered to be a measure of market fear by Whaley (2000), hence
the choice of a volatility measure as a sentiment proxy for each oil. The oil-based
implied volatility measure (OVX) was not available for the 12 years required. Hence
the 30-day historical volatility of the oil futures price is used. This is calculated as the
standard deviation of the log price returns for the previous 30 trading days for prompt
month futures contracts. Thirty-day volatility, which uses approximately the previous
month-and-a-half of price data, was chosen as it is a reasonable compromise between the
measurement of the volatility being accurate and being current. The volatility gures
are obtained from Bloomberg LP and are the second proxy.
The put-call ratio is used as a measure of market fear in equity research, for example
by Bathia and Bredin (2013). The put-call ratio for oil futures options is the third
proxy. The data used is the aggregated open interest futures from Bloomberg LP.
Speculation is measured by Coleman (2012) and Bunn and Chen (2013) using the
churn ratio, which was the ratio of the number of forwards or futures contracts to phys-
ical delivery, this indicated the level of speculation in the oil and electricity markets re-
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spectively. A more specic measure is also used, namely the number of non-commercial
futures positions from the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); this
measure is used by Kolodziej and Kaufmann (2013). The CFTC denes a commercial
position on a commodity as one held by someone who produces, processes or sells the
commodity, this includes using futures to hedge actual exposure to commodity prices.
In this investigation, we combine these two methods and use the ratio of non-commercial
WTI futures to world oil supply from the US Dept of Energy as a speculation indicator
for WTI. A similar indicator for Brent is constructed from the corresponding data from
the CFTC for Brent non-commercial futures positions where available, and is the fourth
proxy. A diculty with the data is that Brent non-commercial data is unavailable be-
fore April 2008; to overcome this the WTI data is used in its place from January 2002
to March 2008, this is a reasonable approximation as the price of Brent and WTI were
very closely aligned before 2011.
The VIX is used as a proxy of sentiment by Simon and Wiggins III (2001). Volatility
indices are considered to be measures of investor fear or anxiety, see Whaley (2000)
and Whaley (2009). The VIX is the weighted average of implied volatilities of rst and
second month options on the Chicago Board of Trade. We use this measure as a proxy
when analysing WTI. The volatility of the Euro Stoxx 50 index (V2X) is used for Brent.
The Euro Stoxx 50 index is comprised of 50 of the largest stocks in the Eurozone and
represents more than 50% of all the Eurozone equities by capitalization. Equity index
volatility is the fth and nal proxy and is chosen as a proxy for overall sentiment in
the economy.
2.2.2 Building a Sentiment Index by Principal Component Analysis
This investigation uses PCA to produce a linear combination of the proxies. The
rst principal component is the linear combination of the proxies which captures the
maximum variance compared with other linear combinations subject to normalization.
Baker and Wurgler (2007) oer two comments regarding the robustness of this method:
rst that it reduces reliance on individual proxies, even though measured individually
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some are very signicant; and second, that an index constructed from individual proxies
would behave almost identically to that formed by PCA.
A rst stage index is constructed following Baker and Wurgler (2006) to decide
whether to use each proxy's current value or its rst time-lagged value. This is to
take into consideration the possibility that some of the proxies may be stronger leading
indicators than others. The rst stage index is the rst principal component of all the
current and rst lags of the proxies. For each proxy the correlation of the current value
with the rst stage index and the correlation of the proxy's rst lag with the rst stage
index are calculated. The larger value decides whether the current or rst lag is chosen
to build the sentiment indices. The selected proxies are then used in a second PCA
stage, the rst principal component of which is dened to be the sentiment index for
the crude oil in question.
The results of the PCA based oil sentiment construction processes are summarized
in Table 2.2. Thus for WTI and Brent the sentiment indices are calculated as follows,
WTISentimentt = 0:36TradingV olumet 1 0:44WTIV olatilityt 0:53PutCallRatiot 1
+0:59Spec WTIt   0:22V IXt 1 (2.1)
BrentSentimentt = 0:19TradingV olumet 1 0:63BrentV olatilityt+0:06PutCallRatiot 1
+0:46Spec Brentt   0:60V olatility of Stoxxt 1 (2.2)
where WTI V olatilityt or Brent V olatilityt is the 30-day historical volatility of WTI
or Brent and Spec WTIt or Spec Brentt is the speculation indicator for each oil. The
PCA process calculates the ratio of the components which maximizes variance subject
to the sum of the squared loadings being one.
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Wang (2001) showed that sentiment from speculators and hedgers did contain useful
information regarding the movements of agricultural commodity prices but that senti-
ment from small traders was not useful, this is similar to the nding in Chapter 4 of
a dierence between climate change sentiment and emissions market sentiment. It is
conjectured here that sentiment in the professionally-traded oil markets is useful in ex-
plaining oil prices. When Baker and Wurgler (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)
and Chung et al. (2012) examine the stock markets they use an orthogonalization pro-
cedure to remove from the equity sentiment proxies anything which could be attributed
to the economic cycle. This procedure eectively produces an index which depends
heavily on the choice of economic cycle variables. In order to capture the sentiment in
the oil markets, this orthogonalization step is not carried out. This choice keeps the
sentiment indices and the choice of fundamental variables independent of each other.
This approach is argued to be reasonable due to there being insignicant or low cor-
relation between the oil sentiment indices and the fundamental variables (Table 2.3).
This nding also refutes a criticism that the sentiment indices are eective because they
capture fundamental information.
2.2.3 The Sentiment Indices for WTI and Brent
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the WTI and Brent sentiment indices as well as the log of the
WTI and Brent price series. It is seen that the Brent sentiment index is quite similar
to that of WTI with both showing a general upward trend over the period. In addition
both have a severe dip during the period of rapid oil price change in 2008.
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The gure shows the natural log of the price of Brent (dashed line) in US$ at the top of the plot. On
the same numerical scale we have the oil sentiment indices for Brent (dot line) lower on the same plot.
The sentiment scale is described in section 2.2.3.
Figure 2.1: Log of Brent price and its Sentiment Index
The gure shows the natural log of the price of WTI (solid line) in US$ at the top of the plot. On the
same numerical scale we have the oil sentiment index for WTI (dash and dot line) lower on the same
plot. The sentiment scale is described in section 2.2.3.
Figure 2.2: Log of WTI price and its Sentiment Index
Table 2.3 shows that there is low or insignicant correlation between the rst dif-
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WTI Brent
Proxy
Current
or First Lag
Loading
Current (t)
or Lag (t-1)
Loading
Trading Volume First Lag 0.36 First Lag 0.19
30-Day Volatility Current -0.44 Current -0.63
Put Call Ratio First Lag -0.53 First Lag 0.06
Speculation
Indicator
Current 0.59 Current 0.46
VIX , V2X First Lag -0.22 First Lag -0.60
Variance Explained 33% 27%
The table shows the loadings from the principal component analysis of the WTI and Brent sentiment proxies. The
choice of current (t) or rst lag (t-1) is made using the method of Baker and Wurgler (2006). The linear combination of
these proxies with their loadings is the rst principal component for each set of sentiment proxies. This rst principal
component is the sentiment index for each crude oil. The percentage of variance explained by this rst component is
listed. V2X is the volatility index based on the Euro Stoxx 50.
Table 2.2: PCA loadings for WTI and Brent Oil Sentiment indices.
ferences of the two sentiment indices and the rst dierences of the key fundamental
variables that we will consider in the fundamental oil price models, which will be dened
later in Eqn.2.3 and Eqn.2.4 in Section 2.3. This demonstrates that the indices are not
simply capturing information from these fundamental variables but are bringing new
information to the model. As this information is extracted from proxies modelled on
channels of sentiment in equity markets, it is reasonably argued that the oil sentiment
indices are measuring oil market sentiment.
2.3 Testing Framework
To test whether changes in the oil sentiment indices explain price movements in prompt-
month futures contracts for WTI and Brent, a benchmark model for these crude oils is
proposed and tested using a multivariate regression. The benchmark model is specif-
ically chosen to capture fundamental rather than sentiment inuences on oil prices.
The oil sentiment indices are added to the benchmark model for each crude oil and the
extended models are tested again. Changes in model performance are measured using
the informal R2 measure and variance ratio tests, along with formal likelihood ratio
tests. A common model for both oils is used so that a fair comparison may be made of
the eect of the sentiment index on WTI and Brent crude oils.
The standard tests for stationarity (Augmented Dickey Fuller and Kwiatkowski
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Proxy WTI Sentiment Index Brent Sentiment Index
4SP500 0.37 0.10
Euro Stoxx 0.36 -0.05
Nikkei 0.31 0.10
Hang Seng 0.27 0.21
USDEUR -0.20 -0.24
USDJPY 0.14 0.01
USDHKD -0.05 0.03
BDI -0.01 0.14
Moody -0.10 -0.03
US Oil Inventory 0.05 0.00
World Oil Supply -0.06 -0.09
OPEC Surplus 0.14 0.13
OPEC Proportion -0.18 0.09
The table shows the correlations between the rst dierences of the fundamental variables, and the rst dierences of
the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent crude oils. These fundamental variables are used in the benchmark models of
oil price. The results are generally very low correlation with 18 of the 26 correlations below the 5% signicance level of
0.1642. The sentiment index for WTI is weakly correlated with the stock indices which is expected as the US is a larger
oil producer than Europe.
Table 2.3: Correlation Table: Sentiment Indices and Fundamental Benchmark Variables
Phillips Schmidt Shin) were carried out. There was strong evidence against the ADF
null of non-stationarity and no evidence against the KPSS null of stationarity, see Table
2.4.
2.3.1 Benchmark Model Specication
Benchmark models for WTI and Brent are proposed at monthly frequency using the
following fundamental variables:
1. Equity indices: S&P 500, Euro Stoxx, Nikkei and Hang Seng
2. The US$ exchange rate for the Euro, the Japanese Yen and the Hong Kong dollar
3. Baltic Dry Index
4. Corporate bond rates, where we specically consider Moody's Aaa corporate bond
rate
5. US oil inventory and World oil supply
6. OPEC's proportion of world production and OPEC's spare capacity.
We choose a selection of equity indices, from the USA (world's largest oil consumer),
the Eurozone (2nd), China (3rd) and Japan (4th) which together accounted for 50%
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Variable ADF ADF + Trend KPSS KPSS + Trend
4WTI 2.7 x 10 12 3.7 x 10 11 > 0.1 > 0.1
4Brent 4.6 x 10 11 6.4 x 10 10 > 0.1 > 0.1
4SP500 4.9 x 10 12 7.0 x 10 11 > 0.1 > 0.1
Euro Stoxx 7.7 x 10 4 5.7 x 10 3 > 0.1 > 0.1
Nikkei 1.6 x 10 12 1.9 x 10 11 > 0.1 > 0.1
Hang Seng 2.6 x 10 14 3.6 x 10 13 > 0.1 > 0.1
USDEUR 1.8 x 10 16 2.0 x 10 15 > 0.1 > 0.1
USDJPY 1.3 x 10 14 1.7 x 10 13 > 0.1 > 0.1
USDHKD 9.9 x 10 12 2.1 x 10 11 > 0.1 > 0.1
BDI 1.0 x 10 8 8.1 x 10 8 > 0.1 > 0.1
Moody 2.4 x 10 16 2.9 x 10 16 > 0.1 > 0.1
US Oil Inventory 3.4 x 10 21 1.5 x 10 23 > 0.1 > 0.1
World Oil Supply 2.1 x 10 2 1.0 x 10 1 > 0.1 > 0.1
OPEC Surplus 4.0 x 10 9 4.1 x 10 8 > 0.1 > 0.1
OPEC Proportion 2.8 x 10 19 2.7 x 10 20 > 0.1 > 0.1
The table presents the p-values of the stationarity tests for the variables. The Augmented Dickey Fuller
(ADF) test has a null of non-stationarity. The Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test has a null of
stationarity. The results show strong evidence to accept that the variables are stationary. Models with the
addition of a constant, and with the addition of a constant and a trend are used for robustness.
Table 2.4: Stationarity Test Results
of world oil consumption in 2012 4. These regions are represented in our testing by
S&P 500, EuroStoxx 50, Hang Seng and the Nikkei stock indices. There is abundant
literature addressing the interactions of oil prices and stock prices. Jones and Kaul
(1996) have reported negative co-movements of stock prices in response to oil price
shocks between 1947 and 1991, although Fan and Xu (2011) nd that from 2004 to
2009 the S&P 500 did not provide a signicant explanation of oil prices. Zhang and Li
(2016) looked at oil prices from 1990 to 2012 and have found close correlations between
oil prices and equity indices particularly after 2008, with the signs of the correlation
always positive, which is also the case here. There has been some debate concerning
the inuence of Asian demand on oil prices, see Li and Lin 2011, Beirne et al. 2013
and Alquist and Gervais 2013 which supports the inclusion of Hong Kong and Japanese
stock indices. It is clear that there is a complex relationship between oil price and
equity prices and hence stock markets must be part of the fundamental model. The
variables S&P 500t; Stoxx 50t; NKYt; Hang Sengt are the S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50,
Nikkei and Hang Seng stock indices.
4US Energy Information Administration, the situation has changed by 2015 when the
top consumers in sequence were USA, China, Eurozone, India and Japan.
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Beckmann and Czudaj (2013) have found that nominal dollar depreciation causes
nominal oil price increase. Brahmasrene et al. (2014) nd that US exchange rates
Granger cause oil prices in the short run, although Reboredo (2012) nds that oil price
and exchange rate interaction is weak. These ndings and the selection of stock indices
lead to the choice of the US Dollar against the Euro, Yen and Hong Kong dollar as the
exchange rates for the benchmark model. The variables USDEURt; USDJPYt and
USDHKDt are the values of $1US expressed in Euro, Yen or Hong Kong dollars.
The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) which tracks the cost of shipping goods across the
oceans is used as an indicator of global industrial production following Mitchell et al.
(2005), Frale et al. (2008), Kilian (2009), Fan and Xu (2011) and Coleman (2012). This
literature shows that the BDI is a useful indicator for income and economic growth as
it immediately records the demand for the transport of nished goods. A criticism of
using the BDI is that it is inuenced by fuel costs, and so is an endogenous variable.
This problem is addressed by Kilian (2009) who states that the variation in BDI rates
is much larger than the variation in bunker fuel costs, and so the inuence of the
endogeneity is not important, that is, the BDI rates are primarily set by economic
activity, rather than the price of bunker fuel. BDIt is the Baltic Dry index of shipping
costs.
Moody's Aaa corporate bond rate is used because Coleman (2012) suggests that since
extraction of oil is a capital-intensive business, the cost of capital should be reected
in the price of oil, and that since oil companies are highly rated Coleman (2012) uses
the Aaa rate. Corp Bondt is Moody's Aaa corporate bond rate.
Following the basic law of supply and demand, the US oil inventory at Cush-
ing, Oklahoma and world oil supply from the US Dept of Energy are also included.
US Oil Inventoryt is the US oil inventory, World Oil Supplyt is the world oil supply.
The proportion of world oil that is produced by OPEC has been found to inuence oil
prices by Kaufmann (2004), Hamilton (2009b), Lin and Tamvakis (2010) and Coleman
(2012). This would occur due to market power. Also included is the dierence between
OPEC's estimated capacity and production as this represents the decision of OPEC
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Variable Mean Std Dev Skew Ex Kurt
 WTI 0.011 0.091 -0.797 2.030
 Brent 0.012 0.086 -0.939 3.148
 S&P 500 0.003 0.045 -0.941 1.947
 Stoxx 50 -0.001 0.057 -0.764 1.301
 Nikkei 0.003 0.058 -0.910 2.514
 Hang Seng 0.005 0.062 -0.781 2.066
 USD Euro -0.003 0.031 0.437 1.308
 USD Yen -0.002 0.027 0.338 0.369
 USD Hong Kong dollar 0.000 0.001 -0.904 5.614
 BDI 0.006 0.249 -1.453 6.624
 Bond Rate -0.002 0.037 -0.726 4.909
 US Oil Inventory 0.001 0.030 -0.220 -0.122
 World Oil Supply 0.001 0.007 -0.084 1.258
 OPEC Spare Capacity -0.008 0.170 -1.668 12.383
 OPEC Proportion 0.000 0.013 -0.337 2.640
The table shows descriptive statistics for log returns data used in the benchmark models. The data is from January
2002 to December 2013 (N = 144 months). The price of the prompt month WTI and Brent crude oil futures contracts
are in US$ per barrel. Corporate Bond rate is Moody's Aaa rate. Std Dev, is standard deviation, Skew, is skewness and
Ex Kurt, is excess kurtosis.
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics
producers to restrict supply. OPEC SpareCapacityt and OPEC Propt are the OPEC
spare capacity and OPEC proportion of world production.
Based on the above arguments, the benchmark model for WTI and Brent crude oil
is set out in Eqn. 2.3. Before running the regressions, all the data are log transformed,
rst-dierenced, standardized and checked for stationarity using Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) tests which show the log
returns of the fundamental variables and sentiment indices to be stationary, see Table
2.4. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 2.5. The benchmark model is given in
Eqn. 2.3:
Oilt =  + 1S&P 500t + 2Stoxx 50t + 3NKYt + 4Hang Sengt;
+5USDEURt + 6USDJPYt + 7USDHKDt ++8BDIt
+9Corp Bondt + 10US Oil Inventoryt + 11World Oil Supplyt
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+12OPEC Spare Capacityt + 13OPEC Propt + "t (2.3)
where all variables are expressed in log returns, so for example Oilt is the log
returns of the WTI or Brent prompt month crude oil price.
With the addition of the sentiment index this model becomes:
Oilt =  + 1S&P 500t + 2Stoxx 50t + 3NKYt + 4Hang Sengt;
+5USDEURt + 6USDJPYt + 7USDHKDt ++8BDIt
+9Corp Bondt + 10US Oil Inventoryt + 11World Oil Supplyt
+12OPEC SpareCapacityt + 13OPEC Propt + 14Oil Sentimentt + "t (2.4)
where OilSentimentt is rst dierence of the oil sentiment index for WTI or Brent
at time t measured in months. As is usual practice, standardized variables are used so
that comparisons between the variables may be made and so that calculations may not
be liable to oating point errors, see Aboura and Chevallier (2013), thus the  terms
are zero.
2.4 Results
There is a clear improvement to the benchmark models for WTI and Brent on the
inclusion of the oil sentiment indices as is seen in Table 2.6. This indicates that these
indices, and hence oil market sentiment, has a signicant inuence on WTI and Brent
oil prices.
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2.4.1 Performance of the Oil Sentiment Indices
The sentiment indices for WTI and Brent make a statistically signicant and econom-
ically important improvement to the fundamental models for oil price changes during
the 12 years from January 2002 to December 2013. The results are presented in Table
2.6 and show that the R2 statistic increases in the WTI and Brent benchmark models
from 41.2% and 36.1% to 56.6% and 53.9% respectively; in addition the variance ra-
tio test is much more signicant. More formally, there is a strongly signicant result
from the likelihood ratio test of the improvement to the fundamental model, after the
inclusion of the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent.
Looking at the results in Table 2.6 it is notable that the coecients of the S&P 500,
Euro Stoxx 50 and the Nikkei are all insignicant at MHT levels, except for Stoxx for
WTI when sentiment is included. There is a range of ndings in the literature. Our
result is in contrast with with Jones and Kaul (1996) who nd a negative reaction from
stock markets to oil prices. Sukcharoen et al. (2014) nd that the connection between
oil markets and equity markets in countries which trade oil heavily (USA and Canada)
to be weak but non-existent for other countries. The result we nd here is in line with
the that of Fan and Xu (2011) that the S&P500 was not signicantly connected with oil
prices for roughly the same period of time. Following the results of Alquist and Gervais
(2013) and Beirne et al. (2013), we nd that there is evidence at conventional levels
that the Hang Seng signicantly explains WTI and Brent prices; this will be revisited
in Section 2.4.2.
The exchange rates used are expressed as the price of US$1 in various local currencies,
namely the Euro, Yen and Hong Kong dollar. Only the Euro and the Japanese Yen
are found to be signicant, though the Yen is much less signicant than the Euro.
The cost of one US dollar in Japanese Yen has a positive coecient meaning that a
weakening Yen is on average accompanied by higher oil prices measured in US dollars.
The links between exchange rates and oil prices are not entirely straightforward, see
Beckmann and Czudaj 2013, and Reboredo 2012, but it is clear that an appreciation
in oil price is accompanied by appreciation of the currency of the exporter, and since
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Japan produces a much smaller amount of oil than the US, 140,000 barrels per day
from Japan in contrast to 11,110,000 from the US5, the positive coecient is in line
with expectations. The coecient of the cost of US$1 in Euro is negative, indicating
that a weakening Euro against the US dollar is, on average, accompanied by negative
oil price returns and so a fall in the price of oil measured in US dollars, this is in line
with Chen and Chen (2007), Akram (2009) and Aloui et al. (2013). This indicates that
as the Euro weakens Europeans will actually have to buy fewer of the more expensive
dollars to pay for oil. This may be because a depreciation of the local currency causes
lower demand for oil, as explained by the term denomination channel, see Beckmann
and Czudaj (2013). The greater size of Eurozone relative to Japan and the fact that
the Eurozone (which does not include UK or Norway) produces 500,000 barrels of oil
per day, may explain why the Euro exchange rate coecient is negative while the Yen's
coecient is positive.
It is interesting that there is very weak evidence that the Baltic Dry Index (BDI)
is associated with oil price changes; it is only just signicant at the 10% level. This
is unexpected as the BDI has been used as a proxy for worldwide industrial activity
by Mitchell et al. (2005), Frale et al. (2008), Kilian (2009), Fan and Xu (2011), and
Coleman (2012). The cost of borrowing as measured by Moody's Aaa corporate bond
rate has the expected positive coecient as found by Coleman (2012) indicating that
as borrowing becomes more expensive so does oil. As would be expected by the law of
supply and demand, the US oil inventory has a highly signicant negative coecient
for WTI prices and a less signicant negative coecient for Brent prices see Hamilton
(2009b,a, 2014). There is no evidence that world oil supply is signicant; which is unex-
pected. OPEC spare capacity is a measure of the dierence between OPEC capacity to
deliver oil and the actual quantity delivered, it is thus a measure of how much oil OPEC
is holding back from the market. This variable has a positive coecient as expected.
Finally the proportion of world oil production which is from OPEC has a signicant
positive coecient indicating that OPEC has considerable market power as is expected
5The 2012 data is from the US Energy Information Administration and was accessed on 29th October 2014 from
http://www.eia.gov/countries/
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from the work of Kaufmann (2004) and, Lin and Tamvakis (2010).
Jan 2002 - Dec 2013 WTI Brent
N = 143 Months Bench Bench + Sentiment Bench Bench + Sentiment
S&P500 0.110 0.215 0.086 0.098
(0.51) (0.14) (0.62) (0.52)
Stoxx 50 -0.249 -0.340** -0.215 -0.186
(0.11) (0.012) (0.18) (0.18)
NKY 0.049 -0.076 0.060 -0.041
(0.65) (0.41) (0.59) (0.67)
Hang Seng 0.247** 0.232** 0.247** 0.225**
(0.030) (0.018) (0.037) (0.028)
USDEUR -0.353*** -0.309*** -0.339*** -0.275***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0009)
USDJPY 0.197** 0.213*** 0.152* 0.112
(0.023) (0.004) (0.090) (0.15)
USDHKD 0.074 0.010 0.118 0.042
(0.32) (0.88) (0.13) (0.53)
BDI 0.107 0.078 0.110 0.113*
(0.16) (0.23) (0.16) (0.097)
MoodyCAAA 0.213*** 0.125** 0.173** 0.154**
(0.0034) (0.049) (0.022) (0.018)
US Oil Inventory -0.186** -0.164*** -0.137* -0.084**
(0.011) (0.0096) (0.073) (0.020)
World Oil Supply 0.085 0.066 0.046 -0.014
(0.27) (0.32) (0.57) (0.84)
OPEC Spare Capacity 0.219*** 0.118* 0.203** 0.069
(0.0076) (0.10) (0.017) (0.36)
OPEC Proportion 0.167** 0.143** 0.165** 0.175**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.011)
Oil Sentiment 0.443*** 0.459***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Log Likelihood 164.43 142.64 170.36 148.50
p-value of the Likelihood
Ratio Test
4.1 x 10 11 3.8 x 10 11
Variance Ratio (F) Test 4.6 x 10 10 2.7 x 10 17 4.9 x 10 8 3.5 x 10 15
R2 41.2% 56.6% 36.1% 52.9%
The table shows OLS regression results for the WTI and Brent benchmark models before and after the inclusion of the
sentiment index described by Eqns. (2.3) and (2.4). The data has been rst dierenced and standardized. The likelihood
ratio test formally compares model performance of the sentiment model (Bench + Sentiment) relative to the benchmark
(Bench) model. *, ** and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels; p-values appear in brackets below
each coecient. Bold print indicates coecients which were signicant under the Generalised Holm Multiple Hypothesis
Testing framework see Section 2.4.2.
Table 2.6: OLS Regression Results for WTI and Brent 2002 - 2013
2.4.2 Review of Results and Discussion
Recognizing the novel nature of our research into oil market sentiment, we deliberately
take a prudent approach. There is a multiple comparisons problem that exists in this
testing framework; it is a source of bias that we explicitly address by applying recently
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developed generalized multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) techniques. The multiple
comparisons problem occurs when a large number of hypothesis tests are performed
simultaneously, leading to a non-negligible likelihood that some statistically signicant
results may be identied by pure random chance alone, rather than as a result of any
underlying statistical relationships. In our testing framework, the model specications
set out a total of 120 individual hypothesis tests comprising of individual coecient
tests, F tests, the ADF and KPSS tests and likelihood ratio tests. Hence, the multiple
comparisons problem is an important issue to consider and address in order to build
robust conclusions. For a more technical treatment of MHT issues, see Holm (1979),
Romano et al. (2010), Cummins (2013a), Cummins (2013b) and Appendix A.
To give the greatest power to identify true discoveries, we set a probability of  = 0:1
as the upper bound probability that there are k = 6 or more false rejections of null
hypotheses amongst the 120 tests; we choose 6 as this is approximately 5% of the total
number of hypotheses tested. Using these criteria we can be much more assured that the
conclusions we draw are statistically reliable and robust. In this particular study, the
generalized Holm procedure in Romano et al. (2010) leads us to reject 48 null hypotheses
while at the conventional signicance of 5%, 63 hypotheses would have been rejected.
This MHT framework is more conservative than conventional signicance levels, where
in the latter case one ignores the multiple comparisons problem. In so doing wrong
economic conclusions could be drawn from the extra 15 rejected null hypotheses. With
this motivation in place, we revisit the results set out in the previous section (2.4.1) and
seek to address the multiple comparisons problem that was not explicitly considered.
This is an important statistical correction missing from prior sentiment investigations.
In Table 2.6 results which are considered signicant under the MHT process are in-
dicated in bold. Most notably, there is no change to the conclusion that the sentiment
indices for WTI and Brent oil signicantly account for oil prices. This is an important
nding and allows us to argue with statistical condence that sentiment aects pro-
fessionally traded oil markets. (Mizrach and Otsubo (2014) and Grin et al. (2015)
state that energy markets are professionally traded.) It is also found that the US$ Euro
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exchange rate signicantly explains the movement of oil prices. At the more demand-
ing levels of signicance required by the MHT procedure, the anomalous result found
previously that changes in the Stoxx 50 explained WTI price movements is not found
to be signicant. Furthermore the Hang Seng and the BDI are not found to be signif-
icant. The US Euro, US$ Yen exchange rate, the Moody corporate bond rate, the US
oil inventory, OPEC spare capacity and OPEC proportion are found to be signicant.
Due to the MHT approach we may be very condent of these ndings.
There are of course other inuences on oil prices apart from our benchmark model
and sentiment. Cheng and Xiong (2014) nd that risk sharing and information discovery
has had an eect on oil prices. Specically, Cheng and Xiong (2014) nd that the
increase in liquidity brings not only improved price discovery but opens the commodity
markets to shocks from other markets. This was found also by Bhardwaj et al. (2016)
where the interaction between commodities and equities is seen to be temporarily higher
at the time of the nancial crisis in 2007. This nding is in line with Silverio and Szklo
(2012) who nd the eect of the nancial crisis on the linkage between futures and spot
prices of oil lasted only a short while. Part of the reason for this change in correlation is
that the higher price for oil during the start of the crisis was mistakenly interpreted by
markets as an increase in economic activity (Cheng and Xiong; 2014). The consequence
for this investigation, is that we need to be careful interpreting our results, but this has
been done through the use of the MHT techniques where much more reliable inferences
are drawn then by using conventional techniques.
2.5 Conclusion
We nd that sentiment is an important consideration when explaining WTI and Brent
prices using monthly data from Jan 2002 to Dec 2013. This was done following the
methods of Baker and Wurgler (2006) by building sentiment indices for both WTI
and Brent using similar proxies to those used in equities research. The two indices
were constructed using principal component analysis of the following sentiment proxies:
volume of futures contracts, the volatility of the oil price, oil speculation indicators, the
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put-call ratio for options on oil futures and stock index volatility. The inclusion of these
sentiment indices signicantly improved the performance of fundamental models for oil
prices as measured by the likelihood ratio test and also brought about a large increase in
the R2 statistic. The ndings are supported by a multiple hypothesis testing framework
which gives a very high degree of condence that we are not merely observing a chance
result due to the multiple comparison problem.
Sentiment has already been seen to aect equity markets, our ndings expand the
discovery of sentiment eects in the oil markets. This not only leaves open the possibility
that sentiment indices can be constructed for energy markets other than oil, gas and
coal being the obvious next steps, but also acts as a call for further research on the
mechanism by which sentiment inuences oil pricing. We take immediate advantage of
this success in applying it to another professionally traded energy commodity market,
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) the largest emissions market in the world.
.
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Chapter 3
Inuences from the European
Parliament on EU Emissions Prices
3.1 Introduction
The decisions of the European Parliament (EP) are shown to inuence both EU emission
allowance (EUA) prices and volatility. This is not a universal inuence though, only the
decisions which are either (i) parliament-led, as opposed to topical decisions originating
from the political groups, (ii) made during times of low market sentiment or (iii) made
during times of low market awareness, reduce the price and increase the volatility of
EUA futures. Daily EUA prompt December futures prices from 2007 to 2014 are used
in the study, with decisions analysed using an event study approach for price impact,
and a GARCH specication for volatility impact. Our ndings suggest the need for
policymakers to improve communication of long-term strategies for the EUA market in
order to reduce the evident ongoing uncertainty experienced by traders around decisions
made by the EP. The sentiment ndings indicate a need to consider market dynamics
in terms of decision timing so that market turbulence is not an unintended by-product
of an EP decision.
In April 2013 the European Parliament was expected to pass a European Commission
legislative proposal to x the recognized oversupply issue in the EU Emissions Trading
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Scheme (EU ETS), see Koch et al. (2014). The Commission's proposal 1 involved
postponing until 2019-2020 the release of 900 million EU emissions allowances (EUAs)
- each allowance granting permission to a regulated installation to emit one tonne of CO2
equivalent - that were originally due to be released into the market in 2013-15. The hope
of the Commission was that this would support the declining price of allowances already
trading in the emissions market and thus act as an incentive towards the reduction of
emissions across the EU. On 16th April 2013, (known here as the backloading day), the
European Parliament narrowly voted against the proposal. There was an immediate
impact on EUA prices, which dropped by over a third. The futures price of an EUA
permitting the emission of one tonne of CO2, which had cost ¿4.76 at close of business
on 15th April, fell to ¿3.09 at the close of business on 16th April. This was by far the
largest daily change in EUA futures prices during the period under investigation.
This is one example where legislation passed by the European Parliament (EP),
which holds legislative authority over the EU ETS, impacted on EUA prices. Prior re-
search supports a wider argument that EUA prices are inuenced by regulatory actions
see Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) and Koch et al. (2014). There has been work done
by Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009), Conrad et al. (2012), Hitzemann et al. (2015)
and Chen et al. (2017) to show that announcements concerning National Allocation
Plans (NAPs)and veried emissions and economic data announcements have an eect
on EUA returns. We add to this literature by showing that decisions of the European
Parliament (EP), which do not follow the same regular announcement pattern as the
NAPs, similarly aect EUA returns. We use a GARCH analysis to examine EUA re-
turns volatility before and after the times of European Parliament decisions. European
Parliament decision dates are known in advance but are not regularly spaced. The
approach taken and the results show a similarity with Chen et al. (2017) who examined
the behaviour of EUA prices before and after regularly scheduled events. Missing from
prior studies though is a systematic investigation of the overall impact of emissions
market specic, and related legislation and resolutions passed by the EP, thus leav-
1European Commission Press Release accessed on 9th June 2015 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-343_en.htm
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ing a number of open questions. Do the legislative eorts of the EP move the EUA
market? Are particular types of legislation and resolutions more inuential? Are there
conditional eects under which legislation and resolutions have a greater market im-
pact? These are important questions. It is clear from Blyth et al. (2007), Fuss et al.
(2008) and Yang et al. (2008) that there is considerable regulatory risk in the EU ETS.
The resulting uncertainty in the price of carbon, has major implications for investment
decisions in the power sector. Indeed the uncertainty regarding the implementation of
measures to combat climate change makes possible the contradictory opinions regarding
the existence of a carbon bubble (Grin et al.; 2015) and a projected higher demand
for fossil fuels2.
Our study addresses these issues by tracking 29 relevant decisions made by the EP
from 2nd October 2007 to 5th February 2014, and examining how the origin of each
decision, the level of market sentiment and the level of market attention, all have an
inuence on the price behaviour of Phase II and Phase III EUA futures. There is
some evidence to show that the decisions made by the EP act, on average, to reduce
emission allowance prices and very strong evidence that EP decisions are associated
with increases in volatility. This is quite striking given that the success of the trad-
ing scheme requires prices of emission allowances to be at a suciently high level so
as to act as a disincentive to traditional high emission energy production and energy-
intensive business practices. We contrast party-political decisions brought to the EP
by the seven political groups of MEPs3, with non-party-political decisions brought
from other sources. The other sources are the committees of the European Parliament,
the European Commission and the European Council; these are ocial bureaucratic
organizations rather the seven political groups of MEPs that respond to voters' con-
cerns. The classication of the source of each decision is recorded by the EP itself.
2The Telegraph, The Guardian and Carbon Tracker accessed on 6th June 2015 display diering perspectives on
the prospect of a carbon bubble. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/nance/newsbysector/energy/oilandGas/11615079/Shell-
CEO-carbon-bubble-campaigners-ignores-reality.html
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/apr/19/carbon-bubble-nancial-crash-crisis
http://www.carbontracker.org/resources/
3The groups of MEPs for the present 8th European Parliament are, the European People's Party (EPP), the Pro-
gressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) containing the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the European Conservatives and Reformists, the European United Left 
Nordic Green Left, the Greens / European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) or the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy.
Accessed on 6th June 2015 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00010/Organisation
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An example of a non-party-political decision would be that brought forward by the
EP Committee on Transport and Tourism on 11thMarch 2008 concerning the inclu-
sion of airlines in the EU ETS. An example of a party-political decision would be that
brought before the parliament by ve of the political groups4 on 5th June 2008 concern-
ing US emissions and climate change policy. When we analyse resolutions categorized
as non-party-political and those termed party-political, we nd that it is the non-
party-political initiatives which are the particular drivers of these negative returns. We
also nd there is heightened volatility around key legislative decision dates when we
incorporate this information in an appropriately designed GARCH volatility model,
indicating that market uncertainty is a feature of prices around these dates. It may be
the case that some form of forward guidance such as is used by central banks, would
be benecial in communicating, in advance, the nature of complex legislative decisions
to the market. This action might reduce volatility in the market, as has been found
to be the case by Campbell et al. (2012) and, Kool and Thornton (2012) who analyse
the macroeconomic eects of Federal Reserve forward guidance. The main challenge
though with this policy solution is that the EP is subject to many competing inuences,
and does not have the independence and targeted focus of a central bank.
A possible explanation for the strong eect of EP decisions on EUA prices during
times of low media exposure can be found in the Investor Attention Hypothesis from
Barber and Odean (2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2009), Da et al. (2011) and Vozlyublennaia
(2014). In an equity context this proposes that since attention is a limited resource,
investors will make decisions about rms to which their attention has rst been drawn,
and that until their attention is drawn to a stock, its price will only slowly reect new
information due to lack of trading interest. We draw on this line of argument and
adopt the theory for emissions markets. The amount of attention given to emissions
trading is normally small, as it is only a very small part of the energy market. To
illustrate this point, from 2010 to 2014 the value of the trades of the most liquid EUA
futures contracts (prompt December) was 0.88% of the value of trades of the most
4The groups were EPP, PES, ALDE, Greens-EFA and the UEN.The Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) was an
active political group in the European Parliament from 1999 to 2009.
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liquid futures contracts of Brent oil (prompt month); in 2012 the value of the trades in
EUAs was $73 billion while the total value of the world's oil production that year was
$3.27 trillion5. When attention is focused on emissions by the media or by the actions
of MEPs, the market in turn pays attention and anticipates the decisions made by
the European Parliament. When the European Parliament makes decisions about the
emissions market when there is low media coverage or when the decision arises from non-
party-political sources within the EU namely, the European Parliament committees, the
European Commission or the European Council, then market inattention will lead to a
lagged corrective price adjustment and an increase in volatility.
We also test for dierences in behaviour when sentiment is relatively high compared
with times when it is low. This is in line with the negativity eect mentioned by Soroka
(2006), Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), Akhtar et al. (2013) and Sprenger, Sandner,
Tumasjan andWelpe (2014) who point out that markets generally react more strongly to
negative news than to positive news. We nd that EP decisions made when sentiment is
low, have a negative impact on returns and are associated with an increase in volatility.
The impact on returns is determined by an event study which shows that on days
on which the EP makes a decision there are, on average, signicant negative returns,
and these negative returns become cumulatively greater in the following week. An
explanation for the cumulative reduction in prices is that this may be similar to the
post earnings announcement drift of Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Hirshleifer et al.
(2009). After an earnings announcement it is common to nd that the price of the stock
continues moving in the same direction due to a lack of investor attention. This eect
is more pronounced when news aecting the price of the stock is dicult to interpret,
see Song and Schwarz (2010). We nd that there is a similar continued movement of
EUA prices after the announcement of an EP regulatory decision. We posit that this
is due to similar investor inattention in the emissions markets. The implications of
many of these decisions are more dicult to interpret than straightforward messages
like earnings announcements and so the eect is extended. This oers an explanation
5Data from Bloomberg, EU ETS Factsheet at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_en.pdf,
and the Energy Information Administration EIA at http://www.eia.gov/ all accessed on 9th June 2015
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for the continued slow movement of prices after an EP announcement.
This study is similar in intent to a recent investigation by Lin and Tamvakis (2010)
which examined the impact of OPEC output decisions on crude oil prices. Based on
an argument, in part, that OPEC had the ability to adjust the volume of oil produced,
and was thus a major actor in the market, a systematic investigation was carried out
of each OPEC meeting where a quota decision was made. In the case of the EUA
market the major player, the EP, has even greater power as it can alter the structure
of the market's operation, aect supply through adjusting allowances available in the
market, and even boost demand through an ability to determine which installations and
industries must partake in the scheme. This suggests a need to formally investigate the
inuence of EP decisions on the prices at which EUAs trade in the market.
In a further contribution, extending work done independently by Koch et al. (2014),
we examine the potential conditional determinants of market reaction to EP legislation.
In particular we develop innovative measures of market sentiment and market attention,
which are known in other markets to inuence reaction to new information. This is a
dierent approach from Koch et al. (2014) who use the monthly Economic Sentiment
Index (from Eurostat) as a proxy for economic outlook. An emissions market sentiment
index is constructed by adapting the principal component analysis approach of Baker
and Wurgler (2006) in equity markets, and particularly based on the oil sentiment in-
dex proposed in Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015) and presented in
Chapter 2. The components of this index draw on volatility and speculative measures
from the EUA market, while also drawing pertinent information from the wider energy
markets, and the nancial markets. As a further contribution we apply a multiple hy-
pothesis testing framework to counter the multiple comparisons problem. This problem
arises when many hypothesis tests are carried out simultaneously; it is possible that
some null hypotheses would be rejected erroneously, see Appendix A. This precaution
is useful here as EUAs are a relatively new asset class and we wish to proceed with
some caution as we examine explicit sentiment for the rst time in the EU emissions
market.
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Sentiment has been found to be a signicant inuence in equities markets e.g. Baker
and Wurgler (2006) and Schmeling (2009), and more recently in the energy and com-
modity markets, see Silverio and Szklo (2012) and Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and
Bermingham (2015). Sentiment has been found to be particularly eective at predict-
ing the prices of stocks with greater inherent uncertainty; these have been characterized
by Baker and Wurgler (2006) as being young, small, unprotable, non-dividend-paying,
with high volatility, capable of extreme growth or becoming distressed. It can be ar-
gued that the European emissions market contains some of these same characteristics,
albeit from dierent sources. For example, there is the already discussed dependency on
uncertain political events; a history of extreme movements, see Koch et al. (2014); and
strong crossover inuences and volatilities from other energy markets, see Bredin and
Muckley (2011), Chevallier (2011a) and Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011). The sentiment
state of market participants at the time that new information arrives is also known to
be important. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) show that sentiment mediates how
investors react to news, with high sentiment periods related to a positive reaction to
news and the opposite for low sentiment periods. Investors tend to choose good news
to focus on in high sentiment times and bad news to focus on in times of low sentiment.
We thus expect that whether the market is in a time of high or low sentiment will
mediate the reaction of prices to new legislation.
Fang and Peress (2009) show that news exposure has an inuence on the returns
of stocks in the US market. We thus construct a market attention variable based on
news stories about the EUA market and emissions trading. We propose this variable
as measuring market attention. We argue that market attention both informs market
participants, see Tetlock (2007), and is informed by market participants, see Oberlech-
ner and Hocking (2004), and therefore acts as a guide to the level of market interest in
upcoming news events. Following from this, we nd that low market attention of issues
relevant to the EU ETS in advance of a legislative decision, is associated with greater
price shock, and we nd there is a signicant cumulative negative price reaction in
the days after a low market attention decision.
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The results show deciencies in the EMH. The EMH states that the carbon market
should update the prices for EUAs as soon as new information becomes available. In
2013 there were approximately half a million trades on prompt December futures, this
is a mean of 2,000 trades per day, so the reaction of the market to news should be visible
within minutes. Our empirical results show that the eect on the market of decisions
by the European Parliament depends to a large extent on the origin of these decisions
and, on the level of media attention and market sentiment at the time of the decisions.
When we exclude the outlier of the backloading day we nd that for low news and
non-party-political decisions it takes a day for the market to react, indeed it is even
slower for low sentiment, see Table 3.7. We nd that there is market inattention, this
contradicts the EMH.
The data and methodology are detailed in Section 3.2, followed by the testing
schemes in Section 3.3, the ndings and analysis in Section 3.4, and we conclude with
further discussion of the implications for policy makers and market participants in Sec-
tion 3.5. Our policy implications centre on the general importance of understanding
the reaction of market participants to legislative decisions and the need to improve
communication with market participants as to the long-term policy goals for the EUA
market. This calls for more eective signposting of the intermediate steps that will
be adopted to achieve these goals. There also needs to be greater understanding of
the factors aecting the market at a given point in time, as shown particularly by the
sentiment and media coverage ndings. This conditional understanding is argued to
be of potential benet to policy makers across a variety of regulated markets and in
particular to the nascent Chinese national emissions market.
3.2 Data and Methodology
Prior research suggests that EUA prices are inuenced by regulatory actions, see
Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) and Koch et al. (2014). We add to prior studies
by a systematic investigation of the overall impact of emissions market specic and
related legislation passed by the EP. We contribute to the existing literature on the EU
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ETS by testing whether policy decisions of the EP inuence the price and volatility of
EUAs. We provide a distinction by means of examining whether there is a dierential
eect to the impact of EP policy decisions depending on: (i) the origin of EP policy
decisions, i.e. whether non-party-political or party-political; (ii) the level of market
sentiment (high or low); and (iii) the level of market attention (high or low) which we
measure in terms of emissions market news exposure.
The origin of EP policy decisions inuences the impact of those decisions on the
price and volatility of emission allowance prices. The EP itself classies the origin
of each decision. We divide these into non-party-political resolutions brought by
a combination of the parliament's own committees, the European Council and the
European Commission, and party-political resolutions brought by a combination of
the political groups in the parliament. A full explanation is given in Section 3.2.2. This
allows us to understand which sources of legislation and which parts of the European
political system have the greatest impact on emissions markets. The investigation based
on market sentiment provides policy makers with insights into the timing of policy
decisions and to what extent the prevailing market dynamics have an impact. For this
analysis, we develop a unique EUA market sentiment index based on nancial proxy
information relating to the emissions market and the wider energy and nancial markets.
A decision is considered to be high sentiment if it takes place on a day on which the
market sentiment index is higher than the median sentiment for all the decision dates
under consideration. Construction of the market sentiment index follows the method of
Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015) -
a detailed explanation is given in Section 3.2.3 which follows the methods presented in
Section 2.2. Finally, the analysis based on emissions market attention provides insights
into the the timing of policy decisions and to what extent the level of market attention
to climate change and emissions aects impacts. The analysis allows us to consider
how the level of public awareness of these issues inuences the tendency of MEPs to
vote in a way which the market expects. This has implications for policy makers who
simultaneously must plan to avoid damage to the environment, give clear signals to the
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Statistic Log Return EUA
N 1,625
Mean -0.000815
Max 0.24525
Min -0.43208
Median 0.00000
Standard Deviation 0.03294
Skewness -0.90640
Excess Kurtosis 23.305
The table presents descriptive statistics for daily log returns of the prompt December EUA futures contracts from 3rd
October 2007 to 5th February 2014. and I futures are used, hence data during 2007 refers to Dec 2008 futures.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of EUA Futures Returns
market, and must attempt to carry out the wishes of their electorate. A policy decision
is considered to take place in a period of high news if the news exposure at the time of
the decision is higher than the median for all the decision dates under consideration.
The news exposure measure is based on Fang and Peress (2009) and is detailed in
Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 EUA Prices
We use the prices of prompt December futures in our anlaysis; these are the futures
contracts with an expiry of the next December. The December contracts are traded
in much higher volumes than EUAs on the spot market. December futures are the
most liquid of the futures contracts available, see Zhu et al. (2015). Futures contracts
for Phase II (2008 - 2012) and Phase III (2013 - 2020) allowances are examined using
daily data beginning on 2nd October 2007 and ending on 5th February 2014. Phase I
allowances (2005 - 2007) are not examined as they were not permitted to be used after
Phase I nished in 2007, whereas allowances could be banked and used from Phase II
into Phase III. The data before 1st January 2008 refers to the December 2008 futures
contracts. Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the log returns of the prompt
December EUA futures contract over the sample period and Figure 3.1 shows the time
series. A discussion of the outlier on 16th April 2013 follows at the end of Section 3.2.2.
3.2.2 EP Policy Decision Selection and Classication
The overall objective of our study is to test what impact policy decisions of the EP
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Figure 3.1: Log Returns of EU Emission Allowance Prices 2007 - 2014
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have on the level of EUA prices and their volatility. Therefore, identifying the dates of
EP policy decisions relating to the EU ETS is fundamental to our objective. During
the course of legislation making its way through the EP, there are many stages before
the date of the actual decision, including debates in the council, votes by relevant
committees, and debates in the parliament. We select the Decision by Parliament date
for each policy decision as given in the European Parliament Legislative Observatory.6
This source provides a list of key stages of a resolution as it makes its way through the
EP and gives the origin of each resolution.
The EP itself classies resolutions brought to it. Thus we may objectively distinguish
resolutions originating from the political groups of the MEPs (which we term party-
political), from resolutions brought by the EP's committees, the European Council,
or the European Commission (termed by us as non-party-political). To nd all the
relevant decisions, we search for the terms: EU ETS, emissions trading and carbon
trading in the European Parliament Legislative Observatory. We do not use the term
climate change as this was found to be too broad and would have found EP policy
decisions which concern climate change mitigation, adaptation and other matters only
loosely related to the EU ETS. A list of the dates and classications of the EP decisions,
obtained from our search, is given in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, along with brief explanations
of their connection with and potential inuence on the EU ETS. Thirty seven policy
decisions were identied over our sample period of 2nd October 2007 to 5th February
2014. In order to ensure a reasonable period for the calculation of the parameters
needed in the event study described in Section 3.3.1, we choose 20 days for the length
of the estimation window and ve days on either side of the decision day as the event
window. This is shorter than similar studies such as Lin and Tamvakis (2010) who
examined regularly spaced OPEC meetings, but we must compromise between having
a reasonable number of events and adequate lengths for each of the estimation and
event windows. Having chosen a 20 day estimation window and ve days on either side
of the decision as the event window we are compelled to omit 8 of the 37 identied
events. This is because we cannot have an event occurring in the estimation window
6Accessed on 20th November 2014 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/home/home.do.
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of another event as the estimation window is used to calculate the parameters for the
expected behaviour without any event taking place. This means that two events must
be fewer than 5 trading days apart or more than 25 days, therefore we chose 29 of the
37 events. The result of the selection process is that there are 10 events classied as
party-political, 14 classied as high sentiment and 14 classied as high news exposure,
see Table 3.5. A list of the EP decisions and the totals for each category are found in
Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
The 16th April 2013 requires special consideration for the reasons outlined in the
introduction. On this date there was a very close vote of the EP rejecting backloading.7
As noted earlier, backloading was the proposal to delay the release of 900 million EUAs
until 2019-2020, which were originally due to be released into the market in 2013-2015.
On this date the price of EUAs fell from ¿4.76 to ¿3.09 on the futures market, a
collapse of approximately 35%. This was the largest percentage drop in a single day
observed in the EUA futures market by a large margin. The second largest movement
on a single day, a drop of 24%, was on 26th April 2006 when the publication of the
veried emissions data showed a glut of EUAs. The size of the drop on 16th April 2013
can be seen in the EUA log returns series provided in Figure 3.1. The EP backloading
rejection date may therefore be deemed an extreme event, this is further discussed in
more detail in Section 4.4.1. While this anecdotally illustrates the ability of an EP
decision to move EUA prices, it presents the problem that inclusion of this one day's
data may drive the conclusions on its own. For robustness, we therefore conduct our
statistical analysis with and without the inclusion of 16th April 2013 - which we will
herein refer to as the backloading rejection date - for both the event study and the
GARCH analyses.
7On the same day there was also a resolution to delay the imposition of penalties arising from the failure of aircraft
operators to abide by an earlier directive on emissions, but this would not have had the same importance as the rejection
of backloading as it aects penalties applied in one sector of the market and whereas backloading is looking to address
on a system-wide basis the recognized oversupply of allowances in the market.
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Date Origin Sentiment News Relevance of Decision
11/10/2007 Non-Party
Political
High High Support for EU ETS to include air transport
11/03/2008 Non-Party
Political
High Low Air transport to be included in EU ETS
24/04/2008 Party Political High High Increasing the ambit of the EU ETS and
support for the polluter pays principle
05/06/2008 Party Political High High Expresses hope that US will trade emissions
with EU ETS
08/07/2008 Non-Party
Political
High High Air transport to be included in EU ETS
09/07/2008 Non-Party
Political
High High Support for low carbon energy ecient
technologies
04/09/2008 Non-Party
Political
High Low Policy to curb CO2 emissions
21/10/2008 Non-Party
Political
High High Commitment to Global climate change
Alliance and plans for spending EU ETS
income.
17/12/2008 Non-Party
Political
High High Resolution to extend EU ETS to include
maritime, shipping and aviation
03/02/2009 Non-Party
Political
High Low Second strategic energy review aiming to
reduce GHG by 80% by 2050
11/03/2009 Party Political High High Resolution on an EU strategy for a
comprehensive climate change agreement in
Copenhagen and the adequate provision of
nancing for climate change policy
23/04/2009 Party Political High High Proposal of a Global Forest Carbon
Mechanism and commitments to spend EU
ETS income
22/10/2009 Party Political Low High Resolution on the upcoming EU-US Summit
calling for stronger cooperation in energy
eciency and bio-fuels.
25/11/2009 Party Political Low High Resolution on the EU strategy for the
Copenhagen Conference on climate change
(COP 15)
The table shows the European Parliament (EP) decisions under consideration from 2007 to 2009. Decisions are either
less than 5 trading days or more than 25 days apart. The classications are assigned by the EP itself and indicate the
following types of decisions: resolution on topical subjects (RSP) refers to resolutions brought forward by one of the
Party Political groups of MEPs within the European Parliament, we categorize these as Party Political and categorize
others as Non-Party Political. Two decisions were taken on 24th April 2008 and since one was Party Political this
date has been categorized as Party Political. Decisions for 2010 - 2013 are in Tab.3.3.
Table 3.2: List of Selected Dates of European Parliament Decisions 2007 - 2009
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Date Origin Sentiment News Decision
11/03/2010 Party Political Low High Commitment to meet GHG targets and the
use of the European Investment Bank to
support low carbon targets
06/05/2010 Non-Party
Political
Low Low Adapting to climate change: towards a
European framework for action. Possible
changes of electricity generation using
renewable and fossil fuels.
17/06/2010 Party Political Low Low Resolution on the EU-US disagreement on air
transport in EU ETS
25/11/2010 Non-Party
Political
Low High Inclusion of maritime transport in the EU
ETS
08/03/2011 Non-Party
Political
Low Low Financial Transaction Tax and strengthening
of EU ETS
05/07/2011 Non-Party
Political
Low Low Options to move beyond 20% GHG emission
reductions and assessing the risk of carbon
leakage
14/09/2011 Non-Party
Political
Low Low Wholesale energy market integrity and
transparency
17/11/2011 Party Political Low Low Resolution on the EU-US disagreement on air
transport inclusion in EU ETS
15/03/2012 Non-Party
Political
Low Low Road map for moving to a competitive low
carbon economy in 2050
19/04/2012 Non-Party
Political
Low Low Proposal to tax electricity generation using
GHG output as one component
22/11/2012 Party Political Low Low Resolution on the climate change Conference
in Doha, Qatar
12/03/2013 Non-Party
Political
Low Low Greenhouse Gas emissions, climate change:
mechanism for monitoring and reporting
16/04/2013 Non-Party
Political
Low Low * (Backloading rejected) Scheme for
greenhouse Gas emission allowance
trading: temporary derogation from the EU
ETS
23/10/2013 Party Political Low Low Resolution on the climate change conference
in Warsaw, Poland (COP 19)
10/12/2013 Non-Party
Political
Low Low Greenhouse Gas emission allowance trading:
timing of auctions
The table shows the European Parliament (EP) decisions from 2010 to 2013. For an explanation of the EP
classication of decisions see Table 3.2. The decision * on 16th April 2013, the backloading rejection day, caused the
largest drop in EUA prices during the period of the investigation. The EP narrowly rejected a plan to delay the release
of EUAs known as backloading. All statistical tests were repeated omitting this date so as to ensure the robust nature
of our conclusions.
Table 3.3: List of Selected Dates of European Parliament Decisions 2010 - 2014
53
3.2.3 Measurement of Market Sentiment
Having selected and classied the dates for analysis we turn to the second question in our
analysis. We ask whether the impact of policy decisions depends in any way on the level
of market sentiment at the time of the decision. Towards answering this question, we
develop a unique emissions market sentiment index following a similar index constructed
for the oil markets in Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015) and discussed
in Section 2.2. For our purposes, we use nancial proxy information relating to the
emissions, energy and the nancial markets.
A decision of the EP is characterized as being high sentiment if it occurs on a day
when the market sentiment index is above the median for the set of decisions under
consideration, that is, the set of decisions under consideration will be either all 29
decisions or 28 when the backloading day is omitted or a subset of these days. A
daily market sentiment index is constructed for the emissions market using principal
component analysis (PCA) of appropriately chosen nancial proxies, in line with Baker
and Wurgler (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), and Deeney, Cummins, Dowling
and Bermingham (2015). This approach has most popularly been applied to the equities
markets, where there are abundant data available and levels of market liquidity are for
the most part high. By contrast, in the emissions market liquidity is lower, with the
volume of options traded being particularly low, see Byun and Cho (2013). This makes
the use of emissions market specic nancial information less reliable on a stand-alone
basis than we would desire, see Byun and Cho (2013). To overcome this weakness,
we construct an index which includes additional nancial information from the wider
energy markets not just the emissions market. This aligns with Bredin and Muckley
(2011), Chevallier (2011a), and Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011), who nd the emissions
market to be intrinsically linked with the energy markets. We choose the coal and gas
markets because they have an established connection to the prices of EUAs, as shown
by Alberola et al. (2008) and Chevallier (2011a). For coal prices, we use the API2 grade
for Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) prompt month futures contract, following
Chevallier (2011a). For gas prices, we use the UK's National Balance Point (NBP)
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prompt month futures price, following Creti et al. (2012) and Aatola et al. (2013). For
oil prices, we use the benchmark Brent prompt month futures contract, providing us
with a key oil market indicator and proxy measure of economic activity, see Zhu et al.
(2015). To capture a measure of market fear in the European economy, we use the
implied volatility index associated with the FTSE index, termed VFTSE. This follows
Whaley (2000) who associates index volatility and market fear. As a robustness check
the sentiment index calculations were repeated using the Euro Stoxx 50's volatility
index instead of the VFTSE. The classication of the 29 days was identical.
The specic nancial proxies used in the construction of the market sentiment index
comprise volume, open interest and volatility measures and are as follows:
1. the volume of trades of the prompt December EUA futures contract;
2. the aggregate total of all EUA futures contracts of all expiry dates excluding the
prompt December contract;
3. the 20-day volatility of the prompt December EUA futures contract;
4. the 20-day volatility of the prompt month Brent crude oil futures contract;
5. the 20-day volatility of the prompt month NBP natural Gas futures contract;
6. the 20-day volatility of the prompt month ARA Coal futures contract;
7. the open interest of Brent crude oil futures contracts;
8. the open interest of NBP natural Gas futures contracts and
9. the implied volatility of the FTSE index, i.e. VFTSE.
For our rst two proxies we use the volume of EUA futures contracts. Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003), Baker and Stein (2004), Baker and Wurgler (2007) and Canba³ and
Kandr (2009) use the volume of trades as a proxy for investor sentiment across equity
markets. The volume of trades is a natural measure of market activity, and as shown
by this literature, it is also an indicator of market sentiment.
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The volatility of futures prices is also a recognized indicator of market sentiment,
see Whaley (2000), as it indicates rapid changes in price. For our analysis we calculate
twenty-day historical volatility for emissions, oil, gas and coal futures prices; a period
of 20 trading days corresponds approximately to one calendar month. The twenty-day
time frame is chosen as a reasonable balance between a suciently long period for the
accurate calculation of volatility and a short enough period for the volatility information
to be current, this choice follows the monthly time scale used by Baker and Wurgler
(2006) in their seminal paper on sentiment indices and will match our later choice for
the estimation window length for the event study.
The level of open interest of futures contracts is an indicator of the level of spec-
ulation and market activity in the oil and gas markets. It is the quantity of futures
contracts which are not closed, liquidated or delivered. Open interest data for coal and
EUA futures was not available for the period under examination and so we include
information from the oil and natural gas markets.
The volatility of a large stock index has commonly been used as a measure of market
fear in the literature. Whaley (2000), Simon and Wiggins III (2001) and Whaley (2009)
have used the VIX implied volatility index as a proxy of market sentiment, specically,
fear. The VFTSE is used here as a European equivalent to the US-centered VIX. The
VFTSE is calculated from the implied volatility of FTSE 100 index options covering out-
of-the-money strike prices for the near and next term maturities. An alternative choice
would be the volatility of the Euro Stoxx 50 but the VFTSE is chosen as the FTSE 100
has a greater weighting of large energy rms, including BG Group, BP, Petrofac, Royal
Dutch Shell, Tullow Oil and Wood Group, with a total market capitalization of Stg
¿286 billion (¿389 billion) compared with the Euro Stoxx 50, including ENI, Repsol
and Total, which have a total market capitalization of ¿194 billion8. This is shown to
be a robust choice because when the sentiment index calculations were repeated using
the volatility of the Euro Stoxx 50 (V2X) the new sentiment index produced the same
8Data accessed on 9th June 2015 from http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-
markets/stocks/indices/summary/summary-indices-constituents.html?index=UKX , and
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-markets/international-markets/indices/home/eurostoxx-
50.html. In addition Paun et al. (2015) states that the FTSE 100 has 13.1% of value in oil and gas while the MSCI
World has 7.1% and the S&P 500 has 7.9%. This supports the choice of the FTSE 100.
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Energy and Emissions Sentiment Index Current or First Lag Loading
Volume of Prompt Dec EUA Futures Lag -0.36
Volume of non Prompt Dec EUA Futures Current -0.40
20 Day EUA Volatility Current -0.17
20 Day Brent Oil Volatility Current 0.38
20 Day NBP Gas Volatility Lag 0.32
20 Day ARA Coal Volatility Lag 0.35
Open Interest of Brent Futures Current -0.26
Open Interest of NBP Futures Lag -0.32
Volatility of the FTSE Lag 0.38
The table shows the choices of current or rst lag of the listed nancial proxies and the PCA-derived weights for the
linear combination of these proxies to produce the emissions and energy market sentiment index. The rst principal
component explains 27% of the variance.
Table 3.4: Loadings for the Emissions and Energy Market Sentiment Index
categorization of high or low sentiment for each of the 29 EP decisions. The Euro Stoxx
50 is the index of the top 50 rms of the Euro zone by capitalization, its volatility index
is calculated similarly to the VFTSE. The two are very highly correlated and so it is not
surprising that the substitution of the V2X and VFTSE did not change the designation
of high and low sentiment.
To take into account the possibility that some of the proxies may be more strongly
leading indicators of market sentiment than others, we follow the method of Baker
and Wurgler (2006). A rst stage index Ft is prepared by entering the current values
of the nine proxies and their rst lags in a principal component analysis (PCA). The
rst principal component of this PCA of the 18 series is the rst stage index, Ft. For
each individual proxy, Pt, the correlation between the current value and the rst stage
index, Corr(Pt, Ft ), and the correlation between its rst lag and the rst stage index
Corr(Pt 1, Ft) are calculated. For each individual proxy the larger of these two values
determines whether to use the current or rst lag for each proxy; these are entered into
a second PCA which produces the sentiment index as its rst principal component.
3.2.4 Measurement of Media Exposure
For the third part of our analysis, we consider to what extent the level of market
attention on issues pertinent to the emissions market at the time of policy decisions
impacts on price and volatility. Fang and Peress (2009) show that news exposure has
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an inuence on the returns of stocks in the US market. This is in line with the Investor
Attention Hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008), Da et al. (2011) and Vozlyublennaia
(2014), which posits that since attention is a scarce commodity, investors are more
likely to trade stocks to which their attention has already been drawn. Motivated by
this work, we thus construct a media exposure variable based on news stories about
the EUA market and emissions trading, a variable we propose as measuring market
attention. Media coverage both informs market participants and is informed by market
participants, see Oberlechner and Hocking (2004), and Tetlock (2007); it therefore acts
as a guide to the level of market interest in upcoming news events.
A policy decision of the EP is categorized as being of high news importance if the
news exposure on the day of the decision is above the median for the set of decisions
under consideration. Fang and Peress (2009) dened the news exposure of a particular
stock, as a count of stories which appeared in either the Dow Jones Newswire service,
or in any of four US newspapers: The New York Times, USA Today, The Wall Street
Journal or The Washington Post, which together accounted for 11% of daily circula-
tion of newspapers in US at that time. Motivated by this approach, we consider the
following sources of news: the newswire services Agence France Presse (AFP), The
Associated Press (AP), Thomson Reuters ONE and Thomson Reuters Financial News
Super Focus; and the UK broadsheets The Daily Telegraph, The Financial Times, The
Times, The Independent and The Guardian, which account for 18% of daily circulation
of newspapers in the UK9. The list of broadsheets is taken from Lexis Nexis and ex-
cludes Sunday papers as these would give a biased result for that one day of the week
which is not a trading day.
We search the Lexis Nexis database for the following terms: EU ETS, climate
change, carbon emission, and CO2. When the search term EU ETS was used on
its own very low counts were made so that such data was too sparse, hence a wider
selection of search terms were used. For an article to be counted at least one of these
four search terms must have occurred three times in the article. This provides an
objective way to ensure that the article is actually about the EU emissions market and
9Source: Audit Bureau Circulations (ABC). Site accessed on 2nd February 2015 at http://www.abc.org.uk/
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Origin Sentiment News Exposure
Party Political 10 High 14 High 14
Non-Party Political 19 Low 15 Low 15
The table records the number of decisions of the European Parliament in each of the categories tested.
Table 3.5: Distribution of the Decisions by Origin, Sentiment and News Exposure.
not merely referring to it while discussing other emissions related topics, such as the
Chinese emissions trading schemes for instance. We therefore dene the following time
series:
Newspapert = the number of stories on day t in any of the newspapers listed, with
each story containing at least three occurrences of at least one of the search terms listed;
NewsWiret = the number of stories on day t in any of the news wires listed, with
each story containing at least three occurrences of at least one of the search terms listed.
In order to measure the eect of the media on EP decisions, we construct a time
series which captures the level of coverage of the EU ETS and related issues over the
previous three days. We therefore dene Newst for the time period under consideration
as follows
Newst =
t 1X
i=t 3
(Newspaperi +Newswirei) ; t = 4; 5; ::; 1626
This time series is calculated and the median for the 29 days under consideration is
calculated. High news coverage is considered to happen on days when Newst is higher
than its median.
A summary of the classications set out in this section and that of Sections 3.2.3
and 3.2.4, is given in Table 3.5 which provides a breakdown of the 29 events dates by
origin, sentiment and news exposure.
3.3 Testing Methodology
In this section we set out the technical details of the event study employed to examine
price eects and follow this with the specication of the GARCH modelling used to
examine volatility eects. We use event study and GARCH methods to test changes in
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the price and volatility at the times of EP decisions, following Lin and Tamvakis (2010)
and Lu and Chen (2011).
3.3.1 Event Study Specication
Following the method of MacKinlay (1997), Kothari and Warner (2007) and, Lin and
Tamvakis (2010) we use an event study on the 29 identied dates of EP policy decisions.
In addition to this, we perform separate event studies using the categorizations based
on: (i) the EP policy decision origin; (ii) the level of market sentiment and (iii) the
level of market attention. An event study is chosen as it is suitable to test for the
presence of changes in the mean of a time series where the date of the change is known
approximately. It will allow us to see when the event is reected by a change in the mean
log returns. There is strong support in Kothari and Warner (2007) for the usefulness
of short horizon event studies, such as the one proposed below.
We use an estimation window of 20 days and an event window of 11 days, comprising
the 5 days before the decision, the decision day itself and the 5 days after the decision.
Lin and Tamvakis (2010) used lengths of 40 days for the estimation window and 20
days for the event window to examine quarterly OPEC meetings. Here we retain
the approximate ratio of 2:1 for the estimation window and event window lengths by
choosing a 20 day estimation window and 11 day event window. There is an inherent
limitation of an investigation of EP decisions, as they do not occur at a constant
frequency. The selection for the estimation and event window lengths are chosen as a
compromise between obtaining a reasonably accurate estimation for the parameters for
expected behaviour without events happening during the estimation window periods,
keeping the event windows short enough to detect events more eectively, and selecting
a reasonably large number of decisions to test, see Kothari and Warner (2007). At
the same time it is necessary to keep an event window long enough to test for price
movements before EP decisions possibly due to information leakage and the possibility
of price movements after the event day itself. Akin to the phenomenon of post earnings
announcement drift of Hirshleifer et al. (2009) the eect of an EP decision on EUA
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prices may not end on the day of the decision itself, but may continue for a short period
after. Setting longer periods for the estimation window will improve the accuracy of
the parameter estimates for the statistical testing as suggested by Kothari and Warner
(2007), however in this application the cost of this increased accuracy is the loss of the
number of EP decisions which can be analysed. In this application we have sample sizes
ranging from a minimum of 10 events for the party-political classication to a maximum
of only 29 when we consider all decisions of the EP including the backloading rejection
on 16th April 2013.
The abnormal returns for a day are calculated as the dierence between the day's
actual return and the expected returns. In particular we follow Lin and Tamvakis (2010)
by using both a zero log return and a constant log return model for the behaviour of
EUA prices during typical periods. MacKinlay (1997) states that although a constant
return model is a very simple, it is surprisingly useful at identifying changes in price
behaviour compared with more sophisticated models. The conclusions drawn from these
two models, zero log return and constant log return, are the same, giving practically
the same p-values; the results presented in Table 3.7 are for the simpler zero log return
model. We dene EUAi; as the observed EUA log return, with i being an index for
the particular event and  being an index for time during this particular event. In this
case i = 1; 2; ::; N , where N = 29 when all of the events are under consideration. When
we examine only a subset of these, such as days when decisions are party-political in
origin, or days with high sentiment or high news then N = 10 , N = 14 or N = 14
respectively. We set the event time,  = 0 on the day of the EP decision,  then takes
values between  25 and 5. Ki;  is dened to be the expected return based on a model
calibrated during the estimation window, which are the 20 days when  25 6  6  6.
We therefore dene the residual i;  = EUAi:  Ki;  . In this application of the event
study, as is the case in Lin and Tamvakis (2010) we assume Ki;  = 0. Very similar
results and identical conclusions are obtained when using a constant return model for
Ki;  ; calculated as the mean during the estimation windows. Following the standard
approach, the average abnormal return AR at event time  is dened as
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Test Constant Constant + Trend
ADF 8.9 x 10 27 4.7 x 10 30
KPSS < 0.1 < 0.1
The table presents the p-values for the ADF and KPSS tests of stationarity. The Augmented Dickey Fuller
(ADF) test has a null of non-stationarity. The Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test has
a null of stationarity. The results show strong evidence to accept that the EUA log returns series is
stationary. Models with the addition of a constant, and with the addition of a constant and a trend
are used for robustness.
Table 3.6: Stationarity Test for EUA Returns
AR =
1
N
NP
i=1
i;  : (3.1)
The cumulative average abnormal return between two days 1 and 2, CAR(1; 2), is
therefore dened as
CAR(1; 2) =
2X
t=1
AR :
This is calculated for all 29 events and for the dierent categories of events, party-
political, non-party-political, and high and low sentiment and high and low levels of
news exposure. We calculate an associated test statistic
T =
CAR(1; 2)p
2(1;  2)
 N(0; 1)
where 2(1; 2) = L
2, 2 is the variance of the AR calculated during the estimation
window, and L = 2  1+1: In our application the value of 1 is xed at 1 =  5 while
2 varies from  5; 4; :::; 5; we present results labelled in the form CAR 2. The results
of the event studies are presented in Table 3.7 both with (Panel A) and without (Panel
B) the extreme event of the backloading rejection date, 16th April 2013. Repeating the
event studies in this way provides a robustness check for our analysis. We nd from
both the ADF and the KPSS tests that the time series of the log returns of the EUA
is stationary see Table 3.6.
3.3.2 GARCH Model Specication
In addition to the impact on returns, we are also particularly interested in the eect of
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EP policy decisions on the volatility of the EUA emissions market. To test this we use
a GARCH model with a dummy variable in the variance equation, following Lu and
Chen (2011). In line with Engle and Ng (1993) and Chevallier (2011a), the standard
GARCH(1,1) model for EUA prices is specied as follows:
EUAt = + EUAt 1 + "t; "t  i:i:d:(0; 2t );
2t = 0 + 1"
2
t 1 + 
2
t 1
whereEUAt is the log return for day t;  is the coecient of rst order autocorrelation;
 is the drift;, 0; 1 and  are constants, and "t is the error term process with mean
zero and conditional variance 2t . We test whether there is an eect on the EP decision
days by introducing a dummy variable dt in the variance specication. We test the
period before the event day, by setting dt = 1 on each of ve days before each event
and zero on all other days. We test the period of and after the event by setting dt = 1
on the day of each event and on the following ve days. These periods are chosen so
that we may make compare the event study results and the GARCH results. That is,
we specify
2t = 0 + 1"
2
t 1 + 
2
t 1 + dt
where dt is the value of the dummy variable on day t. We use Marquardt's method
implemented in EViews; we present the results before the event in Table 3.8 with the
results on and after the event in Table 3.9. Again, as a robustness check we repeat
the GARCH modelling while excluding the extreme event of the backloading rejection
date, 16th April 2013.
3.4 Empirical Results
Following the method set out in the previous section, Table 3.7 presents the results of
the event studies while Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the results of the GARCH modelling
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before and after the EP decisions. Our principal nding, is that when all 29 EP decisions
are included, these decisions have a very signicant eect on EUA prices. From the
event study analysis, this eect starts on the day of the policy decision itself, and
results in a reduction of average EUA prices, while from the GARCH modelling we see
an average increase in volatility before and after these decisions. The decrease in EUA
prices is strongly statistically signicant, as seen in the cumulative abnormal returns
over event dates  = 0; : : : ; 5. These event study results were found to be robust to a
change in the model used to calculate the abnormal returns in Eqn. 3.1, where instead of
a zero log returns model we use a constant log returns model to calculate the abnormal
returns (calculated as the mean during the estimation window). From the GARCH
modelling, an increase in volatility is seen after the event dates with a smaller eect
before. There is a very strong result after event days as seen in the higher positive value
of the  parameter, showing that there is, on average, considerable market instability
as a result of EP decisions.
As set out in Section 3.3, given the inuence, and hence potential source of bias from
the backloading event, we check the robustness of our ndings by repeating the testing
after removing from the data the 16th April 2013, i.e. the date of the backloading
rejection by the EP. Panel B of Table 3.7 presents the results of the event studies
in this case. As this date falls into the classications of non-party-political, low
sentiment and low news, we report the updated results for these categories only as the
other categories are unaected. When the eect of the vote on backloading is removed
from the analysis the statistical signicance of the results is less striking, although the
results remain statistically signicant at conventional levels. Thus, our ndings hold
after accounting for the potential bias of the extreme backloading event. In a similar
manner, Panel B of Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the results of the GARCH modelling
when the backloading rejection date is removed. When we re-examine the results for
the set of 28 decisions we notice that before the event the size of the coecient for the
dummy variable, , is lower without the outlier and has lost statistical signicance, but
the coecient of the volatility dummy variable on and after the event is practically the
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same and remains strongly signicant. This indicates that the backloading rejection
date was an important part of the overall pattern in the data but was not responsible
on its own for the pattern.
The drop in EUA prices for the set of all 29 decisions is seen not only on the event
day itself but for several more days after these EP decisions. We may conclude that
the emissions market is taken by surprise when EP decisions are made. Then, similarly
to the post earnings announcement drift in Barber and Odean (2008), Da et al. (2011)
and Vozlyublennaia (2014), the change in price continues for several days. We see from
the results in Table 3.4 that the cumulative eect of the set of all EP decisions is to
reduce the EUA price by approx. 3.6% on the day of the decision. The reduction is
larger for the sub group of non-party sources and larger still for decisions made in times
of lower sentiment or when news attention was low. This pattern is also followed when
the backloading decision is omitted from the analysis.
Our second nding is that when the EP is dealing with a policy decision which is
non-party-political, i.e. legislation which originated from the European Parliament's
committees, the European Council or the European Commission, there is on average a
large reduction in the price of EUAs and an observable increase in the volatility of the
EUA returns. These eects are not seen for decisions brought forward by the party-
political groups of MEPs. Decisions made in these cases tend not to move the price
signicantly and there is some evidence that volatility decreases after such decisions.
The results are seen to hold when the backloading rejection vote is excluded. This
would indicate that if the political groups of the MEPs are themselves the source of the
discussion, then the resulting decisions of the EP do not take the market by surprise.
This may be caused by the political groups' willingness to publicize their activities.
The market is more strongly aected by the non-party-political decisions from more
bureaucratic sources which are less likely to seek publicity and so these decisions are
less anticipated by the market. This nding has an important implication for policy
makers as it shows that non-party-political legislation has the greatest impact on the
emissions markets, and these on average cause market shocks.
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Our third nding is that EP policy decisions are associated with a decrease in the
level of EUA price and an increase in volatility after the decision during times of low
market sentiment but not in times of high sentiment. This suggests a particular eect
of EP policy decisions during times of low market sentiment, namely that in spite of the
sentiment being low, the market is surprised by negative news and prices, on average,
move signicantly downwards when the EP decisions are made. Conversely there is
little evidence of a signicant price movement when EP decisions are made in times of
high sentiment, which might indicate that the good news from the EP was already
anticipated in the EUA price. A similar pattern is seen without the backloading event
date. These sentiment ndings indicate a need for policy makers to consider market
dynamics in terms of policy decision timing.
Our fourth nding is that when there are low levels of emissions market attention,
as measured by media exposure, the EP decisions again move the price of EUAs sig-
nicantly downwards after the event and signicantly increase volatility both before
and after the event. In contrast, when there are high levels of emissions market related
news, the EP decisions do not, on average, have an eect on the level of EUA prices
but actually lower the volatility after the decision takes place. This suggests that policy
decisions that directly or indirectly relate to the structure and functioning of the EUA
market, have an impact on price and volatility when general market attention is low.
These ndings indicate a need to inform market participants more eectively concerning
upcoming EP decisions which might have an impact on the market. There is evidence
that there is considerable market inattention when there is low general media attention
and when the political parties are not the originators of the decision process. This
demonstration of market inattention violates the Ecient Market Hypothesis (EMH).
There is no evidence, even at conventional levels, of a calm before the storm eect
for decisions made during times of high news intensity and for party political sourced
decisions, see Table 3.8. In both cases the  parameter, which indicates the extra
eect on volatility in the period being tested, is not signicantly dierent from zero.
In contrast, there is very strong evidence of higher than expected volatility before
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decisions during times of low news. This indicates that the market is unsure what
to expect from these decisions which are to take place in the near future. After the
decisions of the EP take place there is evidence, at conventional levels, of a reduction in
volatility for the high news periods and party-political decisions. There is very strong
evidence of an in increased volatility eect for low news periods and non-party-political
decisions and evidence only at conventional levels for an increase in volatility for low
sentiment decisions. This indicates that the market was in a state of turmoil even after
such decisions were made except for decisions made during times of high news or from
party-political sources, see Table 3.9.
3.4.1 Discussion and Review of the Results
There are some weaknesses in the testing method used here which would prompt future
investigations. Firstly the media analysed is only in the English language. While it is
certainly the case that the chosen newspapers and newswires have international respect,
it would be interesting to test the exposure in other languages. Another weakness is
that we only test 29 decisions, while this is a much larger sample size than Koch et al.
(2014) it is always desirable to have more data points. This selection was a compromise
between the length of the estimation window and the number of decisions used for the
event study, because an increased estimation window size would reduce the number of
decisions available for the event study. The decision to use a 5 day post event window
is reasonable because the EU ETS futures market has on average 2,000 trades per day.
The data suggests that the eect of decisions lasted as long as 5 days, however the aim
of the tests was to discover whether there was an eect due to sentiment, rather than
to test how long the eect endured. This would be an interesting extension to the work
but was not realistic for the data available. The evidence is inconsistent with EMH as
the changes to prices and volatility are inuenced by sentiment, news coverage and the
origin of the decisions. This violates the EMH.
In this chapter there have been 468 hypothesis tests and so our conclusions are
vulnerable to the multiple comparisons problem, whereby we may falsely reject true
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Panel A Event Study using all data
All Party Non Party High Low High Low
Decisions Political Political Sentiment Sentiment News News
CAR -5 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003
CAR -4 -0.013 -0.010 -0.014* -0.005 -0.020* -0.014 -0.012
CAR -3 -0.016 -0.022 -0.013 -0.010 -0.022* -0.021* -0.012
CAR -2 -0.012 -0.021 -0.007 0.000 -0.023 -0.009 -0.015
CAR -1 -0.013 -0.018 -0.010 -0.003 -0.022 -0.010 -0.015
CAR 0 -0.036*** -0.028 -0.041** -0.020 -0.051** -0.020 -0.049**
CAR 1 -0.045*** -0.019 -0.059*** -0.019 -0.070*** -0.009 -0.074***
CAR 2 -0.039*** -0.013 -0.052*** -0.012 -0.064*** 0.000 -0.070***
CAR 3 -0.047*** -0.020 -0.062*** -0.020 -0.073*** 0.001 -0.086***
CAR 4 -0.056*** -0.014 -0.078*** -0.018 -0.082*** -0.000 -0.101***
CAR 5 -0.060*** -0.024 -0.079*** -0.036* -0.083*** -0.006 -0.105***
N = 29 10 19 14 15 14 15
Panel B Event Study omitting the backloading rejection day
All Non Party Low Low
Decisions Political Sentiment News
CAR -5 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.003
CAR -4 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 0.000
CAR -3 -0.011 -0.004 -0.011 -0.001
CAR -2 -0.009 -0.003 -0.018 -0.010
CAR -1 -0.010 -0.006 -0.018 -0.010
CAR 0 -0.019 * -0.014 -0.018 -0.018
CAR 1 -0.024 ** -0.027 * -0.029 -0.037 *
CAR 2 -0.021 * -0.026 * -0.031 -0.040 *
CAR 3 -0.031 ** -0.038 ** -0.043 * -0.059 **
CAR 4 -0.037 ** -0.050 ** -0.046 * -0.068 ***
CAR 5 -0.044 *** -0.055 *** -0.051 ** -0.077 ***
N = 28 18 14 14
Panel A shows the cumulative abnormal returns from the event study tests comparing the eect of European
Parliament (EP) decisions on the mean log returns of EUA prices from ve days before, on the day itself and during
the ve days after the EP decision. Panel B repeats these tests without the extreme value on the backloading rejection
day, 16th April 2013. Party Political refers to EP decisions originating from the political groups of MEPs, Non-Party
Political refers to all other sources of EP decisions. High sentiment refers to levels of sentiment above the median. The
EUA sentiment index uses data from the EUA and Energy markets, and the volatility of the FTSE 100 to construct a
sentiment index. News is a measure of the exposure of the EU ETS in broadsheet and newswire stories. The event
study measures changes in the cumulative abnormal returns for an event window of 11 days. CAR(n) refers to the
cumulative abnormal returns from 5 days before the decision to the nth day, where n = 0 on the day of the decision.
These tests are repeated with a constant level of change model to calculate the abnormal returns, the results of which
yield very similar results and identical conclusions; results are omitted for brevity and are available from the authors.
N indicates the number of events in each test. The usual */**/*** indicates 10%, 5% and 1% p-values for the
coecient signicance test, bold typeface indicates signicant p-values at MHT levels.
Table 3.7: Event Study Results
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Panel A GARCH Results Before the European Parliament decisions
Base All Party Non Party High Low High Low
Model Decisions Political Political Sentiment Sentiment News News
 (x 10 6) - 19.9* -5.3 30.6* 12.7 25.7 -2.9 87.0***
0 (x 10 6) 15.4 *** 12.8*** 15.4*** 12.4*** 14.4*** 14.1*** 15.6*** 12.3***
1 0.160 *** 0.157*** 0.160*** 0.156*** 0.159 *** 0.157*** 0.160*** 0.151***
1 0.839 *** 0.843*** 0.839*** 0.845*** 0.840*** 0.842*** 0.839*** 0.846***
N - 29 10 19 14 15 14 15
Panel B GARCH Results Before the European Parliament decisions omitting the backloading rejection
Base All Non Party Low Low
Model Decisions Political Sentiment News
 (x 10 6) - 14.7 21.1* 11.5 59.0***
0 (x 10 6) 15.4 *** 13.3*** 12.8*** 14.5*** 12.2***
1 0.160 *** 0.157*** 0.157 *** 0.158*** 0.153***
1 0.839 *** 0.843*** 0.844 *** 0.841*** 0.846***
N - 28 18 14 14
The table shows the results of GARCH models for the 1,625 daily log returns of EUA prices. Panel A uses all 29
decisions of the European Parliament (EP) selected according to origin, sentiment and news exposure. Panel B repeats
these tests, omitting an extreme value on the backloading rejection day, 16th April 2013. The base model is the
standard GARCH(1,1) model following Engle and Ng (1993) and Chevallier (2011a) without the dummy variables
around the times of EP decisions. This model is shown for comparison purposes. Party Political refers to a
categorization of each decision by the EP itself where the decision originates from the political groups of the EP. High
sentiment refers to levels of sentiment above the median. The sentiment index uses data from the EUA and Energy
markets, and the volatility of the FTSE 100 to construct a sentiment index. News is a measure of the exposure of the
EU ETS in broadsheet and newswire stories in the three days before the EP decision. The change of variance is based
on the addition of a dummy variable dt to the variance equation in a GARCH(1,1) model describing the log returns
EUAt by EUAt = + EUAt 1 + "t, where  is a constant, , is the coecient of rst order autocorrelation and
"t  i:i:d:(0; 2t ); where the variance 2t is described by 2t = 0 + 1"2t 1 + 12t 1 + dt, where 0; 1 and  are
constants, the dummy variable dt takes the value 1 on the 5 days before the European Parliament (EP) decision and
zero otherwise, and  is the coecient of the dummy variable which is tested to determine the eect of EP decisions on
EUA variance before such a decision. N refers to the number of events (EP decisions) in each model. The usual
*/**/*** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% p-values for the coecient signicance test. For brevity the mean equation results
are not included but are available from the authors.
Table 3.8: GARCH Results for the Five Day Period Before European Parliament Decisions
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Panel A GARCH Results After the European Parliament decisions
Base All Party Non Party High Low High Low
Model Decisions Political Political Sentiment Sentiment News News
 (x 10 6) - 23.5** -26.9* 39.3*** 5.6 35.5** -28.8** 93.9***
0 (x 10 6) 15.4 *** 13.3*** 15.6*** 13.2*** 15.1*** 14.1*** 17.5*** 13.5***
1 0.160 *** 0.164*** 0.159*** 0.166*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.166***
1 0.839 *** 0.836*** 0.841*** 0.834*** 0.839*** 0.837*** 0.837*** 0.832***
N - 29 10 19 14 15 14 15
Panel B GARCH Results After the European Parliament decisions omitting the backloading rejection
Base All Non-Political Low Low
Model Decisions Sentiment News
 (x 10 6) - 22.3** 37.0*** 32.5** 86.0***
0 (x 10 6) 15.4 *** 13.3*** 13.1*** 14.0*** 13.2***
1 0.160 *** 0.163*** 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.165***
1 0.839 *** 0.836*** 0.835*** 0.838*** 0.833***
N - 28 18 14 15
The table shows the results of GARCH models for the same tests as in Table 3.8 with the change that the dummy
variable dt takes the value 1 on the day of the decision and on the following 5 days, and is zero otherwise again  is the
coecient of the dummy variable. This tests for a change of variance after a decision of the European Parliament.
Table 3.9: GARCH Results for the Day of European Parliament Decisions and the Following Five
Days
null hypotheses because a large number of tests are carried out simultaneously. In
order to be consistent with the application of a multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) as
used in Chapters 2 and 4, we apply the MHT framework of Holm (1979), following
its use in Cummins (2013b) and Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015).
Due to the particular distribution of the p-values in this data we nd that there is a
general cut o level for all the tests of p = 0:00606. Coecients in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and
3.9 which are considered signicant at this level are presented in bold type.
With the MHT adjustments in mind we now re-visit the results presented above in
Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. When we remove the eect of the outlier of the backloading
rejection day from the event study (Table 3.7 Panel B) we nd that only one of the
cumulative abnormal returns is considered signicant. As this particular result, for
EP decisions made during periods of low news, refers to cumulative returns a full week
after the these EP decisions are made, it is dicult to consider it to be truly signicant.
When we examine the GARCH results for changes in volatility, excluding the eect of
the backloading rejection, we nd that under the MHT framework only those decisions
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made from non-party-political sources and those decisions made at times of low news
attention are considered signicant.
In the event study application we have small numbers of events ranging from a min-
imum of 10 events for the party-political classication to a maximum of only 29 when
we consider all decisions of the EP including the backloading rejection on 16th April
2013. This restricts the power of our testing method and so it is not a surprise that the
use of a MHT framework drastically reduces the number of rejected null hypotheses.
This reduction changes the strength of our conclusions that EP decisions generally, EP
decisions coming from non-party-political sources, EP decisions made during times of
low sentiment and EP decisions during times of low news exposure all have a negative
impact on price level and a positive impact on volatility. These conclusions cannot
be supported within the strictures of the MHT framework, although there is consider-
able and consistent evidence for these conclusions at conventional levels. Therefore we
may only report these conclusions with the proviso that the evidence is of only mod-
erate strength and not sucient to pass the higher standard associated with an MHT
approach.
3.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Koch et al. (2014) and Koch et al. (2016) are clear that there is much yet to be discovered
about the drivers of EUA prices beyond the fundamentals. It is not surprising that there
is moderate evidence that policy decisions from the European Parliament have a direct
eect on the volatility and level of EUA prices. Bearing in mind the proviso that our
conclusions are supported by moderate, rather than very strong evidence, this study
shows that EP inuence is changed by the type of decision, the current sentiment of
the emissions market, and the current level of market attention, as measured by news
exposure, in advance of the decision.
The emissions market has some insight into the likely outcome of decisions made by
the European Parliament, and so does not react strongly, in three circumstances, (i)
when it is the party-political groups in the parliament who propose the legislation, (ii)
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when market sentiment is high and (iii) when the level of market awareness is high,
that is, when there are high levels of media exposure. The decisions made under these
circumstances seem to be anticipated correctly by the market and there is little price
movement.
Of greater interest are the occasions when EUA market reacts as if it has just been
surprised. The decisions that we have termed non-party-political in this study, namely
those decisions originating from one of the EP committees, the European Council or
the European Commission, signicantly lower EUA prices and are strongly associated
with heightened price volatility. The GARCH volatility ndings indicate a high level of
trader uncertainty around the outcome of these decisions and their potential impact on
prices, particularly so for decisions which are from non-party-political sources. Better
communication by policy makers would help reduce this. Clearly setting out a time-
line of planned legislative decisions over the medium-term and what these policies will
broadly aim to achieve, can help provide some improved certainty to market partici-
pants. Ideally some form of forward guidance might be given. A benet of this is that
current prices would be a more accurate reection of true value and thus organizations
that must buy allowances will be paying an appropriate price. Reducing uncertainty
will also encourage market participation by large institutions, thus helping to add depth
to the market.
With regard to the sentiment and media ndings, these oer some additional impor-
tant implications. Firstly the nding that sentiment and media coverage might inuence
price reaction is of interest in terms of informing the timing of decisions. Political de-
cisions are often timed based on judgements of public receptiveness, and perhaps this
needs to be considered for EP decisions on the EUA market. EUAs are not like typical
commodities; the supply of EUAs is under political control and the demand for them is
caused by regulation. Hence they have a high level of regulatory uncertainty attached
to their valuation. The sentiment literature in equity markets, for example Baker and
Wurgler (2006), has consistently recognized that more uncertain assets are more prone
to the inuence of sentiment. The presence of high uncertainty in the pricing of EUAs,
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and not just for the EUA market, but also other highly regulated markets subject to
political inuence, suggests a greater need for awareness of these behavioural drivers of
price.
It is clear that EP decisions have a signicant and important inuence on EUA price
levels and volatility. We have provided a systematic investigation of this inuence in
this study. Providing greater certainty to market participants, possibly through forward
guidance, would enhance market participation, while improved awareness of behavioural
inuences regarding the market's reaction to EP decisions, can help strengthen the
operation of the EUA market. A next step is to delve more qualitatively into the
nature of individual EP decisions and ascertain particular facets of those decisions that
might be driving market reactions. There is also scope for integrating market sentiment
deeper into our understanding of emissions markets pricing.
We have shown that there is moderate evidence that sentiment, as well as political
origin and news exposure, inuences the market's reaction to decisions of the European
Parliament regarding the EU emissions trading scheme. This is an important issue as
the largest moves in EUA price have always been associated with regulatory matters
rather than the day to day movements of the energy markets. In our next chapter
we examine the inuence of sentiment from a dierent perspective and at a higher
frequency.
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Chapter 4
Twitter Sentiment and the EU Carbon
Market
4.1 Introduction
Sentiment measured from Twitter originates in a completely dierent manner from
sentiment measured by proxies which have been used until now in this thesis. On
account of this, Twitter oers a new opportunity to test the eect of sentiment in
the EU emissions market. Twitter also oers the possibility of using intra-day data
to examine sentiment, which until now has been examined at monthly frequency in
Chapter 2 and at daily frequency in Chapter 3. For these two reasons, diversity and
granularity, Twitter is an ideal source of sentiment information to examine the EU
emissions market.
The subject of this research, the EU emissions market, is important for several
reasons. It is the principal method by which the EU addresses the reduction of its
greenhouse gas emissions. The market itself is quite large; during the nal year of the
December 2015 futures contract, ¿ 25bn was traded on that single contract. The cost
of EU emission allowances (EUAs) is part of the cost of many goods in the EU, for
example electricity. Research on this new asset class informs the design of other large
trading schemes around the world, most notably the Chinese national emissions trading
scheme which is set to become the largest emissions market in the world.
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The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 4.1.1 we summarize recent
literature and in Section 4.1.2 we discuss the emissions market as the context of this
study. In Section 4.2 we describe the unstructured Twitter data and the construction
of the sentiment impact measures derived from this data. In Section 4.3 we describe
the EUA intra-day price data, the sampling frequency and the control variables. In
Section 4.4 we identify outliers in the data and then set out the statistical models.
Vector autoregression (VAR) and Granger causality testing are used to test whether
sentiment has an inuence on EUA returns. GARCH and Threshold GARCH are used
to test whether sentiment has an eect on volatility. In Section 4.5 we present the
results for the emissions market and climate change sentiment analysis separately. We
then present results concerning the control variables and the implications of our use of
a Multiple Hypothesis Testing framework. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.1.1 Background Literature
The research presented here is the rst investigation to explicitly examine sentiment, as
derived from social media, and the emissions market, and to do so using EUA, energy
and equity market index data at intra-day frequency. Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011)
and Koch et al. (2014) have used the EU Eurostat Economic Sentiment Index as a
measure of economic outlook. This index is gathered across the EU using a monthly
survey examining economic expectations in several markets across all EU members. In
both papers the sentiment measured concerns the whole economy and is not specic
to the EU ETS or indeed to the wider energy market. Our use of Twitter allows us
to be more targeted in our measurement of sentiment pertinent to climate change and,
more importantly, the EU ETS itself. Our work is also one of very few studies to take
account of the multiple comparisons problem inherent in the testing framework; which
is an important statistical robustness measure given the novelty of this research. This
multiple comparisons problem, as identied earlier, is the issue that some true null
hypotheses may be rejected falsely when many hypotheses are tested at the same time.
To correct for this we use a multiple hypothesis testing framework previously used in
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Sections 2.4.2 and 3.4.1 based on the work of Holm (1979), Romano et al. (2010) and
Cummins (2013a,b). We use this approach because this is a relatively new area for
research and so, we wish to be prudent and careful with our conclusions. In order to
measure the eect of sentiment, we add sentiment information to a fundamental model
of EUA prices which has been informed by the literature.
There have been several fundamental drivers of EUA prices identied in the liter-
ature. Oil, coal and gas prices have been found to be inuential by Alberola et al.
(2008), Fezzi and Bunn (2009), Bredin and Muckley (2011), Chevallier (2011a), Creti
et al. (2012), Aatola et al. (2013) and Ahamada and Kirat (2015). Stock markets
have been found to be inuential by Creti et al. (2012), Zhu et al. (2015) and Sousa
and Aguiar-Conraria (2015). There have also been many papers examining the mi-
crostructure of the European emissions markets, including Daskalakis and Markellos
(2009), Bredin et al. (2014) and, Chevallier and Sevi (2014). These show that there is
a link between volume and volatility at the microstructure level and that the jumps in
EUA prices are due to regulatory announcements. Also working at intra-day frequency,
Mizrach and Otsubo (2014) suggest that order book imbalances can predict returns for
up to three days, this would contradict the EMH, while Ibikunle et al. (2016) show that
eciency is improving as the market matures. In addition the ambient temperature
has been found to be inuential by Bredin and Muckley (2011), Chevallier (2011a) and
Ahamada and Kirat (2015). While it is possible to obtain intra-day nancial data it
was not possible to obtain intra-day temperature data, hence we base the EUA price
modelling in this chapter on the literature's suggestion of oil, coal, gas and market
indices, see Section 4.3.1.1. We build on the ndings of Chapter 3 which gave some
insight into the eect of regulatory announcements on EUA prices. Our overall aim is
to examine the eect of sentiment in professionally traded markets. In order to do this
we examine sentiment expressed in tweets. There has been quite a body of literature
to support the use of social media, and Twitter in particular, as a method of measuring
sentiment.
Social media analysis is particularly suited to the European emissions market because
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of the interplay of economic and political inuences in the market as attested to by Benz
and Trück (2009), Koch et al. (2014), Zhu et al. (2015) and Deeney et al. (2016a). The
demand for EUAs depends on the expectation of future industrial production which
drives greenhouse gas output (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2011 and Koch et al. 2014).
This is largely an economic matter, but the inclusion of particular industries in the EU
ETS and possible changes in regulations are a political matter. Therefore the price
of EUAs depends on both economics and politics, both of these subjects have been
investigated in the literature using sentiment measured from tweets. Examples of the
use of social media analysis applied to political issues are Parameswaran et al. (2013),
Siapera et al. (2015), Quinn et al. (2016) and Jull et al. (2016), who use DataSift, the
same source as this investigation, to examine political attitudes to war, utility pricing
and health issues (see Section 4.2.3 for more details). Corea and Cervellati (2015) and
Corea (2016) use Twitter sentiment from DataSift1 to investigate stock prices. In an
unpublished study, Rao and Srivastava (2012) examine several commodities, including
oil, using Twitter sentiment and Google search volume. They nd correlations between
sentiment and oil prices. Bollen et al. (2011) and Sprenger, Tumasjan, Sandner and
Welpe (2014) use Twitter to measure market sentiment and its eect on the Dow Jones
Industrial Average. Yang et al. (2015) show that the people who form a community by
communicating with each other using Twitter, send tweets whose sentiment is predictive
of stock markets. Sprenger, Sandner, Tumasjan and Welpe (2014) use the daily count
of tweets as conrmation that a news event has happened and as a method of nding
out precisely when an event happened. All these examples have in common the fact
that they all link political or nancial issues with online sentiment, and they are all
very recent. These investigations support the use of Twitter as a means of measuring
sentiment in the EU ETS.
1This leading supplier of news and media analytics is based in California USA. DataSift provided tweets with individual
sentiment scores for the period 17th Dec 2012 to 16th Dec 2013. See www.datasift.com
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4.1.2 Context
The literature cited above has shown that social media can provide useful information
for the study of a wide variety of topics. We now focus on the nancial markets relevant
work and in particular on our context of the EU emissions market. We examine whether
and why sentiment, measured by social media, has an inuence on the nancial markets
and how we might test this in general. We then specialise the discussion to make this
relevant for our study of sentiment eects on emissions markets. Of particular interest
is the behaviour of the emissions markets on the day the European Parliament rejected
the backloading proposal, which caused a sudden and sharp drop in EUA prices.
Social media sentiment is already used extensively in trading, a striking example is
seen on Tuesday 23rd April 2013 when the Associated Press Twitter account was hacked
and a false story posted claiming that there had been an attack on the White House.
This was accompanied by a drop in US stock prices2 which was quickly corrected.
More recently on 7th October 2016 there was a ash crash in the sterling/US dollar
exchange rate apparently due to one news story and the reaction of an algorithmic
trading programme3. The inuence of Twitter is not conned to sudden shocks but is
part of many rms' trading strategies4;5. Lynn et al. (2015) provide a basis for social
media sentiment analysis, suggesting that there are several aspects to interactions on
social media. Of interest here are the aspects of identity, relationship, reputation,
conversation and sharing. We see that tweets convey a writer's wish to reveal themselves
to some extent, to form relationships with others, to build up their reputation and to
share opinions and information. A further examination of the rationale behind sharing
commercially valuable information is given by Chen et al. (2014) who examine the
Seeking Alpha blog. Chen et al. (2014) list four reasons why writers are prepared to
place valuable information on a public forum: the writer gets attention, fame and a
2BBC report of the event http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-21508660 and Bloomberg News report
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-24/how-many-hft-rms-actually-use-twitter-to-trade both accessed
on 8th August 2016.
3The BBC report of this event http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37582150 and Bloomberg News report
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/pound-plunges-6-1-percent-in-biggest-drop-since-brexit-result
4A special report by CNBC was published at the end of June 2012, see http://www.cnbc.com/trading-on-twitter/
accessed on 11th August 2016.
5Twitter messages between farmers has been used by traders to estimate harvests. http://www.cnbc.com/id/41948275
accessed on 11th August 2016
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following; in the case of the blog Seeking Alpha, posters of messages get paid if people
read their blogs; writers get a chance to put their opinions into circulation and perhaps
x errors; and nally, writers get a chance to support their own positions so that the
market will move in their favour.
We see therefore that sentiment concerning equity, commodity and energy markets
is expressed on Twitter. We propose that sentiment regarding the EU ETS is also
expressed on Twitter and that this sentiment is associated with the price and volatility of
the EUAs. A parsimonious and direct explanation is that sentiment inuences emissions
traders. There is considerable evidence showing that professional traders are subject to
behavioural biases in their decisions as has been outlined earlier in Section 2.1. Coval
and Shumway (2005) show loss-aversion from intra-day trading data on the Chicago
Board of Trade; O'Connell and Teo (2009) show currency trader overcondence; Coates
and Herbert (2008) and Coates (2012) show that dierent testosterone levels, which are
linked to risky behaviours, are associated with dierent trading outcomes; Cummins
et al. (2015) and Dowling et al. (2016) show there are psychological price barriers even in
the professionally traded oil markets and in the metals markets. Of greatest relevance
to this chapter is the nding by Palao and Pardo (2012) showing that EUA traders
cluster their orders and prices around multiples of ve; that is, there is a behavioural
bias present in carbon traders to select multiples of 5c for the price and multiples of
5 for order sizes, especially when there is uncertainty in the market and when there is
low liquidity, neither of which is a rational explanation for this behaviour. Palao and
Pardo (2012) do not explain this behaviour as a result of sentiment but as a method
of quickly and cheaply managing information by restricting the number of choices from
which to select the specications for a trade. Having conrmed that there are irrational
behavioural biases by professional traders in many markets including the energy markets
and the EU emissions market, we propose that sentiment directly aects EUA traders'
decisions and hence EUA prices.
To test whether sentiment has an eect in the professionally traded emissions market,
we measure sentiment at intra-day frequency using Twitter. We relate this sentiment
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with intra-day EUA futures prices, while taking account of recognized control variables.
By nding that sentiment has an eect on the price and volatility of the profession-
ally traded EUA futures market, we show that the EMH does not provide a complete
description of EUA market behaviour and that sentiment must become part of the ex-
planation for EUA price dynamics. In this investigation we propose that sentiment is
directly related to the price and volatility of EUA futures. This is based on a similar
model used in Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015) (Chapter 2) where
an oil market sentiment index modelled on Baker and Wurgler (2006) was found to be
directly related to the price of crude oil futures.
The preliminary stage of the sentiment measure construction involves a scoping test
to identify search terms which are useful for selecting tweets concerning climate change
and the European emissions market, (see Section 4.2.1). The scoping test produces 17
terms6 giving 1,522,562 tweets which produce the climate change sentiment measures.
A more specic list of 5 search terms,7 focusing on the emissions market, yields 20,884
tweets which produce the Emissions Market sentiment measures used in our investiga-
tion. We use the sentiment score assigned by DataSift for each tweet, as well as the
sign of that score, as measures of sentiment. In addition we use the number of tweets as
our measure of Twitter trac intensity. The positive and negative sentiment scores are
treated separately because the literature suggests that positive and negative sentiments
behave dierently, see Soroka (2006), Akhtar et al. (2013) and Sprenger, Sandner, Tu-
masjan and Welpe (2014). These scores are used to form four time series based on the
sum and count of positive and negative tweets. A fth time series based on the Twitter
trac intensity is included. These ve series are used to test whether sentiment series
from the emissions market tweets and from the climate change tweets have an eect on
EUA price level and volatility.
The World Bank (2014) report on the EU emissions market summarized 2013 as
a year which had a formal endorsement of backloading and many uncertainties, in
6The terms used for the climate change sentiment were: backloading, carbon market, carbon price, carbon trading,
climate change, CO2, drought, emission, EU ETS, ood, fossil fuel, geothermal, GHG, global warming, greenhouse gas,
renewable and UNFCCC
7The terms used for the Emissions Market sentiment were: backloading, carbon market, carbon price, carbon trading
and EU ETS
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particular the backloading rejection by the EP. Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that
sentiment is at its most eective when fundamental data is lacking. This supports our
choice of 2013 as our test year in which to examine the eect of sentiment on the EU
emissions market.
Having considered the context used to examine sentiment in this particular profes-
sionally traded futures market, and in particular the events surrounding the rejection
of backloading by the European Parliament, we now summarise the ndings which are
explained in detail in Section 4.5.
The rst nding is that there is strong evidence of bi-directional Granger causality
between changes in emissions market sentiment and changes in EUA prices. Further,
we establish that periods of strong (weak) emissions market sentiment correspond with
periods of high (low) EUA return volatility. The second nding is that there is only very
weak evidence that Twitter sentiment concerning the general topic of climate change,
rather than specically the EU emissions market, is associated with EUA returns,
but the strength of climate change sentiment is associated with EUA volatility in a
similar manner to that of the emissions market. The third nding is that while energy
commodity prices, particularly NBP gas, Brent oil and to a lesser extent the FTSE, show
weak evidence of accounting for EUA prices, they show no evidence of predicting these
changes. This suggests that the emissions market assimilates new information from the
energy market eciently because there is some evidence that the energy variables, of
NBP gas, Brent oil and the level of the FTSE explain contemporaneous EUA prices,
but this ability is lost for information one hour into the future. Thus we may conclude
that the market has absorbed the information and adjusted prices in less than an hour.
4.2 Twitter Data
In this section the methods for selecting tweets, gathering sentiment scores for individ-
ual tweets, combining these scores into sentiment measures and calculating sentiment
impact are described. This entire process is carried out twice, once for tweets con-
cerning the general topic of climate change and once for tweets specically about the
82
emissions market. Tweets are selected by searching for particular words or combina-
tions of words, referred to as search terms, which occur anywhere in the text of any
tweet posted between 17th December 2012 and 16th December 2013. Location and
language are used as additional selection criteria. The sentiment analysis used is that
provided by DataSift8, which gives a sentiment score for each measurable tweet. If
positive sentiment is detected the score is an integer between 1 and 20 indicating the
intensity of the positive sentiment, if the sentiment is detected as negative, the score
is a negative integer between -1 and -20. It is important to treat negative and positive
sentiment separately as the literature indicates that they do not simply cancel each
other, see Soroka (2006), Sprenger, Sandner, Tumasjan and Welpe (2014) and Akhtar
et al. (2013). Sentiment time series are constructed to describe the sentiment on a
minute-by-minute basis, these are aggregated later into observation intervals of length
m minutes so as to be compared with the time series of EUA prices and control vari-
ables using the same observation interval. The use of intra-day sentiment data is one
unique element of this investigation. Four sentiment measures are constructed for both
the climate change tweets and the emissions market tweets for the 525,600 minutes
covering the period under investigation. The four one-minute-frequency time series for
both sets of tweets are respectively based on: (i) the sum of the positive scores during
each minute, (ii) the sum of the negative scores during each minute, (iii) the count of
the number of tweets containing positive sentiment during each minute, and (iv) the
count of the number of tweets containing negative sentiment during each minute. The
latter two series, based on tweet counts, reduce our reliance on the scaling accuracy of
the DataSift sentiment algorithm. A fth measure that we consider is the count of the
total number of tweets during each minute, irrespective of whether these tweets had
measurable sentiment or not. It thus produces a count of Twitter trac. This is used
to test whether DataSift's sentiment scoring method improves upon a simple count of
Twitter trac.
In order to create a simple and realistic model of the behaviour of sentiment, we
8This leading supplier of news and media analytics based in California, USA supplied tweets with sentiment scores
for the period 17th Dec 2012 to 16th Dec 2013. See www.datasift.com
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follow the method of Mitra et al. (2009) and Yu et al. (2013). This allows the sentiment
associated with a particular tweet to remain eective for a period after the tweet was
posted, and for this impact to decrease with time. The details of these procedures are
given below in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Selection of Tweets
To select the tweets for the analysis an initial scoping list of 44 words and phrases are
used as search terms, see Table 4.1. These terms concern climate change, global warm-
ing, renewable energy and the emissions market, and are collected from the indexes of
several published books namely, Kaplan (1983), Stern (2006), Serletis (2007), Ellerman
et al. (2010), Richter (2010) and Chevallier (2011a). Tweets which contain any one
of the search terms are selected, this includes occurrences where the search term is
prexed with a hashtag, e.g. #EU ETS. The scoping list search terms are: backload-
ing, biofuels, biogas, biomass, cap and trade, carbon, clean tech, climate, CO2, dioxide,
drought, electricity, emission, emitter, energy market, environment, EU ETS, EU Par-
liament, EUETS, ood, fossil fuel, geothermal, glacier, global warming, greenhouse gas,
hydrocarbons, hydroelectric, ice cap, IPCC, Kyoto Protocol, methane, pollution, power
plant, power sector, renewable, sea ice, sea level, smelting, sustainab, trading, UN-
FCCC, warming, wave energy and wind turbines . Note that EUA is not used as a
search term despite its obvious desirability, because it is an acronym for the USA in
French, Spanish, Catalan and Portuguese; it is likely that this would lead to confusion.
For each of these search terms a random sample of 100 tweets found by the search term
are manually checked for subject accuracy. If at least 70 of these tweets are accurate for
their stated subject the search term is used for the next stage of the Twitter selection
process. It is found that many search terms produce tweets which are not intended.
For example IPCC selects many tweets concerned with the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change but also produces tweets concerned with the Independent Police
Complaints Commission, which is from the UK. It is also found that carbon produces
tweets concerning greenhouse gases as well as carbon steel, carbon bre, carbon lters
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and the description of a colour. Those search terms which produce tweets that are
accurate concerning their subject in 70 or more cases are used to produce the climate
change list of 17 words namely: backloading, carbon market, carbon price, carbon trad-
ing, climate change, CO2, drought, emission, EU ETS, ood, fossil fuel, geothermal,
GHG, global warming, greenhouse gas, renewable and UNFCCC.
In addition to restricting the search to tweets containing any of these 17 search
terms, climate change tweets are selected to come from Europe and to be written in
English. The geographical origin of the tweets is determined by the time zone in the
tweet metadata, and the language is determined by the language detection system of
DataSift. The geographical restriction is to ensure subject accuracy. Twitter metadata
does include a location eld which is entered by the user, however the description of
the location is entirely at the user's discretion and is often null or refers to an unusable
location name. The geo-location function is another possible source of location data.
The diculty with this source is that it is not available to laptop and PC users, but
only to mobile phone users many of whom have disabled the function. This would
probably produce a sample with fewer tweets from people who post tweets from their
desks. The time zone is a particularly useful way to describe the location of the poster
of the tweet as it is copied from the computer's own settings and is likely to be correct.
Furthermore, on reading samples of time zones in the initial scoping list, it is clear that
almost all time zones are the names of capital cities e.g. Paris , and not as the name of
a time zone such as Central European Time. Hence we can be very condent that the
tweets originated in Europe. The restriction to English is to ensure that the authors
may check the subject accuracy of samples of the tweets. Again for reasons of accuracy
DataSift is used to verify the language rather than the user's self-description.
As well as building a set of sentiment measures based on the 17 words for the
climate change tweets, a second set of sentiment measures, based specically on the
emissions market is produced from tweets containing any of the 5 words: backloading,
carbon market, carbon price, carbon trading and EU ETS. The search terms to produce
these two sets of tweets, namely the climate change tweets and the emissions market
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Terms used for Tweet Search
Scoping backloading, biofuels, biogas, biomass, cap and trade, carbon, clean tech,
climate, CO2, dioxide, drought, electricity, emission, emitter, energy market,
environment, EU ETS, EU Parliament, EUETS, ood, fossil fuel, geothermal,
glacier, global warming, greenhouse gas, hydrocarbons, hydroelectric, ice cap,
IPCC, Kyoto Protocol, methane, pollution, power plant, power sector,
renewable, sea ice, sea level, smelting, sustainab, trading, UNFCCC, warming,
wave energy and wind turbines
Climate Change backloading, carbon market, carbon price, carbon trading, climate change,
CO2, drought, emission, EU ETS, ood, fossil fuel, geothermal, GHG, global
warming, greenhouse gas, renewable and UNFCCC
Emissions Market backloading, carbon market, carbon price, carbon trading and EU ETS
The table presents the search terms used for the scoping, climate change and emissions market tweet searches.
The Initial Scoping set of 44 terms were used to verify search term accuracy. Selections were made so that the
set of search terms in the climate change sentiment and emissions market lists were at least 70% accurate for
subject when random samples of 100 tweets for each term were checked, and the list of search terms for the
Emissions Market were specic to the EU ETS and not to a wider topic of climate change.
Table 4.1: Search Terms for Initial Scoping, Climate Change and Emissions Market Tweets
tweets, are listed in Table 4.1, their descriptive statistics are given in Table 4.2. In
total, 1,522,562 tweets concerning the topics of climate change, global warming, and
emissions markets formed the source for the climate change sentiment measures. The
smaller set of 5 search terms specically related to the emissions market, rather than the
broader topic of climate change, returned 20,884 tweets. The sentiment measures from
this smaller set of tweets is found to be very useful in explaining the level and volatility
of EUA returns, but there is no evidence from correlation or VAR tests that the climate
change sentiment measures are associated with EUA prices. There is evidence that a
high number of climate change tweets is associated with higher volatility. Thus from
this stage onwards in the investigation we mainly concern ourselves with emissions
market sentiment as this has a much richer association with both the direction and
volatility of EUA returns than the climate change sentiment. Descriptive statistics for
the emissions market and climate change tweets are found in Table 4.2, histograms are
found in Figures 4.6 on page 105 and 4.8 on page 108.
4.2.2 Verifying the Subject Matter of the Emissions Market Tweets
A very useful aspect of using tweets to measure sentiment is that samples of the selected
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N = 365 Emissions Market Tweets Per Day Climate Change Tweets Per Day
Total 20,884 1,522,562
Mean 57.22 4,171.40
Max 1,586 22,970
Min 2 2,074
Median 29 3,931
Standard Deviation 123.74 1,671.14
Skewness 7.86 5.26
Excess Kurtosis 79.77 49.52
Positive Tweets 21% 20%
Negative Tweets 18% 26%
Unclassied 61% 54%
The table presents descriptive statistics for the number of emissions market and climate change tweets per day
and the percentages of positive, negative and unclassied tweets. This includes the entire data set and is not
restricted to trading hours.
Table 4.2: Distribution of Emissions Market and Climate Change Tweets Per Day
tweets can be read individually to check for subject accuracy. This is the reason only
English language tweets are chosen. In practice it is not possible to read each tweet
but samples of 100 tweets found by each search term in the scoping list are tested for
accuracy. For each search term 100 tweets are randomly selected and if 70 or more of
these tweets are on the stated topic, the search term is used in the list of 17 search
terms which yield the climate change tweets. A smaller set of 5 search terms are used
to specically identify tweets which can only be concerned with the emissions market.
Since these emissions market tweets are fewer in number than the climate change
tweets and since it is found that the sentiment of these tweets is an inuence on EUA
returns and volatility, it is considered prudent to carry out some tests to check that
these tweets were actually on the correct topic of the EU ETS. The daily frequency
distribution of these tweets is compared with the number of newspaper stories per day
concerning the EU ETS following Sprenger, Sandner, Tumasjan and Welpe (2014) who
use the number of tweets to check the timing of actual news events. Following this
example we verify that the days with the largest numbers of emissions market tweets
correspond to days on which there are important events in the EU ETS as measured
by news stories found by Nexis Lexis. This verication is carried out using Lexis
Nexis to search for articles in European newspapers containing the phrases Emission
Allowances or EU ETS or Carbon Emissions. An exact replication of the search
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terms was not possible due to the search criteria availability in Lexis Nexis. As these
stories are written by professional journalists and selected by professional editors it is
reasonable to assume that they are relevant to events in the EU ETS. If the tweets
are concerned with events in the EU ETS then we would expect that large numbers of
tweets would be posted on the days when there are important events in the EU ETS
as conrmed by large numbers of newspaper stories on these days retrieved using Lexis
Nexis. This is indeed the case. On days on which there are high numbers of emissions
market tweets, there are high numbers of newspaper stories about the EU ETS, see
Table 4.3. It might be argued that the similarity between the numbers of news stories
and tweets is due to a common correlation between the day of the week and the number
of stories in the media. An example of this would be that there are more sports stories
on a Monday after the weekend or fewer nancial stories on days when the markets
are closed. It may also be argued that both tweets and print media follow a general
trend. The day of the week and trend eect is measured by regressing the number
of emissions market tweets per day against dummies for six of the days of the week
and a trend term; this is repeated for the number of newspaper stories each day. It
is found for example that there are signicantly fewer stories on a Friday compared
with a Monday. There is a very strong day of the week eect in the number of both
tweets and newspaper stories released concerning the emissions market, but there is no
evidence of a signicant trend during the year. This is somewhat unusual given the
general increase in Twitter activity, however the investigation deals with only a tiny
proportion, 0.0008%, of the total number of tweets9. The 10 days with the largest
excess numbers of emissions market tweets are presented in Table 4.3 along with the
corresponding numbers of newspaper stories. Excess numbers of tweets or newspaper
stories are the number actually published on that day less the number expected given
the day of the week and the trend, i.e., the residuals. The dates are sequenced in
decreasing order of number of excess tweets, and it can be seen that this corresponds
closely with the largest numbers of excess newspaper stories. It is also seen by reading
the new stories that on these days there were highly signicant events for the EU ETS.
9Source http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/ accessed on 6th September 2016
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This provides strong evidence that the emissions market tweets are veriably concerned
with the EU ETS, based on: (i) the origin of the search terms producing these tweets,
(ii) the distribution of the numbers of tweets coinciding almost exactly with important
EU ETS events, and (iii) reading large samples of the tweets. This study adds to
the literature by using the greater granularity of the intra-day Twitter information to
examine at what specic time within the day particular events happened, not just on
which days. This allows a much faster and more accurate estimation of returns and
volatility than estimations available using daily data, and as such is of practical benet
to traders. Having carried out the previous tests which indicate that the emissions
market tweets are associated with the emissions market, the next task is to produce
time series of the changes in sentiment of these tweets which may be compared with
time series of EUA, oil, coal, gas and the FTSE returns.
4.2.3 Sentiment Scores and the Calculation of Sentiment Impact
We now use the sentiment scores from both sets of tweets to produce intra-day time
series which can be used to test whether sentiment has a direct eect on the price and
volatility of EUAs. The sentiment scores are provided by DataSift; such scores have
been used in published research as a source of sentiment information. The accuracy of
the DataSift sentiment algorithm, which measures the sentiment of tweets, has been
attested to by Parameswaran et al. (2013) who nd it two to three times as accurate
as traditional data retrieval schemes. Quinn et al. (2016) use sentiment supplied by
DataSift to analyse public mood from tweets regarding a new public utility. Siapera
et al. (2015) use DataSift's sentiment scores to analyse tweets concerning violence in
the Middle East. Jull et al. (2016) use DataSift to measure issues relating to public
health. Corea and Cervellati (2015) use Twitter sentiment measured by DataSift to
predict the NASDAQ and nd that it improves an existing benchmark model. Corea
(2016) nds that the volume of tweets as collected by DataSift is a useful addition to
stock prediction models. We can therefore have condence that the sentiment scores
assigned by DataSift are reliable. The descriptive statistics for both emissions market
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Date Excess
Tweets
Excess
News
Stories
Event / Headline
16th April 2013 1,475.7 62.7 Backloading rejected by European
Parliament (EP)
3rd July 2013 992.1 49.1 Backloading Accepted by EP to be put to
individual states
15th April 2013 699.0 19.7 EU ETS faces crunch vote
19th June 2013 391.1 20.1 EP votes to freeze the number of permits
auctioned; Shenzhen starts the rst of
seven Chinese ETS and Kazakhstan plans
a national ETS
2nd July 2013 384.7 12.7 Zombie carbon markets to be shocked
back to life; ETS tension mounting ahead
of new EP vote on allowance backloading;
mixed far curves (futures market) as
region awaits CO2 vote.
17th April 2013 367.4 54.1 Backloading Rejected by European
Parliament (EP)
19th February
2013
337.7 39.7 The International Emissions Trading
Association supported the European
Commission's backloading proposal
12th April 2013 327.4 51.6 EU Commission is using an outdated list
to grant free EUAs; Agricultural Bank of
China to support Green Development
10th December
2013
253.7 110.3 Britain must press on with fracking;
Sinopec buys credits after formal opening
of Beijing carbon trading exchange
11th April 2013 238.4 63.6 CE Delft, the research group, suggests
that low CO2 prices can be corrected by
cutting free allowances; advance publicity
about the EU ETS facing a crunch vote
on 16th April
The table shows a list of the days which have the largest number of excess emissions market tweets. Excess
tweets are the dierences between the actual daily count of tweets and the numbers expected from a regression
model based on the day of the week and a trend term. The number of excess news stories is shown for
comparison.
Table 4.3: The Ten Days with the Most Excess Emissions Market Tweets
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tweets and climate change tweets have been summarized in Table 4.2, we note that there
are broadly similar proportions of positive, negative and unclassied tweets in both.
Further comments on the polarity of the climate change and emissions market tweets
are to be found in Section 4.2.4. We see that there are substantial numbers of tweets
which are unclassied, in these cases DataSift has found un-opinionated statements.
This is entirely normal in the eld of natural language processing.
Sentiment measured from tweets is precisely in line with the denition of Baker and
Wurgler (2007, p.129), a belief about future cash ows and investment risks which are
not justied by the facts at hand, as it is based on the expressed opinions of a commu-
nity of people. In sentiment analysis, such as used by DataSift, the sentiment detection
programme extracts opinionated text from tweets and ignores factual text. DataSift
assigns an integer between -20 and +20 to each tweet which it detects as containing
sentiment. It uses a proprietary sentiment detection programme where a positive num-
ber indicates a tweet with positive sentiment and a negative number indicates a tweet
with a negative sentiment. We initially construct four one-minute-frequency time se-
ries of sentiment for both the emissions market tweets and the climate change tweets
comprising, respectively, (i) the sum of the positive scores during each minute, (ii) the
sum of the negative scores during each minute, (iii) the count of the number of tweets
containing positive sentiment during each minute and (iv) the count of the number of
tweets containing negative sentiment during each minute. We add a fth series, Count
All, which is the sum of the number of tweets per minute, so as to produce a measure of
Twitter trac intensity. The search-based method of Da et al. (2015) is analogous this
fth measure Count All, in that it is a measure of the interest in the particular topics
identied by the search terms. In Da et al. (2015) these search terms are words such
as recession, bankruptcy, unemployment, price of gold, donation or savings.
The sums of positive and negative sentiment scores, the counts of positive and nega-
tive tweets and the total number of tweets per minute are not immediately useful as
time series because there are many zeros in these series, particularly for the emissions
market tweets due to the fact that there are many fewer of these tweets than minutes
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in the year. There is of course a more fundamental problem, namely that sentiment
one minute after a tweet has been posted cannot reasonably be considered to return
to zero because the person holding the sentiment may be assumed to hold on to their
opinion for longer than one minute. In order to model sentiment more realistically we
calculate sentiment impact following Mitra et al. (2009) and Yu et al. (2013). We set
the parameters so that the impact of each sentiment measure decreases during every
minute, becoming negligible, i.e. 1% of original impact, after a set number of days
termed the decay length. As we will use the Twitter trac intensity to test the e-
cacy of DataSift's sentiment algorithms, we treat the count of tweets (trac intensity)
exactly the same as the four sentiment series when we calculate the sentiment impact
measures. We dene for both the emissions market sentiment and the climate change
sentiment, the sentiment impact,
SentimentImpactPos;Sumt =
t DX
i=0
SentPos;Sumt i e
 ri (4.1)
SentimentImpactNeg;Sumt =
t DX
i=0
SentNeg;Sumt i e
 ri (4.2)
SentimentImpactPos;Countt =
t DX
i=0
SentPos;Countt i e
 ri (4.3)
SentimentImpactNeg;Countt =
t DX
i=0
SentNeg;Countt i e
 ri (4.4)
SentimentImpactAll Countt =
t DX
i=0
SentAll Countt i e
 ri (4.5)
where SentimentImpact;t is the impact of the indicated sentiment measure at minute
t; Sent;t i is the sum of the sentiment scores or counts during minute t   i; r is the
rate of decay of the sentiment impact and is chosen so that e rD = 0:01 when D is the
number of minutes in the decay length, see Yu et al. (2015). Thus the sentiment of a
particular tweet has a decreasing sentiment impact for several days (the decay length)
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after which its inuence is zero. Patton and Verardo (2012) have found a decay length
for the eect of news in the equity market of 2 to 5 days and Yu et al. (2013) conrm
these time periods. To ensure robustness we use decay lengths from two days to one
week; these give similar results.
These four series of sentiment impacts and the impact measure based on trac
intensity, of both emissions market and climate change tweets, are aggregated at m
minute observation intervals by summing each of the sentiment impact measures for
these minutes following the pattern of
SentImpact;(m)t=m =
tX
i=t m+1
SentImpact;i ;
subject to t
m
N, where m is the number of minutes in the observation interval. This
allows a range of granularities for the analysis of prices and sentiment which are chosen
so as to suit the EUA data availability, and chosen with m dividing into 600 so that an
observation interval does not straddle two trading days; the length of the trading day
is 600 minutes. The statistical properties of the resulting series at dierent observation
interval lengths is given in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The descriptive statistics show that the
series of sentiment impacts are reasonably stable when the length of the observation
interval is changed. The series themselves and their rst dierences were found to be
stationary using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. The choice of m = 60 for the main
results is to suit the EUA data and this choice is described in Section 4.3. In the testing
phase, several other values near to one hour frequency are used to ensure the results
are robust.
To examine the eect of sentiment on volatility we consider sentiment as being
either strong or weak, a binary variable. While it may be considered preferable to
use the sentiment impact variables directly in the GARCH and Threshold GARCH
variance equations, it is found that convergence is not attained using the Marquardt
steps method implemented in EViews, thus high/low sentiment is used. The use of
a binary variable does have the advantage that it places less reliance on the scaling
accuracy of the DataSift sentiment algorithms. The practice of characterizing sentiment
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with a binary variable has been quite useful and is found widely in the literature, for
example it is indicated by the sign of the Fama French RMRF10, which is excess return
on the market; this indicates a bull or bear market on a daily basis. Kim et al. (2014)
nds that investor disagreement predicts lower stock market returns during times of
low investor sentiment but it does not do so in times of high investor sentiment. Baker
and Wurgler (2006) nds that high or low sentiment is a predictor of rm value for
rms which are otherwise dicult to value. Here we use more detail than simply high
or low, but assign strong or weak to the positive and negative sentiment measures
separately, as well as strong or weak for the intensity of Twitter trac. For each of
the four sentiment impact measures and the trac intensity impact measure for both
emissions market and climate change sentmient, we dene sentiment as strong or weak
using the StrongSent;(m)t variable in Equations 4.6 to 4.10, for simplicity of labelling
we later refer to this variable as StrongSent;t . Sentiment or trac intensity for each
of the measures is considered to be strong if the magnitude of the sentiment impact
at that time is larger than the magnitude of the mean value of the sentiment impact.
Recall that each of the terms of each series has the same sign as each other term, except
possibly for terms equal to zero. This method is repeated using the median instead of
the mean and gives identical conclusions. Explicitly for each sentiment impact measure
we dene
StrongSentPos;Sumt =
8>><>>:
1; SentImpactPos;Sumt > MeanSentImpact
Pos;Sum
0; otherwise
(4.6)
StrongSentNeg;Sumt =
8>><>>:
1; SentImpactNeg;Sumt < MeanSentImpact
Neg;Sum
0; otherwise
(4.7)
StrongSentPos;Countt =
8>><>>:
1; SentImpactPos;Countt > MeanSentImpact
Pos;Count
0; otherwise
(4.8)
10The RMRF is the value weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks minus the one month Treasury
bill rate.
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StrongSentNeg;Countt =
8>><>>:
1; SentImpactNeg;Countt > MeanSentImpact
Neg;Count
0; otherwise
(4.9)
StrongSentAll Countt =
8>><>>:
1; SentImpactAll Countt > MeanSentImpact
All Count
0; otherwise
(4.10)
where MeanSentImpact; is the mean of the particular sentiment impact measure
taken over the whole period under investigation; we use an observation interval of one
hour, i.e.m = 60, for the reported tests in Section 4.5. The sum of negative sentiment
impacts is necessarily a series of non-positive terms, hence it is considered strong when
below its mean. The sum of positive sentiment impact and the counts of the numbers
of positive, negative and trac intensity is a series of non-negative terms, and as such
is considered strong when above its mean.
Having dened useful time series for both the climate change and emissions market
sentiment impact series, we now make some interesting observations.
4.2.4 Initial Observations of Climate Change Sentiment and Emissions
Market Sentiment
It is seen in Figure 4.3 that there is no obviously unusual behaviour in the climate
change sentiment counts or scores on 16th April, 1st February or 3rd July on which
the EUA returns have their largest daily changes, see Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The large
negative spike in climate change sentiment, on 5th December 2013 (C) in Fig 4.3, is due
to public reaction to ooding in Britain after a winter storm; there is no particularly
unusual behaviour in the returns of EUAs on that day. These observations suggest that
climate change sentiment is not strongly associated with EUA prices. This suggestion,
that climate change sentiment is largely unconnected to the EUA prices, is developed
later in Section 4.5. We see in Table 4.2, that there are slightly more negative tweets
about climate change than positive, while the reverse is true for the emissions market
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20 Minute N=7,620 Sum Pos Sum Neg Count Pos Count Neg Total Tweets
Mean 36.51 -29.94 8.84 6.47 39.60
Max 1036.62 0.00 244.41 108.03 842.07
Min 0.00 -476.77 0.00 0.00 1.33
Median 18.17 -18.83 4.51 4.08 23.63
Std Dev 69.77 37.74 16.33 8.17 59.77
Skewness 7.37 -4.56 7.18 4.92 6.46
Kurtosis 81.68 39.25 79.49 45.28 65.75
Hourly, N = 2,540 Sum Pos Sum Neg Count Pos Count Neg Total Tweets
Mean 37.23 -30.53 9.02 6.60 40.40
Max 1026.79 0.00 242.27 107.57 837.30
Min 0.01 -476.77 0.00 0.00 1.36
Median 18.52 -19.04 4.57 4.11 23.96
Std Dev 71.41 38.59 16.71 8.35 61.21
Skewness 7.33 -4.54 7.14 4.87 6.41
Kurtosis 79.74 38.34 77.56 43.87 64.11
Daily, N = 254 Sum Pos Sum Neg Count Pos Count Neg Total Tweets
Mean 36.51 -29.94 8.84 6.47 39.60
Max 1036.62 0.00 244.41 108.03 842.07
Min 0.00 -476.77 0.00 0.00 1.33
Median 18.17 -18.83 4.51 4.08 23.63
Std Dev 69.77 37.74 16.33 8.17 59.77
Skewness 7.37 -4.56 7.18 4.92 6.46
Kurtosis 81.68 39.25 79.49 45.28 65.75
The table presents descriptive statistics for each of the ve emissions market sentiment impact measures based on
the positive and negative tweet sentiment scores, and the counts of positive and negative tweets and the total num-
ber of tweets. Impacts are weighted means calculated from the sentiment measure provided by DataSift using
SentimentImpact;t =
t DP
i=0
Sent;t ie
 ri following Eqn 4.5 , where where Sent;t i is one of the sentiment measures
summed during minute t  i these being the sum of the positive scores per tweet, sum of negative scores per tweet, the
count of positive tweets, the count of negative tweets or the count of the all tweets; r is the rate of decay of sentiment
impact and is chosen so that e rD = 0:01 when D is the number of minutes in the decay length. Results are presented
for data at 20 minute, hourly and daily frequency.
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for Emissions Market Sentiment
Sum Pos Sum Neg Count Pos Count Neg Total Tweets
Sum Pos 1 -0.75 0.99 0.78 0.90
Sum Neg -0.74 1 -0.75 -0.99 -0.86
Count Pos 0.98 -0.77 1 0.80 0.92
Count Neg 0.76 -0.99 0.78 1 0.88
Total Tweets 0.89 -0.89 0.91 0.90 1
The table shows the correlations between the ve sentiment impact measures for the whole year. The top right shows
the results for hourly data, the bottom left shows results for daily data. The negative sentiment impact is recorded as a
negative number hence the negative correlation between sum of positive and sum of negative sentiment impact actually
means that larger values of positive sentiment occur together with larger values of negative sentiment.
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix for Sentiment Impact at Hourly and Daily Frequency
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The gure shows the EUA price for prompt December 2013 in Euro per tonne of CO2. A marks the large drop in price
on 16th April 2013.
Figure 4.1: Price of EUAs from 17th December 2012 to 16th December 2013
tweets. This is not surprising as the emissions market is of interest primarily to traders
and acionados of the EU ETS who are more likely to take a dispassionate attitude to
events, than is the general public in its opinions about climate change. It is plausible
that those who posted the large number of tweets in response to the storm on 5th
December 2017, related that event to climate change. This is because many people
associate extreme weather events with climate change.
The smaller set of ve search terms specically for the emissions market produces
sentiment measures which are seen to have a much clearer connection with the EUA
market. In Figure 4.4 we see that a large spike in the number of negative sentiment
tweets happens on the same day, 16th April (A), as there is a large negative change
in EUA returns (Figure 4.2). We also see that there is a large spike in the number of
positive sentiment tweets and a positive change in EUA returns on 3rd July (B). This
is conrmed later in the statistical tests outlined in Section 4.4. It is proposed later in
Section 4.4.1 that these two days be treated as outliers, so strong is their inuence.
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The gure shows a plot of the log returns of EUA December 2013 futures prices. A indicates the largest single daily
price movement on 16th April 2013. B indicates the price increase on 3rd July 2013.
Figure 4.2: Log Returns of EUA from 17th December 2012 to 16th December 2013
The gure displays the daily number of positive and negative climate change tweets during the period 17th Dec 2012 to
16th Dec 2013. The number of positive tweets is shown above the x-axis and the number of negative tweets is shown
below the x-axis. C indicates the peak of negative tweets on 5th December 2013.
Figure 4.3: Counts of Positive and Negative Climate Change Tweets from 17th December 2012 to 16th
December 2013
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The gure displays the daily number of positive and negative emissions market tweets during the period 17th Dec 2012
to 16th Dec 2013. The number of positive tweets is shown above the x-axis and the number of negative tweets is shown
below the x-axis. A indicates the peak of negative tweets on 16th April 2013 and B indicates the peak of positive
tweets on 3rd July 2013.
Figure 4.4: Counts of Positive and Negative Emissions Market Tweets from 17th December 2012 to
16th December 2013
4.3 Emission Allowance, Energy and Market Data
In this section we discuss the EUA tick data and the choice of the size of the observation
interval, the control variables, and some possible confounding inuences. Following
standard practice we use prompt December futures for EU emission allowance (EUA)
prices as these are the most liquid of the EUA futures contracts, following Mizrach
and Otsubo (2014) among others; the price data is supplied by the Intercontinental
Exchange in London.
4.3.1 EUA Trading Frequency
Compared with major energy commodities like oil, EUA futures are infrequently traded11
(see Table 4.6). It is not the objective of this research to examine the microstructure
of the EUA futures market. Very useful work on this has already been carried out
by Bredin et al. (2014), Chevallier and Sevi (2014), Mizrach and Otsubo (2014) and
Ibikunle et al. (2016). In order to determine whether sentiment is a signicant driver of
11As an illustration of this there were 286,493 transactions on the Brent futures January 2013 contract carried out on
one day, Wednesday 5th December 2012. There were 446,506 EUA futures December 2013 contracts traded in the year
from 17th Dec 2012 to 16th Dec 2013.
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returns and volatility, it is preferable to avoid microstructure eects. We must therefore
choose a suitably large value for m, the observation interval. Also in order to avoid
the bid-ask bounce, the EUA price is calculated during every minute as being equal to
the price during the previous minute, if there are no trades, or the mean of the trades
during that minute weighted by trading volume.12 This process is also followed for the
control variables of prompt month Brent, NBP gas and ARA coal futures as well as the
FTSE which are discussed in Section 4.3.1.1.
When a time series with an observation interval of m minutes is created for EUA
December 2013 futures contracts, it is found that there may be many observation in-
tervals with no trading activity, for example when we use m = 10 approximately 5% of
these observations do not include trades, see Table 4.6. The choice of m, the length of
the observation interval measured in minutes, is critical to the number of zeros in the
time series. Previous work by Andersen et al. (2001) looking at the Dow Jones found
the median duration (time between trades) was 23.1 seconds between trades, and a 5
minute observation interval was used to produce a time series. Similarly, Wang et al.
(2008) use a 5 minute observation interval for crude oil futures. Both of these markets
have far more frequent trades than the EU ETS. In Table 4.6 we see that if a series
of length m = 5 minutes is chosen then almost one sixth of these observation intervals
would have no trades recorded and hence would have zero as the value for the log return
while there would likely be non-zero entries for the control variables and for sentiment;
this would bias our ndings on the possible connections between these variables. The
issue is completely avoided by using daily frequency but this would lose much of the
information available in the dataset. A reasonable minimal standard is to require that
at least 99% of the periods have an EUA transaction. This would be achieved with
m > 20.
In addition to avoiding a large number of zeros in the time series we wish to avoid
the microstructure eects of the EUA futures market. By examining serial correlation
and order imbalances Chordia et al. (2005) nd that predictive ineciencies should
not persist beyond 60 minutes on the New York Stock Exchange. This suggests that
12The calculations are repeated using the median price with no noticeable changes to the results.
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Timescale, m N Mean No of Transactions No. of Zeros % Zeros
1 minute 151,800 2.9 83,765 55.18%
5 minutes 30,360 14.7 4517 14.88%
10 minutes 15,180 29.4 732 4.82%
15 minutes 10,120 44.1 200 1.98%
20 minutes 7,620 58.8 71 0.93%
60 minutes 2,530 176.5 6 0.24%
600 minutes 253 1,764.8 0 0
The table shows the numbers of transactions per observation interval for a series of choices of m the length of the
observation intervals in minutes. N is the number of such intervals during the year of our investigation. There were
446,506 transactions for EU emissions allowances on the futures market from 17th Dec 2012 until the expiry of these
contracts on 16th Dec 2013. We count only transactions which took place during trading hours of 0700 to 1700 London
time and exclude the backloading day 16th April 2013 as it was exceptional.
Table 4.6: Frequency of EUA Transactions
m = 60 would be a safe choice to avoid microstructure eects. A simple but eective
way to decide on the length is to select a value of m which reduces serial correlation
but retains intra-day frequency. There is very strong negative serial correlation for the
rst lag of the EUA futures returns when the frequency of the time series is set at
m = 5; 10; 15 and m = 20 minutes; this is expected for high frequency data. There is
very little evidence of serial correlation when m = 60 minutes from either PACF plots
or Durbin Watson tests. We thus conclude that the serial correlation, which is a feature
of the microstructure of the EUA market, is not strongly present at hourly frequency
and we use a value of m = 60 for our reported tests, however as a robustness check the
analysis will be repeated using a range of values for m.
4.3.1.1 Energy and Market Controls
Selecting from the the control variables used in Bredin and Muckley (2011), Chevallier
(2011a), Creti et al. (2012), Aatola et al. (2013), Ahamada and Kirat (2015), Oestreich
and Tsiakas (2015) and, Koch et al. (2016), and taking into account data availability,
we use Brent oil, NBP 13 gas and ARA14 coal prompt month futures as well as the
FTSE 100 for the control variables. We analyse log returns of EUA prices, the four
control variables of oil, gas, coal and the FTSE, and changes in sentiment, in a six
variable VAR model following the empirical evidence presented in Chevallier (2011a,b,
13NBP is the price of natural gas in the UK, the market is directly connected to the mainland and so NBP prices
reect prices across Europe.
14ARA is is API2 standard coal for delivery to Amsterdam, Rotterdam or Antwerp.
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20 Minute N=7,620 EUA Brent Oil ARA Coal NBP Gas FTSE
Mean x 10  6 14.2 -7.26 -2.72 -1.53 5.71
Max 0.263 0.012 0.176 0.044 0.008
Min -0.295 -0.001 -0.200 -0.083 -0.008
Median 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 0.014 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
Skewness 0.465 -0.074 -79.946 -8.388 -0.158
Kurtosis 100.63 6.43 2478.01 505.19 6.53
Hourly, N=2,540 EUA Brent Oil ARA Coal NBP Gas FTSE
Mean x 10 6 42.68 -21.77 -8.15 -4.58 17.12
Max 0.230 0.015 0.176 0.042 0.013
Min -0.433 -0.012 -0.200 -0.086 -0.009
Median x 10 6 0 0 0 0 76
Std Dev 0.021 0.003 0.0006 0.003 0.002
Skewness -2.53 0.122 -4.639 -5.16 -0.11
Kurtosis 97.67 5.29 840.21 178.03 5.496
Daily, N = 254 EUA Brent Oil ARA Coal NBP Gas FTSE
Mean x 10 6 426.81 -217.66 -81.48 -45.76 171.24
Max 0.268 0.025 0.176 0.046 0.026
Min -0.448 -0.024 -0.203 -0.078 0.017
Median x 10 6 -461.78 -43.87 0 -152.74 195.99
Std Dev 0.065 0.008 0.018 0.010 0.006
Skewness -0.564 -0.030 -1.836 -1.214 0.176
Kurtosis 13.46 3.37 91.44 17.12 4.03
The table presents descriptive statistics for log returns of EUA futures and the control variables of Brent oil, NBP gas,
ARA coal and the FTSE. Results are presented for data at 20 minute, hourly and daily frequency.
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics for Log Returns of EUAs and Control Variables
2013), Cummins (2012), Aatola et al. (2013) and, Sousa and Aguiar-Conraria (2015).
A VAR model is suited to the serial correlation which is a natural consequence of the
construction method of the sentiment impact series attested to in the literature by
Mitra et al. (2009) and, Yu et al. (2015).
We nd that the correlations between the ve sentiment measures, and the energy
and market control variables, are found to be not signicantly dierent from zero, except
for the correlations between the FTSE and Count Pos and Count Neg (see Table 4.9).
These two results from the 20 correlation tests were only just signicantly dierent from
zero at the 5% level. This possibly hints that the FTSE is susceptible to the sentiment
of the Emissions Market but is by no means conclusive and is not considered signicant
in the MHT framework. This supports our argument that sentiment itself inuences
EUA prices rather than being eective due to fundamental eects.
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LnR EUA LnR Brent LnR Coal LnR Gas LnR FTSE
LnR EUA 1 0.046* 0.003 0.069* 0.032
LnR Brent 0.116 1 -0.010 0.080* 0.181
LnR Coal 0.032 -0.072* 1 0.012 -0.022
LnR Gas 0.095* 0.098* -0.047* 1 0.020
LnR FTSE -0.043* 0.234 0.056* -0.052* 1
The table presents the correlations of the log returns of the EUA and control variables. The top right presents
results for hourly data, the bottom left presents results for daily data. The 5% signicance level (indicated *)
is 0.0389 for a sample size of N=2,540 (hourly, top right) and 0.1231 for a sample of N=254 (daily, bottom
left).
Table 4.8: Correlation Matrix for EUA and Control Variables
Brent NBP Gas Coal FTSE
Sum Pos 0.005 -0.019 -0.001 0.010
Sum Neg -0.003 0.020 -0.004 -0.009
Count Pos 0.015 -0.008 0.002 -0.048*
Count Neg 0.013 -0.007 0.000 0.044*
Count All 0.009 -0.010 -0.000 -0.032
The table presents the correlations of the ve sentiment measures and the control variables. The signicance
level at 5% is indicated (*) by values whose absolute value is above 0.0389 for a sample size of N=2,540.
Table 4.9: Correlation Matrix for Sentiment and Control Variables
4.4 Statistical Testing
Having selected intra-day control variables we wish to test for an association between
carbon market sentiment, measured from tweets, and the returns of EUA futures con-
tracts. As this is the rst investigation into the eect of such explicitly dened sentiment
in the EU ETS we propose a straightforward model, that sentiment drives both price
and volatility of EUA prices. A similar direct association was found between senti-
ment and oil prices in Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015). In order
to investigate the dynamic links between sentiment and EUA returns we use a vector
autoregression (VAR) model to examine the eects of lagged variables and the possible
Granger causality between sentiment and returns as used by Sousa and Aguiar-Conraria
(2015). This is necessary to take account of the serial correlation which is induced in
the sentiment impact measures due to their method of construction. In order to test
the possible links between sentiment and the volatility of EUA returns we use GARCH
and Threshold GARCH models, see Chevallier (2011a). A Threshold GARCH model
is useful as it allows the model to respond dierently to negative shocks and positive
shocks. It is found that there is a signicant improvement using the Threshold GARCH
103
Figure 4.5: Daily Frequency of Emissions Market Tweets
model compared with the GARCH model.
In order to directly test the association of the control variables and emission al-
lowances we use a simple multivariate regression. This conrms the VAR results and
the choice of control variables. As we are carrying out many hypothesis tests we use
a multiple hypothesis testing framework to take account of the multiple comparisons
problem, see Section 4.5.4. Following standard practice we restrict or attention to
trading hours, which are from 0700 to 1700 London time following Zhu et al. (2015).
4.4.1 Identication of Outliers
It is suggested by examining the histograms of the number of tweets per day, that
there may be outliers in both the numbers of emissions market tweets and the climate
change tweets (Figures 4.6 and 4.8). This is supported by the events in the European
Parliament as described in Section 4.3. In Figure 4.6, a histogram of the number of
emissions market tweets per day, we see that the days 16th April (A) and 3rd July (B)
would appear to be outliers while 15th April may also be an outlier. In Figure 4.8, a
histogram of the number of climate change tweets per day we see that the days 5th
December (C), 6th December (D) and 27th September (E) may be outliers. We now
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discuss the identication of outliers in these two sets of data separately.
The gure displays the histogram of the frequency of occurrences of emissions market tweets per day. A
indicates 16th April 2013 (1,586 tweets), B indicates 3rd July 2013 (1,079 tweets) and the next highest
number of tweets on a single day (762) occurred on 15th April 2013.
Figure 4.6: Histogram of the Daily Frequency of Emissions Market Tweets
We see from the list of excess emissions market tweets in Table 4.3 that the 16th April
2013 and the 3rd July are in 1st and 2nd position for the largest number of emissions
market tweets for the year under consideration. It is also the case that the 15th April
and the 2nd of July are in 3rd and 5th positions. This suggests that the large numbers
of tweets are connected with extreme events at these two times. Furthermore we see
on a scatter plot of changes in emissions market Twitter intensity and EUA returns
(Figure 4.10) that these two days are farthest away from the centre of the data. We
therefore have reasonably strong evidence suggesting that these days 16th April and
3rd July are outliers. The explanation for this extreme behaviour is that on 16th April
2013 there was a narrow rejection of backloading by the European Parliament which
caused a huge drop in EUA December 2013 futures prices from ¿4.76 at the close of
business on 15th to ¿3.09 at the close of business on 16th; the drop in the price of the
June 2013 expiry futures was even larger but we use December futures as they are the
most liquid of the futures. This was accompanied by the largest number of emissions
market tweets on a single day (1,586) see Figure 4.5. On 3rd July 2013 the European
Parliament decided to send the backloading decision back to national parliaments. This
caused the price of EUAs to rise from ¿4.29 to ¿4.69 a rise of 9.3%. While this is a
less dramatic change in EUA prices it was accompanied by the second-largest number
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The plot shows the price of EUAs during each minute from 10am GMT to 11am GMT on 16th April
2013, the day of the rejection of the backloading proposal by the European Parliament. The missing
lines are due to minutes during this hour when there were no trades.
Figure 4.7: Price of EUA Futures during the backloading decision of the European Parliament
of tweets on a single day (1,079).
The sudden collapse in the price of EUAs occurred at 10:41am GMT and can be
seen in Figure 4.7. This was due to the European Parliament rejecting a plan which
had been intended to support the price of EUAs under a proposal of the European
Commission to withhold 900 million EUAs from the market and release them at a later
date in Phase I of the EU ETS. This process, known as backloading, was proposed as
a way to address the historical oversupply of allowances that resulted from the general
over-allocation of allowances by Member States to their industries during Phases I and
II of the scheme. Backloading was aimed at supporting EUA prices while holding on
to the support of EU states who wanted to maintain the supply of EUAs in the long
term. Given the size of this price change it is an ideal opportunity to verify that there
is an association between Twitter sentiment and EUA price changes. Later in the year,
on 3rd July 2013, there was a decision of the European Parliament to pass discussions
about backloading to national parliaments. This increased EUA prices by a lesser
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amount than the previous fall. These two days had the largest number of emissions
market tweets per day for the year and as such represent important subjects for further
investigation. The large number of emissions market tweets (see Figure 4.5) suggests
that there is a very close association between tweets regarding the EU ETS and the
EUA price.
While these two days provide an illustration that emissions market tweets and EUA
price returns are strongly associated, they have the characteristics of outliers which
would be capable of driving the results of tests. In order to investigate the unexceptional
behaviour of EUA returns it is prudent to run such tests both with and without these
two backloading events.
On examination of the climate change tweets daily histogram in Figure 4.8 we note
that there are three days which have exceptionally large numbers of tweets, the 5th
(C) and 6th (D) December 2013 and 27th September 2013 (E). These dates do not
have unusual behaviour in EUA returns. The cause of the large number of tweets in
December was ooding around Britain which produced a huge public reaction15, the
sentiment of which was measured as negative (see Figure 4.4). On 27th September
2013 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its report IPCC
(2013) indicating that it was extremely likely that humans were responsible for climate
change. This also produced a large response in the print media16. While there is less
analytic evidence for these three days being outliers it is prudent to repeat the analysis
of the eect of climate change sentiment on EUA returns both with and without these
three days.
4.4.2 VAR Model and Granger Causality
Following Chevallier (2011a,b, 2013), Cummins (2013b), Aatola et al. (2013) and, Sousa
and Aguiar-Conraria (2015) we use a VAR model to examine the interactions between
the EUA price, emissions market sentiment and the control variables; we also test for
Granger causality. Most recently Chen, Muckley and Bredin (2017) addresses the issue
15In total 1,895 sources in the UK media reported ooding in a search conducted using Lexis Nexis for 5th and 6th
December 2013.
16In total 1,259 sources were found by Lexis Nexis for the search term climate change on 27th September 2013.
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The gure displays the histogram of the frequency of occurrences of climate change tweets per day. C indicates
5th December 2013 (22,970 tweets), D indicates 6th December 2013 (12,611 tweets) and E indicates 27th
September 2013 (15,083 tweets).
Figure 4.8: Histogram of the Daily Frequency of Climate Change Tweets
The gure presents the histogram of daily log returns of EUA futures. A indicates the log returns on 16th
April 2013.
Figure 4.9: Histogram of Daily Log Returns of EUAs
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The scatter plot shows the log returns of EUA price (horizontal) and the change in the number of tweets per
day. The proposed outliers are indicated as A and B.
Figure 4.10: Scatter Plot of the Daily Log Returns and Daily Change in the Number of Emission
Market Tweets
of the existence of long run behaviour in EUA tick data. Chen, Muckley and Bredin
(2017) use a test by Lo (1991) and nd no evidence for long run memory, this encourages
the use of a VAR model. The lack of evidence of long run memory repeats ndings by
Nazi and Milunovich (2010) who had previously found that there was no long term
relationship between EUA prices and energy commodities.
Following Sousa and Aguiar-Conraria (2015), Chevallier (2011b) and Aatola et al.
(2013) we analyse the three energy prices Brent, NBP gas and ARA coal futures, the
FTSE, and the EUA futures prices in a dynamic VAR setting to take in to account the
possible lagged associations between the EUA prices and the control variables. This
will allow likely serial correlation to be accounted for in the model which will be present
in the sentiment measures.
For both emissions market sentiment and climate change sentiment, the four senti-
ment impacts are used, namely the sentiment impact based on the sum of the positive
sentiment scores, the sum of the negative scores, the count of the positive tweets and
the count of the negative tweets. The correlations between positive and negative emis-
sions market sentiment measurements are tested at hourly and daily frequency and
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Variable ADF ADF + Trend KPSS KPSS + Trend
4EUA 9.8 x 10 9 2.8 x 10 7 > 0.1 > 0.1
4Brent 5.3 x 10 16 4.9 x 10 16 > 0.1 > 0.1
4NBP 6.8 x 10 29 1.6 x 10 30 > 0.1 > 0.1
4FTSE 1.6 x 10 28 5.1 x 10 30 > 0.1 > 0.1
4Coal 1.9 x 10 27 1.5 x 10 28 > 0.1 > 0.1
4PosSumSent 1.3 x 10 9 1.3 x 10 8 > 0.1 > 0.1
4NegSumSent 2.3 x 10 9 1.9 x 10 8 > 0.1 = 0.1
4PosCountSent 1.9 x 10 12 1.9 x 10 11 > 0.1 > 0.05
4NegSumSent 2.0 x 10 10 2.1 x 10 10 > 0.1 > 0.1
4AllCountSent 8.8 x 10 11 4.8 x 10 10 > 0.1 > 0.1
The table presents the p-values of the stationarity tests for the variables. The Augmented Dickey Fuller
(ADF) test has a null of non-stationarity. The Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test has a null of
stationarity. The results show strong evidence to accept that the variables are stationary. Models with the
addition of a constant, and with the addition of a constant and a trend are used for robustness.
Table 4.10: Stationarity Test Results
are presented in Table 4.5. These show that positive and negative sums and counts are
strongly correlated, hence these variables are tested separately. The two measures based
on counts of tweets rather than sum of scores lose information by replacing the scaled
sentiment measure assigned to each tweet with a count-based measure, this approach
serves as a useful robustness check as it removes reliance on the accuracy of the scaling
of the sentiment measure. An additional fth measure is used which is the number
of tweets per observation interval. This allows the ecacy of the sentiment analysis
to be tested. In order to compare the relative size of the inuences of sentiment and
the energy market, variables are standardized. All variables are tested for stationarity
using the ADF and KPSS tests, see Table 4.10. We use the FTSE as a measure of eco-
nomic activity and omit the price of electricity because Aatola et al. (2013) and Fezzi
and Bunn (2009) suggest that electricity price is endogenous. The Akaike information
criteria are used to decide the optimal lag lengths for the VAR. Explicitly the VAR
equations are
EUAt = +
11X
i=1
fEUA;EUAiEUAt i + EUA; SentiSentt i + EUA;BrentiBrentt i
+EUA;CoaliCoalt i + EUA;GasiGast i + EUA;FTSEiFTSEt ig+ t
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Sentt = +
11X
i=1
fSent; EUAiEUAt i + Sent; SentiSentt i + Sent;BrentiBrentt i
+Sent; CoaliCoalt i + Sent;GasiGast i + Sent; FTSEiFTSEt ig+ t
Brentt = +
11X
i=1
fBrent; EUAiEUAt i + Brent; SentiSentt i + Brent;BrentiBrentt i
+Brent; CoaliCoalt i + Brent;GasiGast i + Brent; FTSEiFTSEt ig+ t
Coalt = +
11X
i=1
fCoal; ; EUAiEUAt i + Coal; SentiSentt i + Coal; BrentiBrentt i
+Coal; CoaliCoalt i + Coal;GasiGast i + Coal; FTSEiFTSEt ig+ t
Gast = +
11X
i=1
fGas;EUAiEUAt i + Gas; SentiSentt i + Gas;BrentiBrentt i
+Gas;CoaliCoalt i + Gas;GasiGast i + Gas; FTSEiFTSEt ig+ t
FTSEt = +
11X
i=1
fFTSE;EUAiEUAt i+FTSE; SentiSentt i+FTSE;BrentiBrentt i
+FTSE;CoaliCoalt i + FTSE;GasiGast i + FTSE;FTSEiFTSEt ig+ t
where the log return variables of EUA, Brent, Coal, Gas, FTSE are as before.
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The VAR analysis is repeated for each of the four measures of sentiment and also for
the Twitter trac intensity measures of both emissions market sentiment and climate
change sentiment.
4.4.3 Control Variable Association with EUA Prices
The choice of control variables is tested both contemporaneously and predictively.
These control variables are chosen from the literature as detailed above in Section
4.3.1.1 notably Bredin and Muckley (2011), Chevallier (2011a), Creti et al. (2012), Aa-
tola et al. (2013), Lutz et al. (2013), Ahamada and Kirat (2015), Oestreich and Tsiakas
(2015) and, Koch et al. (2016). Here we aim to verify that these variables are useful at
high frequency and further, we wish to test if they have predictive value. In order to
examine the ecacy of the control variables contemporaneously we use a multivariate
regression equation
EUAt = + BrentBrentt + NBPNBPt + CoalCoalt + FTSEFTSEt + "t:
(4.11)
where EUAt is the log return series of the EUA Dec 2013 futures, Brentt is the
log return of the prompt month Brent oil futures, NBP is the log return of the prompt
month National Balance Point natural gas price, ARAt is the log return of rst month
API2 grade Coal for delivery to Amsterdam, Rotterdam or Antwerp, FTSE is the
log return of the FTSE, and the  coecients are calculated by OLS regression. To test
whether there is any association between one hour lagged control variables and EUA
returns we test the equation
EUAt = +BrentBrentt 1+NBPNBPt 1+CoalCoalt 1+FTSEFTSEt 1+"t
(4.12)
The data for the control variables are supplied by the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).
The size of the observation interval is measured in minutes and denoted m, this allows
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the testing to be carried out at a range of frequencies. To avoid the inuence of
microstructure we choose m = 60, a range of values near to this is used as a robustness
test. Results are presented for one hour ahead predictions. In order to compare the
relative size of the inuences of the controls, variables are standardized. All variables
are tested for stationarity using the ADF and KPSS tests.
4.4.4 GARCH Specication
It has long been the case that sentiment and volatility have been considered to be al-
most synonymous, see Brown (1999), Whaley (2000) and, Baker and Wurgler (2006).
We examine this connection by adding sentiment to a volatility model and measuring
any improvement in the model using a likelihood ratio test. This method of adding a
variable to the variance equation is based on a suggestion by Reider (2009) and similar
use by Lu and Chen (2011), Kumari and Mahakud (2015) and Deeney et al. (2016a).
GARCH models have been found to be very useful for data which has volatility clus-
tering such as equity markets and commodity futures. We use a standard GARCH(1,1)
and a Threshold GARCH(1,1) to test whether the inclusion of sentiment information
improves the volatility modelling. We use a binary indicator of strong or weak level
of sentiment which takes the value +1 when the sentiment is higher than the mean,
and zero otherwise; for the sum of negative sentiment which is measured using negative
numbers, we set the dummy variable to +1 when the sentiment impact is below the
mean, see Equations 4.6 to 4.10. As a robustness check, the analysis is repeated using
the median in the place of the mean. We use the usual four measures of sentiment
impact based on the count of positive tweets, the count of negative tweets, the sum of
the positive sentiment scores and the sum of the negative sentiment scores. In addition
we also test the count of all tweets.
There is an inconsistency between the assumption of constant volatility required for
regression and VAR models, and the use of GARCH models which examine the vari-
ability in volatility and often nd such variability. An important principle in statistics
is that All models are wrong; some models are useful (Box et al.; 1978). Thus we have
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in the literature widespread use of models using the assumption of constant volatility.
For example the following use VAR models for EUA data Chevallier (2011a,b, 2013),
Cummins (2012), Aatola et al. (2013) and, Sousa and Aguiar-Conraria (2015). Most
recently Chen, Muckley and Bredin (2017) use an event study methodology which like-
wise assumes a constant volatility. At the same time we have papers using GARCH
models which test for, and usually nd, variations in the volatility of EUA data, such
as Miclaus et al. (2008), Paolella and Taschini (2008), Benz and Trück (2009), Regnard
and Zakoian (2011), Wang and Wu (2012) Lutz et al. (2013), Venmans (2015) and
Zeitlberger and Brauneis (2016). Indeed in the oil literature there are papers which use
both assumptions of constant volatility and examine how the volatility changes using
GARCH models such as Aboura and Chevallier (2013), Wolfe and Rosenman (2014)
and Kim (2015). We can have condence that the EUA data is reasonably close to con-
stant volatility as the ADF and KPSS tests failed to nd evidence of non-stationarity
and we are further assured that our testing is reasonable due to the support from the
literature.
4.4.4.1 GARCH(1,1)
We t the standard GARCH(1,1) model as used by Benz and Trück (2009), Obern-
dorfer (2009) and Chevallier (2011a), and then add a sentiment term to test whether
this improves the model measuring the improvement with a likelihood ratio test. The
equations for the GARCH model are
EUAt = + EUAt 1 + t; t  i:i:d:(0; 2t )
2t = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + 
2
t 1 + StrongSentt 1 (4.13)
where EUAt is the log returns of the EUA price,  is the drift,  is the coecient
of rst order auto-correlation, 0; 1; ;  are constants, t is the error term with mean
zero and conditional variance 2t , and StrongSentt 1 is one of the binary indicators of
sentiment dened in Equations 4.6 to 4.10. These take the value 1 when the sentiment
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impact is larger than the mean and zero otherwise. For the sum of negative sentiment
impact, which is non-positive, StrongSentt takes the value 1 when it is below the
mean. We test a series of 4 sentiment impacts based on the count of positive and
negative tweets, the sum of the sentiment of positive and negative tweets and also use
the total number of tweets.
4.4.4.2 Samuelson Hypothesis and Time Patterns in the Data
The volatility of EUA returns are likely to be inuenced by the Samuelson hypothesis
and by the time of day. To verify that the Samuelson hypothesis, suggested by Samuel-
son (1965), Andersen et al. (2001), Chang et al. (2009) and, Duong and Kalev (2008)
is not confounding the results, we repeat the volatility tests with dummy variables for
each of the 12 months, recall that the data covers 13 consecutive months from Dec 2012
to Dec 2013. We then repeat the analysis again with data only up to the end of Novem-
ber 2013 following Chevallier and Sevi (2014). This did not change the conclusion that
there was a highly signicant eect of sentiment on volatility. There is often a high
level of volatility due to high frequency of transactions, after opening and before closing
of markets each day, see Cont (2011), and so to avoid this inuencing our conclusions,
we test the eect of the time by allocating dummy variables for each of the nine hours
after the rst trading hour each day. There is little evidence that time of day has any
inuence on price level. Time of the day is shown to inuence volatility, but it does not
change the conclusion that sentiment has an inuence on volatility. A lesser concern is
that the deviation of the present temperature from the seasonal average has been shown
to be an inuence on EUA prices, see Bredin and Muckley (2011), Mansanet-Bataller
et al. (2011) and Alberola et al. (2008), however intra-day temperatures and intra-day
average temperatures were not available. As a robustness test the analysis is repeated
with the control variables in the mean equation, the same conclusions followed.
4.4.4.3 Threshold GARCH (1,1)
The explanation for dierent eects of positive and negative sentiment is present in the
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The plot shows the mean number of emissions market tweets per hour during the year. Hours are in
local time labelled for the end of each hour.
Figure 4.11: Mean Frequency of Tweets per Hour
literature, notably the negativity eect mentioned by Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006),
Soroka (2006), Akhtar et al. (2013) and Sprenger, Sandner, Tumasjan and Welpe (2014)
(see Section 4.2). This is based on the idea that market participants are over-optimistic
on average, recall that there were more positive emissions market tweets than negative,
see Table 4.2, and so respond more strongly to bad news than to the good news they had
been expecting, see Liu et al. (2014) and Feng et al. (2011). This behaviour is modelled
well by a Threshold GARCH model which allows negative shocks to add to the variance
independently from positive shocks. The particular form of the Threshold GARCH
model used here is selected as it is the same as the GARCH model with the addition of
one variable. This makes it possible to test the improvement of the Threshold GARCH
compared with GARCH using a likelihood ratio test. Threshold GARCH is used by
Alberola et al. (2009), Chevallier (2009) and, Byun and Cho (2013) to model EUA
price dynamics. It is found that the addition of the threshold term (2(
 
t 1)
2), term
signicantly improves the Threshold GARCH model compared with the GARCH model
in all ve applications, see Table 4.14. Following the same nomenclature as Eqn 4.13
we test the following Threshold GARCH specication following (Chevallier; 2009),
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EUAt = + EUAt + t; t  i:i:d:(0; 2t )
2t = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + 2(
 
t 1)
2 + 2t 1 + StrongSentt 1 (4.14)
where  t 1 is the value of the previous residual when it is negative and zero otherwise,
so that the coecient 2 measures the excess volatility due to a negative residual. The
same robustness tests are carried out as for the GARCH model regarding the Samuelson
hypothesis and U-shaped daily volatility.
4.5 Results
We nd there is very strong evidence that sentiment measured from tweets concerning
the emissions market has an eect on the level and volatility of EUA prices. Using
a vector autoregressive (VAR) model we nd that changes in the sentiment measured
from tweets concerning the EU emissions market predicts EUA returns and we nd
there is bi-directional Granger causality between changes in negative sentiment and
EUA returns. There is very strong evidence from the Threshold GARCH model that
stronger than average levels of emissions market sentiment are associated with higher
levels of volatility of EUA returns. There is only very weak evidence that climate
change sentiment inuences the levels of EUA futures but there is evidence that strong
climate change sentiment is associated with high levels of EUA returns volatility. Thus
we see that tweets from the emissions market have a richer insight into EUA behaviour
than the more general category of climate change tweets. We nd that there is some
weak evidence that the returns of oil, gas and to a lesser extent the FTSE, can ex-
plain EUA returns, but that there is no evidence of predictability for a period of one
hour (or longer). This suggests that the emissions market eciently assimilates energy
information into prices.
We repeat our tests to consider the eect of including or excluding the outliers and
nd that the observations in Section 4.4.1 were correct. The inclusion or exclusion of
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16th April and 3rd July does change the conclusions for the positive emissions senti-
ment measures, but not for the negative emissions sentiment measures or the count of
emissions tweets. These days had large spikes in the number of emissions market tweets.
This supports the decision to omit the outliers from reported results. The inclusion or
omission of the outliers of 5th and 6th December 2013 and 27th September does not
change the climate change sentiment results. These days produced large spikes in the
numbers of tweets posted concerning climate change.
In this investigation many hypothesis tests are carried out which leaves the con-
clusions open to the multiple comparisons problem. In Section 4.5.4 we see the eect
that this has on the conventionally signicant results. Coecients which are considered
signicant under the more stringent conditions of the MHT framework are in bold text
in tables of results. We now examine the results for emissions market sentiment and
climate change sentiment separately.
4.5.1 Results for Emissions Market Tweets
We discuss the ndings for the emissions market sentiment in greater detail rst looking
at the outliers, then discussing the connection between changes in sentiment and changes
in EUA prices, and nally looking at the eect of strong sentiment on volatility. The
use of a multiple hypothesis testing framework follows in Section 4.5.4.
4.5.1.1 Outliers for Emissions Sentiment
When the VAR tests and Granger causality tests are carried out, including and exclud-
ing the two outliers of 16th April and 3rd July, we nd that there is a considerable
dierence in the outcomes. Table 4.11 shows that for the two positive sentiment mea-
sures, Sum Pos and Count Pos, there is a much reduced signicance when the two
outliers are omitted. The results for the count of tweets measure is less signicant
but remains. This indicates that these two outliers are driving these results. There
is however, very little change for the two measures of negative sentiment for the VAR
analysis.
We see in Table 4.12, the summary of the Granger causality tests, that there is no
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Including Outliers Excluding Outliers
Lags 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Sum Pos + + - + -
+ -
Count Pos + + - + -
+ - -
Sum Neg - - + + + - - + + +
- + + - + +
+ + + +
Count Neg + - - - - - + -
+ - - - -
- - - -
All Tweets + - + - - - + - - +
+ - + - - +
- + - - +
The table presents a summary of the p-values and signs of the sentiment coecients in the EUA equations of
the VAR analysis. + indicates a positive coecient. - indicates a negative coecient. The number of + or
- signs arranged vertically indicates the level of signicance, one for 10%, two for 5% and three for 1%. The
left side of the table shows the results when the two outliers of 16th April and 3rd July are included, the right
side shows results when these two days are excluded. The numbers indicate the lag length for the sentiment
measured in hours. The total lag length of 11 was chosen by Akakie information criteria.
Table 4.11: Summary of VAR Analysis for Emissions Market Sentiment Measures and Inclusion /
Exclusion of Outliers
signicant evidence that either of the positive sentiment measures Granger-cause EUA
prices when the two outliers are excluded. There is little change to the conclusions for
the two negative sentiment measures or to the count of tweets measure when the outliers
are excluded. The VAR and Granger causality results conrm the indications which
were discussed in Section 4.4.1 that the events of 16th April and 3rd July are outliers,
hence they are omitted from the results presented below, these results are included in
the Appendices.
4.5.1.2 VAR and Granger Causality Results for Emissions Market Tweets
A VAR analysis is well suited to this application because there is a high degree of serial
correlation in the sentiment impact variables due to their construction. The results
of the VAR analysis are summarized in Tables 4.11 and 4.13. The data is tested for
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Including Outliers Excluding Outliers
Sum Pos 0.1029 0.2331
Count Pos 0.0450 0.1706
Sum Neg 0.0000 0.0001
Count Neg 0.0000 0.0001
Count All 0.0000 0.0014
The table presents the p-values of the Granger Causality tests of whether the changes in the various measures of emissions
market sentiment Granger Cause EUA futures returns.
Table 4.12: Summary of Granger Causality Results for Emissions Market Sentiment
stationarity using the ADF and KPSS tests which nd the time series to be I(0). The
lag lengths are selected by the Akaike information criteria. There was little evidence of
serial correlation in the residuals. The results of VAR analysis are found in Appendices
B and D. The results for Granger causality including outliers are found in Appendix
C, the results without the outliers is found in Tables 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16.
We nd that there is very strong evidence with p-values of 5.4 x 10 6and 4.2 x 10 7,
that the changes in the Sum Neg and Count Neg sentiment impacts measures Granger-
cause EUA returns, and we nd strong evidence that changes in the count of tweets,
which measures trac intensity, also Granger-causes EUA returns. This information is
presented in Figures 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 where the direction of the arrow indicates the
direction of Granger causality. There is very high signicance with p-values below 1%,
of this nding of bi-directional causality between each of the sentiment measures and
EUA prices except in one case, count of all tweets, when the p-value is 0.0104. The
forward direction Granger causality from emissions market sentiment to EUA price
returns is explained by the market using sentiment as a source of information about the
future. The reverse direction from EUA price returns is explained by the reaction of the
emissions market to price movements, in that a positive price movement is perceived as
being positive by quite a number of those posting tweets. This pattern of bi-directional
causality was observed by Brown and Cli (2004) in the stock market.
The VAR results show that many of the lags of the changes in the sum of negative
sentiment, count of negative sentiment and count of tweets, and a smaller number of
the lags of sum of positive and count of positive sentiment, are associated with EUA
returns. The signs of the coecients vary both within the lag and within the sentiment
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measure. This anomaly is addressed later in Section 4.5.4. There is no evidence of a
similar eect with positive sentiment, either sum or count, see Table 4.14 and Figures
4.12 and 4.13; this may be a consequence of the negativity eect which posits that
negative news has a greater eect on prices than positive, see Soroka (2006), Sprenger,
Sandner, Tumasjan and Welpe (2014), Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) and Akhtar et al.
(2013). We thus conclude that because of the VAR and Granger causality tests we have
established a direct association between the emissions market sentiment measures and
the price of EUAs. These results are dierent from Sousa and Aguiar-Conraria (2015)
who nd that in the EU ETS the economy, in their case the FTS Eurorst 300, Granger-
causes emissions prices at the 5% level. Fezzi and Bunn (2009) and Mansanet-Bataller
et al. (2007) also nd that energy prices are associated with carbon prices in the EU
ETS. However these studies use daily frequency but here we use hourly frequency.
We nd that there are no signicant coecients even at the conventional 10% level,
from any of the control variables to EUA returns. This is in agreement with the results
of the regression analysis in Section 4.5.3, which nds that the log returns of energy
commodities and the FTSE do not predict changes in EUA prices.
Sentiment does not aect only EUA returns. When we examine the count of negative
tweets, which gives similar results to sum of negative tweets, we see from Table 4.23 that
there is signicant inuence from changes in sentiment to Brent and gas returns, and to
a lesser extent the FTSE. This conrms the choice of the control variables and supports
the placing of EUAs within the energy commodity arena. We recall that sentiment in
the oil markets is found to be a signicant driver of oil prices in Chapter 2, in that
case sentiment was measured from proxies within the oil market. Thus it comes as no
surprise that sentiment in another part of the energy market, namely emissions market
sentiment, would be associated with Brent and gas prices.
There are many other interactions which are not the focus of this investigation but
which deserve comment. We nd that there is an association between the FTSE and
Brent using intra-day data. Chapter 2 also nds evidence that there is an association
between the Hang Seng returns and oil returns, but not between European stock indices
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Sum Pos Sum Neg Count Pos Count Neg Count All
Sentt 1 -0.025 -0.148* -0.040 0.015 -0.105
(0.7594) (0.0805) (0.6359) (0.863) (0.3063)
Sentt 2 0.125 -0.193** 0.151* 0.017 0.169*
(0.1107) (0.0174) (0.0595) (0.842) (0.0599)
Sentt 3 -0.089 0.126 -0.075 -0.148* -0.038
(0.2487) (0.1191) (0.3355) (0.069) (0.6677)
Sentt 4 0.011 -0.109 0.042 -0.006 0.000
(0.8883) (0.1793) (0.5931) (0.939) (0.9969)
Sentt 5 -0.075 0.252*** -0.078 -0.231*** -0.167*
(0.3287) (0.0018) (0.3173) (0.004) (0.0590)
Sentt 6 -0.057 0.043 -0.050 0.008 -0.049
(0.4553) (0.5882) (0.5231) (0.921) (0.5776)
Sentt 7 -0.118 0.028 -0.097 -0.011 -0.107
(0.1247) (0.7251) (0.2129) (0.891) (0.2251)
Sentt 8 0.055 0.023 0.088 0.108 0.046
(0.4769) (0.7736) (0.2610) (0.183) (0.5991)
Sentt 9 0.128* 0.203** 0.113 0.145* 0.145
(0.0963) (0.0112) (0.1494) (0.076) (0.1010)
Sentt 10 -0.144* 0.341*** -0.169* -0.330*** -0.288***
(0.0670) (0.0000) (0.0359) (0.000) (0.0014)
Sentt 11 0.082 -0.047 0.122 0.144 0.282***
(0.3147) (0.5717) (0.1480) (0.105) (0.0061)
The table shows the results of VAR analysis of the ve sentiment measures' coecients for log returns of EUA
futures. The p-values are given in brackets, */**/*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, bold
indicates signicance using the MHT framework . The p-values for each coecient are given in brackets below
the coecients.
Table 4.13: VAR Results for the Five Emissions Market Sentiment Measures' Eect on EUA Returns
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EUA 2 p-value EUA 2 p-value
Sum Pos 14.00 0.233 Count Pos 15.27 0.171
Brent 7.74 0.736 Brent 7.67 0.742
Coal 3.61 0.980 Coal 3.71 0.978
Gas 10.68 0.470 Gas 10.67 0.472
FTSE 5.99 0.874 FTSE 6.10 0.867
Sum Pos 2 p-value Count Pos 2 p-value
 EUA 18.56* 0.070  EUA 19.80** 0.0482
 Brent 20.17** 0.043 Brent 23.14** 0.0169
 Coal 3.19 0.988 Coal 3.82 0.975
 Gas 10.96 0.446 Gas 8.47 0.670
 FTSE 15.66 0.154 FTSE 10.94 0.448
 Brent 2 p-value  Brent 2 p-value
Sum Pos 32.63*** 0.0006 Count Pos 28.40*** 0.0028
 EUA 8.83 0.637  EUA 9.20 0.603
 Coal 30.82*** 0.0012  Coal 30.89*** 0.0011
 Gas 10.57 0.480  Gas 10.46 0.490
 FTSE 24.35** 0.0113  FTSE 24.82*** 0.010
 Coal 2 p-value  Coal 2 p-value
Sum Pos 1.39 1.000 Count Pos 1.74 0.999
 EUA 3.35 0.985  EUA 3.43 0.984
 Brent 4.48 0.954  Brent 4.50 0.953
 Gas 5.26 0.918  Gas 5.25 0.918
 FTSE 12.64 0.317  FTSE 12.57 0.322
 Gas 2 p-value  Gas 2 p-value
Sum Pos 7.29 0.775 Count Pos 7.01 0.798
 EUA 6.04 0.871  EUA 6.01 0.873
 Brent 8.96 0.626  Brent 9.06 0.616
 Coal 8.13 0.702  Coal 8.17 0.698
FTSE 21.73** 0.0266 FTSE 21.65** 0.0272
FTSE 2 p-value FTSE 2 p-value
Sum Pos 24.36** 0.0113 Count Pos 23.59** 0.0146
 EUA 6.90 0.807  EUA 6.68 0.824
 Brent 8.32 0.684  Brent 8.14 0.700
 Coal 5.90 0.880  Coal 5.82 0.885
 Gas 19.34* 0.055  Gas 19.22* 0.0572
The table presents the 2 and p-values for Granger causality tests based on the VAR analysis. The null
hypothesis of the test is no causality, hence signicantly low values of probability indicate Granger causality
from the variable in the row to the variable at the top of each of the 12 sub-tables. Here we present the results
for sum of positive and count of positive sentiment impact. */**/*** indicate p-values at the 10%, 5% and
1% signicance levels, bold indicates signicance using a Multiple Hypothesis Testing framework outlined in
Section 4.5.4.
Table 4.14: Granger Causality With Positive Emissions Sentiment Measures Excluding Outliers
123
EUA 2 p-value EUA 2 p-value
Sum Neg 42.77*** 5.4 x 10 6 Count Neg 50.95*** 4.2 x 10 7
Brent 8.22 0.608 Brent 9.40 0.585
Coal 3.56 0.965 Coal 3.04 0.990
Gas 11.58 0.314 Gas 10.41 0.494
FTSE 4.57 0.918 FTSE 5.57 0.901
Sum Neg 2 p-value Count Neg 2 p-value
 EUA 28.30*** 0.002  EUA 63.92*** 1.7 x 10 9
 Brent 16.59* 0.084 Brent 23.90** 0.0132
 Coal 1.12 1.000 Coal 2.00 0.999
 Gas 11.23 0.340 Gas 11.16 0.430
 FTSE 3.49 0.967 FTSE 13.79 0.245
 Brent 2 p-value  Brent 2 p-value
Sum Neg 21.63** 0.017 Count Neg 16.90 0.111
 EUA 9.83 0.455  EUA 10.28 0.505
 Coal 29.88*** 0.001  Coal 29.05*** 0.002
 Gas 7.56 0.672  Gas 10.51 0.485
 FTSE 22.56** 0.014  FTSE 26.11*** 0.006
 Coal 2 p-value  Coal 2 p-value
Sum Neg 1.07 1.000 Count Neg 1.09 1.000
 EUA 3.40 0.970  EUA 3.45 0.983
 Brent 4.44 0.925  Brent 4.45 0.955
 Gas 5.08 0.886  Gas 5.39 0.911
 FTSE 12.50 0.253  FTSE 12.22 0.348
 Gas 2 p-value  Gas 2 p-value
Sum Neg 4.10 0.943 Count Neg 6.30 0.853
 EUA 6.38 0.782  EUA 6.34 0.850
 Brent 8.51 0.579  Brent 8.78 0.642
 Coal 7.63 0.665  Coal 8.28 0.688
FTSE 17.01* 0.074 FTSE 21.18** 0.0316
FTSE 2 p-value FTSE 2 p-value
Sum Neg 11.48 0.321 Count Neg 20.54** 0.0385
 EUA 6.76 0.748  EUA 10.34 0.500
 Brent 9.62 0.475  Brent 10.51 0.485
 Coal 5.12 0.883  Coal 5.05 0.929
 Gas 17.29* 0.068  Gas 17.18 0.103
The table presents the 2 and p-values for Granger causality tests based on the VAR analysis. The null
hypothesis of the test is no causality, hence signicantly low values of probability indicate Granger causality
from the variable in the row to the variable at the top of each of the 18 sub-tables. Here we present the results
for sum of negative, count of negative and count of all tweets sentiment impact. */**/*** indicate p-values
at the 10%, 5% and 1% signicance levels, bold indicates signicance using a Multiple Hypothesis Testing
framework outlined in Section 4.5.4.
Table 4.15: Granger Causality using Negative Emissions Sentiment Measures Excluding Outliers
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EUA 2 p-value
Count All 23.10** 0.0104
Brent 7.63 0.665
Coal 3.64 0.962
Gas 10.63 0.387
FTSE 5.33 0.868
Count All 2 p-value
 EUA 34.34*** 0.0002
Brent 21.88** 0.0157
Coal 1.56 0.999
Gas 17.26* 0.0689
FTSE 10.19 0.424
 Brent 2 p-value
Count All 98.61*** 0.0001
 EUA 9.83 0.455
 Coal 30.06*** 0.0008
 Gas 7.79 0.649
 FTSE 24.85*** 0.0056
 Coal 2 p-value
Count All 1.93 0.997
 EUA 3.58 0.964
 Brent 4.46 0.924
 Gas 5.01 0.891
 FTSE 12.10 0.279
 Gas 2 p-value
Count All 5.53 0.853
 EUA 6.28 0.791
 Brent 8.26 0.603
 Coal 7.64 0.664
FTSE 17.27* 0.0686
FTSE 2 p-value
Count All 20.18** 0.0276
 EUA 6.68 0.755
 Brent 9.70 0.468
 Coal 5.26 0.873
 Gas 18.23* 0.0512
The table presents the 2 and p-values for Granger causality tests based on the VAR analysis. The null
hypothesis of the test is no causality, hence signicantly low values of probability indicate Granger causality
from the variable in the row to the variable at the top of each of the 18 sub-tables. Here we present the results
for sum of negative, count of negative and count of all tweets sentiment impact. */**/*** indicate p-values
at the 10%, 5% and 1% signicance levels, bold indicates signicance using a Multiple Hypothesis Testing
framework outlined in Section 4.5.4.
Table 4.16: Granger Causality using Count of Emissions Tweets Excluding Outliers
125
The gure summarizes the results of Granger causality tests for the Sum of Positive sentiment measure. In
this and in Figures 4.14, 4.13, 4.15 and 4.16 a black arrow denotes signicance at the 1% level, grey 5% and
white 10%.
Figure 4.12: Granger Causality Results for Sum of Positive Emissions Market Sentiment
and Brent. We recall that Chapter 2 used monthly data, while here intra-day data is
used. We also note that there is a highly signicant eect of lagged sentiment on itself.
This is expected given the method construction of sentiment impact in Equations 4.1 to
4.5. We nd that there is a strong link between the FTSE and Brent which is expected
as both are indicators of economic activity. We also note that the coal market does not
seem to be inuenced by the rest of the energy market.
4.5.1.3 GARCH and Threshold GARCH Results for Emissions Market Tweets
We nd that measures of sentiment impact based on positive and negative, sums and
counts of tweets improve predictions of the variance of EUA returns.
We see from Table 4.17 that the improvement due to adding the dummy variable,
StrongSentt, is highly signicant for all four sentiment measures, but not for the
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A black arrow denotes signicance at the 1% level, grey 5% and white 10%.
Figure 4.13: Granger Causality Results for Count of Positive Emissions Market Sentiment
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A black arrow denotes signicance at the 1% level, grey 5% and white 10%.
Figure 4.14: Granger Causality Results for Sum of Negative Emissions Market Sentiment
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A black arrow denotes signicance at the 1% level, grey 5% and white 10%.
Figure 4.15: Granger Causality Results for Count of Negative Emissions Market Sentiment
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A black arrow denotes signicance at the 1% level, grey 5% and white 10%.
Figure 4.16: Granger Causality Results for Count of All Emissions Market Tweets
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StrongSentt dummy variable based on count of tweets. However, we also note that
the sum of the 1 and  terms is larger than 1 for all six applications, and therefore
the GARCH volatility model is invalid. The Threshold GARCH model results pre-
sented in Table 4.5.1.3 show that this more sophisticated model does not suer from
this problem. It is not a surprise that a Threshold GARCH model is a better t for
the data than a GARCH model since it allows negative residuals to have an additional
contribution to the variance. This concept is found in the literature by Soroka (2006),
Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), Akhtar et al. (2013) and Sprenger, Sandner, Tumasjan
and Welpe (2014) who support the idea of the negativity eect which proposes that
negative shocks have more eect on returns than positive shocks. The results from the
Threshold GARCH model presented in Table 4.5.1.3 are that there is a highly signi-
cant and large association between StrongSentt and higher EUA returns variance for
all of the sentiment measures, Sum Pos, Sum Neg, Count Pos or Count Neg. That is,
we see that strong sentiment of any kind is associated with increased EUA variance. It
is noticeable that this is not the case for StrongSentt based on Count of All Tweets.
This suggests that the sentiment algorithms of DataSift have more information than a
simple trac intensity measure.
We note that the size of the  coecient is of the same order of magnitude as the
0 term which is the minimum volatility. We can therefore conclude that the increase
in volatility during hours of strong sentiment is non trivial.
Recall that we dene an hour as having strong sentiment for a particular sentiment
impact, if the sentiment impact is larger than the mean value for the year, and we record
these hours with a value of 1 for the dummy variable StrongSentt used in Equations
4.13 and 4.14. The tests were repeated using the median in place of the mean and the
same conclusions were reached.
Samuelson (1965) and, Carchano and Pardo (2009) suggest that there is an increase
in volatility near the maturity date of futures contracts, indeed Chevallier (2011a) nds
evidence of the Samuelson hypothesis for EUA futures. In order to make sure that this
eect is not driving the results, the GARCH and Threshold GARCH tests are repeated
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GARCH No Sum Sum Count Count Count of
Sentiment Positive Negative Positive Negative Tweets
Mean Eqn
(x 10 3) 0.564*** 0.587*** 0.601*** 0.604*** 0.578*** 0.558***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
 0.0496** 0.0502** 0.0565** 0.0516** 0.0599** 0.0490**
(0.028) (0.026) (0.018) (0.024) (0.013) (0.030)
Variance Eqn
 (x 10 6) - 10.6*** 10.3*** 14.3*** 12.1*** -1.35
- (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.422)
0(x 10 6) 6.35*** 5.45*** 5.74*** 5.99*** 5.60*** 6394***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
1 0.307*** 0.316*** 0.318*** 0.320*** 0.326*** 0.307***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
 0.769*** 0.760*** 0.757*** 0.752*** 0.752*** 0.770***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Log likelihood 6998.44 7003.793 7004.733 7006.092 7006.084 6998.561
Durbin-Watson 2.109 2.110 2.123 2.113 2.130 2.108
Likelihood Ratio - 0.0011 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.6228
The following GARCH model was tted, with the mean equation EUAt = +EUAt 1+ t; t  i:i:d:(0; 2t )
where the variance of the t term is given by 
2
t = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + 
2
t 1 + StrongSentt. The table records
the eect of strong sentiment measured by tweets concerning the emissions market. An hour is considered to
have strong sentiment and has the dummy variable StrongSentt = 1 when the specic sentiment impact is
larger than the mean for the positive number series and less than the mean for the sum of negative scores. In
this case the positive  coecient indicates that a more extreme sentiment score is associated with a larger
variance. The data here is uses a 3 day delay without the backloading events. This data is not standardized
so that we may compare the 0and  parameter sizes. p-values of zero are due to calculation limitations.
Table 4.17: GARCH Results for Emissions Market Strong and Weak Sentiment
with dummy variables for all but the initial month; this does not change the conclusions.
As a further robustness test the GARCH and Threshold GARCH tests are repeated
without the December 2013 data. This gives the same conclusions as before. U-shaped
volatility in commodity markets during the course of the trading day has been noted
by Wolfe and Rosenman (2014) and, Batten and Lucey (2010). We include hour of the
day dummies for nine of the ten hours and nd that while there is a signicant eect
on the volatility from some of these dummies, there is still a signicant eect from
sentiment as measured by any of the sentiment measures. We conclude that stronger
sentiment, i.e. higher than average positive sentiment, or lower than average negative
sentiment, as measured by Twitter text, is associated with an increase in volatility of
EUA returns. This has implications for risk management as well as option pricing.
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Threshold No Sum Sum Count Count Count All
GARCH Sentiment Positive Negative Positive Negative Tweets
Mean Equation
 (x 10 3) 0.271 0.261 0.299 0.276 0.275 0.271
(0.271) (0.279) (0.227) (0.257) (0.261) (0.272)
 0.0486** 0.0480** 0.0527** 0.0496** 0.0560** 0.0486**
(0.0266) (0.0286) (0.0211) (0.0248) (0.0152) (0.0267)
Variance Equation
 (x 10 6) - 11.9*** 10.3*** 15.3*** 12.3*** 34.4
- (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.9843)
0 (x 10 6) 5.95*** 4.86*** 5.52*** 5.36*** 5.38*** 5.95***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
1 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.213*** 0.202***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
2 0.184*** 0.198*** 0.191*** 0.202*** 0.197*** 0.183***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
 0.777*** 0.770*** 0.764*** 0.762*** 0.760*** 0.777***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Log likelihood 7012.92 7020.404 7019.483 7022.786 7021.06 7012.92
Durbin-Watson 2.108 2.107 2.117 2.110 2.123 2.108
L R Sentiment 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 1
The following GARCHmodel was tted using Marquardt steps with the mean equationEUAt = +EUAt 1+
t; t  i:i:d:(0; 2t ) where the variance of the t term is given by 2t = 0 + 12t 1 + 2( t 1)2 + 2t 1 +
StrongSentt 1. Where  t 1 = t 1 when t 1 < 0; and zero otherwise, thus 2 is a measure of the added
of volatility due to a previous negative residual. The gures presented refer to the data without the two
backloading events on 16th April and 3rd July and with a delay period of three days, similar results are
obtained with a ve day delay period (available from authors). LR Sentiment is the p-value of a likelihood
ratio test comparing the addition of the sentiment variable to the Threshold GARCH model without the
sentiment measure (rst column).
Table 4.18: Threshold GARCH Results for Emissions Market Strong and Weak Sentiment
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4.5.2 Results for Climate Change Tweets
The sentiment measured from climate change tweets is remarkably dierent from that
measured from the emissions market tweets. At the conventional level of signicance,
5%, there is no evidence of an association with the price of EUAs in any of the VAR or
Granger causality tests, but there is strong evidence of a link with volatility. We follow
a similar analysis as for emission market tweets.
4.5.2.1 Outliers for Climate Change Tweets
There is no evidence that the inclusion or exclusion of the days with the most climate
change tweets makes any dierence to the conclusions of the analysis of the eect of
climate change tweets (Table 4.20). These outliers on 5th and 6th of December 2013 or
on 27th September 2013 recorded large numbers of tweets due to severe ooding around
the British coast in December 2013 and the publication of the IPCC report linking
climate change to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions earlier the same year.
4.5.2.2 VAR and Granger Causality Results for Climate Change Tweets
When a VAR model is used we nd very weak evidence of a link between changes climate
change sentiment and EUA returns, see Table 4.20. The p-values are always above 5%,
the conventional boundary for signicance. The p-values for the two positive measures
are above 10%. It is also noted that the data has been standardized and hence the very
small size of the coecients indicates that any eect is tiny. There is no evidence of an
association between changes in climate change sentiment and EUA returns using the
Granger causality tests, the results of which are in Appendix E. Further examination
of the relationship between the rst dierences of the sentiment measures including the
Twitter trac measure and EUA returns, using a basic correlation matrix, fails to show
an association, see Table 4.19. Given these results we conclude there is only very weak
evidence of an association between changes in negative climate change sentiment and
EUA returns, or between changes in the number of climate change tweets and EUA
returns. None of these results are considered signicant in the MHT framework.
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Sum Pos Sum Neg Count Pos Count Neg Count All
Climate Change -0.00879 0.0236 -0.020 -0.0229 -0.0340*
Emissions Market 0.0489** 0.1830*** 0.0354* -0.1867*** -0.0771**
The table shows the correlations between changes in the ve sentiment measures and the log returns of EUA
prices. The 5% signicance level is 0.0389 for a sample size of N=2,539. The p-values are given in brackets,
*/**/*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, bold indicates signicance using the MHT
framework .
Table 4.19: Correlations Between Climate Change Sentiment and EUAs
No Outliers Sum Pos Sum Neg Count Pos Count Neg Count All
Sentt 1 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001* -0.001*
(0.3647) (0.0801) (0.4419) (0.0679) (0.0653)
Sentt 2 - 0.000 - 0.001 0.001
(0.3025) (0.2703) (0.1714)
With Outliers Sum Pos Sum Neg Count Pos Count Neg Count All
Sentt 1 0.000 0.001* 0.000 -0.001* -0.001*
(0.4188) (0.0902) (0.4939) (0.0823) (0.0864)
Sentt 2 - -0.001 - 0.001 0.001
(0.1455) (0.1109) (0.1861)
The table shows the results of VAR analysis of the ve Climate sentiment measures' coecients for log returns
of EUA futures without and with the outliers. The p-values are given in brackets below the coecients.
Table 4.20: VAR Results for the Climate Sentiment Measures Omitting Outliers
135
4.5.2.3 GARCH and Threshold GARCH Results for Climate Change Tweets
There is a very dierent result when we examine the volatility of the EUA returns.
Using the Threshold GARCH model we nd that there is a strong association between
higher than average sentiment levels and higher EUA returns volatility. This is found
using the StrongSentt variable which takes the value 1 when sentiment is above the
mean and zero otherwise. In the case of Sum Neg we dene StrongSentt equal to 1 when
the sentiment impact is below the mean, as these are a sequence of negative numbers.
Similar results are found when StrongSentt is dened using the median. We see from
Table 4.21 that the improvement due to adding the dummy variable, StrongSentt, is
highly signicant, however we note that the sum of the 1 and  terms is larger than 1
for all six applications, and therefore the volatility model is invalid, similar to the case
with the emissions market GARCH analysis in Section 4.5.1.3. The Threshold GARCH
model does not suer from this deciency as is seen in Table 4.22. It is not unexpected
that the Threshold GARCH model is a better t for the data as it has been observed
that negative shocks have a larger eect on volatility than positive. The results from
the Threshold GARCH model are that there is a highly signicant and large association
between StrongSentt and higher EUA returns variance for StrongSentt based on any
of the sentiment measures, including the trac intensity measure, count of tweets. That
is, we see that strong sentiment, of any kind, is associated with increased EUA variance.
This fails to show that DataSift's sentiment analysis has added information to a simple
trac intensity measure.
The regression, VAR and Granger causality results for climate change sentiment
show that there is a failure to nd a connection with EUA returns, however there is
a connection between strong and weak levels of climate change sentiment and EUA
returns volatility. This indicates that those who post tweets concerning climate change
are aware of turbulence in the EU emissions market but do not have an accurate insight
into the direction of EUA returns.
Having established the association between emissions market sentiment and both
EUA returns and volatility, and also the less useful association between climate change
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GARCH No Sum Sum Count Count Count of
Sentiment Positive Negative Positive Negative Tweets
Mean Eqn
(x 10 3) 1.111*** 1.181*** 0.976*** 1.21*** 1.00*** 1.02***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 -0.0487*** -0.0501*** -0.0435** -0.0487** -0.0438*** -0.0504***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.025) (0.010) (0.025) (0.009)
Variance Eqn
 (x 10 6) - 7.74*** 25.0*** 9.16*** 21.9*** 42.3***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0(x 10 6) 13.8*** 10.4*** 7.57*** 10.3*** 9.15*** 9.59***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1 0.8543*** 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.838*** 0.798***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 0.5612*** 0.566*** 0.540*** 0.563*** 0.539*** 0.517***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log likelihood 6702.24 6705.20 6725.16 6705.98 6719.68 6741.10
Durbin-Watson 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.90
Likelihood Ratio - 0.0015 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
The following GARCH model was tted, with the mean equation EUAt = +EUAt 1+ t; t  i:i:d:(0; 2t )
where the variance of the t term is given by 
2
t = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + 
2
t 1 + StrongSentt. The table records
the eect of strong climate change sentiment measured by tweets concerning the emissions market omitting
outliers. An hour is considered to have strong sentiment and has the dummy variable StrongSentt = 1 when
the specic sentiment impact is larger than the mean for the positive number series and less than the mean
for the sum of negative scores. In this case the positive  coecient indicates that a more extreme sentiment
score is associated with a larger variance. The data here is uses a 3 day delay without the backloading events.
This data is not standardized so that we may compare the 0and  parameter sizes. p-values of zero are due
to calculation limitations.
Table 4.21: GARCH Results for Climate Change Sentiment Strong and Weak
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Threshold No Sum Sum Count Count Count All
GARCH Sentiment Positive Negative Positive Negative Tweets
Mean Equation
 (x 10 3) 0.163 0.216 0.179 0.237 0.168 0.235
(0.488) (0.351) (0.42) (0.305) (0.462) (0.295)
 -0.0034 -0.0054 -0.0021 -0.0042 -0.0020 -0.0096
(0.860) (0.771) (0.914) (0.820) (0.916) (0.592)
Variance Equation
 (x 10 6) - 9.01*** 14.8*** 9.93*** 12.3*** 23.7***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0 (x 10 6) 11.8*** 8.33*** 6.49*** 8.33*** 7.80*** 7.11***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1 0.363*** 0.354*** 0.410*** 0.356*** 0.399*** 0.402***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2 0.771*** 0.776*** 0.727*** 0.776*** 0.741*** 0.702***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 0.607*** 0.605*** 0.587*** 0.603*** 0.588*** 0.575***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log likelihood 6753.03 6758.44 6765.74 6759.04 6762.26 6777.16
Durbin-Watson 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.00
L R Sentiment - 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000
The table presents the results of Threshold GARCH analysis of climate change strong and weak sentiment
(omitting outliers). The Threshold GARCH model was tted using Marquardt steps with the mean equation
EUAt = + EUAt 1+ t; t  i:i:d:(0; 2t ) where the variance of the t term is given by 2t = 0+12t 1+
2(
 
t 1)
2 + 2t 1 + StrongSentt 1. Where 
 
t 1 = t 1 when t 1 < 0; and zero otherwise, thus 2 is a
measure of the added of volatility due to a previous negative residual. The gures presented refer to the data
without the two backloading events on 16th April and 3rd July and with a delay period of three days, similar
results are obtained with a ve day delay period (available from authors). LR Sentiment is the p-value of a
likelihood ratio test comparing the addition of the sentiment variable to the Threshold GARCH model without
the sentiment measure (rst column).
Table 4.22: Threshold GARCH Results for Climate Change Sentiment Strong and Weak
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sentiment and EUA volatility, we examine the links between the control variables and
EUA returns.
4.5.3 Control Variables
In order to verify the choice of control variables we examine an association between the
returns of the control variables and the returns of EUA futures. There is evidence at
conventional levels of contemporaneous association between Brent, gas and the FTSE,
and EUA returns, see Table 4.23; the FTSE drops out when the outliers are excluded.
There is no evidence of predictability in the data; it is seen that the F-tests for predic-
tive models show there is, at best, very weak evidence that the coecients are not all
zero, in addition the R2 values are very small. This result conrms our choices for con-
trol variables and suggests that the EU ETS market quickly and eciently assimilates
information from the energy market into EUA prices.
In order to avoid the very high volatility and serial correlation associated with the
microstructure of the carbon market we use hourly data. The regression results are
robust to selecting the observation interval from the following choices of m = 40; 50; 60
minutes while maintaining a one step ahead prediction. These values are chosen as they
divide 600 minutes which is the length of the trading day. There is an unreported test
of the eect of the hour of day on EUA returns which is found insignicant. The usual
ADF and KPSS tests are carried out to conrm the stationarity of the data; Durbin
Watson tests and PACF plots show that there is no evidence of serial correlation in
EUA returns at m = 60 minutes.
4.5.4 Review of Results and Discussion
The general pattern of results in this investigation is in line with previous research
from Simon and Wiggins III (2001), Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), Akhtar et al. (2013),
Bathia and Bredin (2013) and Smales (2015), suggesting that negative news or negative
sentiment is stronger in its eect than positive news or sentiment. Here we nd that
negative emissions market sentiment measures, based on either the sum of the scores
for negative tweets or counts of negative tweets, do aect EUA prices and show bi-
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Regression Including Outliers Excluding Outliers
Contemporaneous Predictive Contemporaneous Predictive
N 2,540 2,539 2,520 2,519
Brent 0.037** 0.005 0.030* 0.007
(0.047) (0.801) (0.091) (0.681)
NBP Gas 0.066* 0.023 0.064* 0.023
(0.074) (0.125) (0.080) (0.139)
Coal 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.008
(0.796) (0.274) (0.799) (0.293)
FTSE 0.024* -0.022 0.021 -0.016
(0.100) (0.201) (0.137) (0.310)
R-squared 0.70% 0.11% 0.74% 0.11%
F-test 0.001334 0.580115 0.00089 0.59862
Durbin Watson 2.02 2.02 2.01 2.01
Log likelihood -3594.676 -3600.68 -3296.674 -3303.143
The table presents the results of the contemporaneous regression EUAt =  + BrentBrentt +
NBPNBPt + CoalCoalt + FTSEFTSEt + "t and the one hour predictive regression EUAt =
 + BrentBrentt 1 + NBPNBPt 1 + CoalCoalt 1 + FTSEFTSEt 1 + "t . The data has been
tested for stationarity and has been standardized. Results are presented including and excluding the two
Backloading events of 16th April 2013 and 3rd July 2013. *, **, *** indicate p-values of below 10%, 5% and
1% which are calculated using Newey West standard errors, p-values are in brackets.
Table 4.23: Regression Results for the Control Variables
directional causality with EUA returns. In addition we nd that any of the measures
of sentiment, either emissions market or climate change, aect the volatility of EUA
returns.
There are however limitations to this study. We have only discussed tweets in En-
glish; it would be very interesting to extend this work to other languages. There is a
limitation to the use of Twitter in that those who post tweets may not be representative
of the general population of those who inuence EUA prices, for example Mislove et al.
(2011) show that the posters of tweets in the USA are not representative of the general
population.
It is clear from Figure 4.11, that there are intra-day eects in the sentiment series.
Most obviously the number of tweets posted per hour changes during the course of the
day. The question of interest is whether the intra-day eects have any inuence on the
conclusions drawn from the data. As well as checking for time patterns in the EUA
volume of trades, volatility and price levels, we tested the controls and the emissions
market sentiment data to check for patterns within the day. The EUA volume of trades
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showed an interesting pattern of increasing towards lunchtime, then falling back and
gradually increasing to a maximum at the last hour of trading. There was no evidence
that the price returns varied in any systematic manner during the day; there was some
evidence that volatility increased in the last hour as would be expected. There was
strong evidence of the usual U-shaped volume of trades for Brent oil and NBP gas, that
is, there are higher volumes of trades at the opening and closing of the markets. There
was no evidence of any systematic changes in the prices of any of the controls or EUAs
compared to the hour of the trading day. There is some evidence in the literature of
the mood of individuals and investors changing due to time of day eects, see Hill and
Smith (1991) and, Sun et al. (2016). We found that the number of tweets rose to a peak
at 11am and gradually fell afterwards, see Figure 4.11. This coincided with an increase
in all measures of sentiment but there was no evidence that the time of the day had
any eect on the distribution of the sentiment measures or the returns of EUAs.
A nal consideration, and one which we now address, is that of the multiple com-
parison problem, namely that if a large number of hypothesis tests are carried out
simultaneously then many null hypotheses may be falsely rejected merely as a result
of chance. In this investigation we have carried out 5,388 hypothesis tests comprising
20 multivariate regressions, 4,560 VAR, 600 Granger causality tests and 208 Threshold
GARCH tests; note that the large number of tests for VAR are due to the lag length.
We therefore use a Generalized Holm Multiple Hypothesis Testing (MHT) framework
to assure that the conclusions of the investigation are robust. For a more technical
treatment of MHT issues, see Holm (1979), Romano et al. (2010), Cummins (2013a),
Cummins (2013b) and Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015). This tech-
nique establishes a threshold p-value for each hypothesis test so that we may have a
very high degree of condence in the conclusions. Due to the particular distribution of
the p-values in this application we nd that any test's p-value is signicant in the MHT
framework if it is below 0.005435, this is based on a 10% chance that we will admit
no more than 5% erroneous false rejections; these parameters follow Deeney, Cummins,
Dowling and Bermingham (2015). This method yields 167 rejections of null hypotheses
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rather than 194, 360 or 570 which would have been rejected at the conventional levels
of 1%, 5% or 10% which are criticized in Baker (2016). With this in mind we re-visit
our ndings and note that p-values which are considered signicant using MHT are in
bold in the results tables.
The results of the regression tests are not found to be signicant within the MHT
framework, so that the nding that Brent, gas and FTSE returns explain EUA returns
is not considered reliable, hence it is only reported as being weak evidence. The results
of the VAR analysis are found to be signicant in the MHT framework so that we are
assured that the association between changes in each of the three measures of sum and
count of negative emissions market sentiment and the count of all emissions market
tweets, and EUA returns is reliable, as are the associated Granger causality ndings.
Furthermore we nd that the only coecients which are considered reliable in the VAR
analysis have negative signs for the count of negative sentiment and positive signs for the
sum of negative sentiment. That is, we nd that there is highly reliable evidence that an
increase in the number of negative emissions market tweets is associated with a decrease
in EUA returns and an increase in the negative sentiment score is associated with a
decrease in EUA returns. Thus we nd that emissions market sentiment is a positive
indicator of EUA price. The connection between emissions market and climate change
sentiment and the volatility of EUA returns is unchanged in the MHT framework as the
p-values are all within the new threshold of the MHT framework. We thus have greater
condence to rely on the existing nding that stronger (weaker) emissions market and
climate change sentiment intensity is associated with higher (lower) volatility.
4.6 Conclusions
This investigation has a number of novel aspects. It is the rst investigation to explicitly
look at the inuence of sentiment in the EU ETS, and to the best of our knowledge
it is the rst time intra-day data has been used to look at the fundamental drivers of
EUA returns. Furthermore it is one of relatively few investigations to use a Multiple
Hypothesis Testing framework to overcome the multiple comparisons problem.
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There are three ndings in this investigation. Firstly, we nd that emissions market
sentiment, as measured from Twitter, does have a statistically signicant ability to ex-
plain EUA prices while accounting for the multiple comparisons problem. Furthermore
we nd Granger causality in both directions from three of the ve emissions market
sentiment measures to and from the EUA price. We nd that the coal price seems to be
disconnected from the rest of the energy market though it does inuence Brent. This
is dierent to what was found by Sousa and Aguiar-Conraria (2015) but may be the
result of the use of intra-day data. We also nd that strong (weak) emissions market
sentiment signicantly explains periods of high (low) volatility of the EUA returns.
Secondly, we fail to nd reliable evidence that Twitter sentiment extracted from
tweets concerned with climate change has any association with EUA returns. Only those
tweets specically concerned with emissions trading have explanatory power. We do
nd, similar to emissions market sentiment, that strong (weak) levels of climate change
sentiment are associated with high (low) levels of EUA volatility. This indicates that
people posting tweets about climate change have only a very slight insight into the EU
ETS, that is, we detect volatility from their tweets but do not detect reliable evidence as
to the price direction. This may be considered surprising as the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme, which is the world's largest emissions market, is the principal means by which
the EU aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It perhaps calls for a greater degree
of education and communication between traders, regulators and the public.
Finally, we nd that there is weak evidence that Brent oil, NBP gas and to a lesser
extent FTSE explain contemporaneous EUA prices, but none of these has the ability
to predict EUA prices for one hour. This suggests that the emissions market is quick
to incorporate information from the energy and stock markets.
In this chapter we have shown that sentiment measured from social media can explain
price returns and volatility in the professionally traded EU emissions market. This
indicates that sentiment does have an eect in another professionally traded market
and that the presence of professional traders is not enough to ensure a perfectly ecient
market. This nding suggests that the Ecient Market Hypothesis does not hold in
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explaining the oil and emissions markets.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Introduction
In this thesis it is shown that sentiment has inuence in the professionally traded oil and
emissions markets. This is done using two distinct methods to measure sentiment, the
use of these diverse methods adds considerably to the reliability of our conclusions as
does the use of multiple hypothesis testing procedures. We compare these two methods,
arguing that they give a consistent and reliable insight into the eect of sentiment in
futures markets. We conclude that information asymmetry and position limits, and
in the case of the emissions market inattention, are sucient conditions for sentiment
to have an eect in these professionally traded futures markets. This extends the
application of a behavioural nance approach in the energy commodity markets. We
now draw together our understanding of sentiment and the mechanism by which it
eects returns and volatility in energy commodity futures markets.
5.2 Topic Identication, Subject Identication and Sentiment
Measurement
The rst task when measuring sentiment about a particular topic is to ensure that
the sentiment which is measured concerns the correct topic. The second task is that
those holding the sentiment should be identied and thirdly the sentiment itself should
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measured accurately.
This thesis examines sentiment about Brent and WTI crude oils, and about the EU
emissions market. The proxies which are chosen for the oil and emissions markets are
specic to these markets and in most cases specic to the individual asset. For the oil
market the following proxies are chosen: volume of trades, historic volatility, put-call
ratio, an oil speculation indicator and a local market volatility index (Table 2.1); all of
these except the local market volatility index are specic to oil futures contracts. In the
case of the emissions market we use the following as proxies: the volume of trades of
EUAs, the volatility of energy commodities, the open interest of energy commodities and
the volatility of the FTSE (Section 3.2.3); these are specic to the energy and emissions
markets. In the case of tweets we follow an objective process to identify which search
terms to select. We produce evidence that the tweets selected by these search terms are
concerned with climate change and specically the EU ETS. The process of selecting
search terms is summarized in Table 4.1. The initial list comprises terms associated
with the emissions market from several published books, namely Kaplan (1983), Stern
(2006), Serletis (2007), Ellerman et al. (2010), Richter (2010) and Chevallier (2011a).
These are tested for subject accuracy and yield 17 search terms capable of selecting
tweets concerned with climate change. These are further reduced to ve specic terms
which select tweets concerned with the emissions market. As a test of accuracy the
frequency distribution of the emissions market tweets is shown to be remarkably similar
to that of news stories concerning the EU ETS, also several hundred of the resulting
tweets are read and found to concern the EU ETS.
In the case of the proxy-based sentiment used in chapters 2 and 3 the data is taken
from the markets. Here it is the case that the sentiment is being held by the market
itself. In the case of the Twitter sentiment, we are measuring sentiment from people
who are interested in climate change and from people who are interested in the EU
emissions market. These are distinct holders of sentiment. In the rst case, using
proxies, we have a market which is the summation of the participants in the market
and in the other cases, using tweets, we have a specic set of people who use a particular
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social media platform. These holders of sentiment are dierent, and the methods used
to gather and measure sentiment from them are also dierent, however the conclusions
regarding the energy futures markets are remarkably similar, namely that sentiment
does have an inuence in professionally traded oil and emissions markets both in terms
of asset returns and also in terms of asset volatility.
After identifying the topic and the holder of the sentiment, the third stage is the
measurement of sentiment itself. The principal component analysis (PCA) method is
used for the nancial proxies so that a common signal across the selection of proxies may
be extracted. This method is widely supported in the literature, for example Brown and
Cli (2004); Baker and Wurgler (2006); Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006); Baker and
Wurgler (2007); Tetlock (2007); Festi¢ et al. (2010); Papapostolou et al. (2014). The
method of calculating a sentiment score from a set of written sources, such as tweets,
is more complex. In this investigation DataSift is used as the source of the tweets and
as the processor delivering sentiment scores for each of these tweets. There are several
papers in the literature supporting the use of DataSift as a source of accurate sentiment
information, for example Parameswaran et al. (2013); Siapera et al. (2015); Corea and
Cervellati (2015); Quinn et al. (2016); Jull et al. (2016) and Corea (2016), and an entire
body of literature and a new industry, supporting the use of social media as a source
of sentiment information.
Thus there is considerable support for both methods used in this thesis regarding
their topic, subject and sentiment accuracy. As well as examining the sources of our
sentiment information to determine their veracity, we examine the behaviour of the
sentiment signals. We note that the nancial proxies which are used for the market
sentiment indices for oil in Chapter 2 have very low correlations with fundamental data
(Table 2.3). This supports our position that these proxies are not eective due to fun-
damental eects, but rather are eective due to their ability to measure sentiment. In
Chapter 3 we use a simple high/low sentiment measure with a small sample size, so it
is not reliable to use a correlation measure in this case to establish that the sentiment
is not representing fundamental data. In Chapter 4 we use DataSift which specically
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extracts sentiment information from the tweets. We nd that sentiment extracted from
tweets is useful at explaining price changes and volatility. In terms of price we see that
the sentiment measures of Chapter 4 display the negativity eect mentioned by Soroka
(2006), Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), Sprenger, Sandner, Tumasjan and Welpe (2014)
and, Akhtar et al. (2013) in which negative sentiment has a larger eect on prices than
positive sentiment. In terms of volatility, we see in Chapter 3 where we use a binary
indicator of sentiment (negative or positive), that negative sentiment is associated with
high volatility. In Chapter 4 we see that strong (weak) levels of sentiment are associated
with higher (lower) levels of volatility. These behaviours underline the assertion that
it is indeed sentiment which has been measured. Finally we note that the sizes of the
coecients and the signicance levels for VAR and Granger-causality tests for associa-
tion between changes emissions market sentiment and EUA returns in Chapter 4, show
that the negative emissions market sentiment measures Sum Neg and Count Neg, are
more useful than the count of tweets, indicating that the sentiment measuring process
has improved the fundamental model more than the trac intensity measure. Given
this reasoning we can have condence that it is sentiment which has been measured
from both the oil markets and the emissions market. We then must ask why sentiment
would inuence the energy and emissions markets?
The eect of sentiment in the equity markets has been explained as the result of the
activity of noise traders (de Long et al.; 1990; Brown; 1999; Lemmon and Portniaguina;
2006; Tetlock; 2007; Kaufmann; 2011), lack of attention Barber and Odean (2008); Hir-
shleifer et al. (2009); Vozlyublennaia (2014) and information asymmetry Forgas (1995);
Medina et al. (2014), so that sentiment essentially lls a gap due to the lack of reliable
fundamental information. This eect persists due to limits on arbitrage caused by the
diculty of taking a short position, market frictions and the cost of capital de Long
et al. (1990); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006). While this
explanation is certainly applicable in the equity markets, it is a much less convincing
explanation of the ndings of the previous three chapters examining the oil and emis-
sions markets. The energy commodity futures markets are professionally traded and
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apart from the information private to supplier rms, there is a great deal of public
information available, though of course much this information needs to be purchased.
The diculty of taking a short position is much less severe in the energy futures mar-
kets than in the equity markets; in the futures markets limits are imposed by portfolio
managers not by the availability of shares. The oil markets in particular, and to a lesser
extent the emissions market, have quite high levels of liquidity, hence market frictions
would be of less importance. The cost of capital for energy commodity traders in the
large oil and energy companies should be reasonably low as they are able to access
the corporate bond markets. In a survey of the Moody credit ratings1 of the world's
largest energy, oil and non-energy non-oil companies by revenue, we nd that the top
ten non-oil non-energy companies have 9A ratings and one B; the top ten oil companies
have 8 As and two Bs and the top ten energy companies have 4As and 6 Bs. While
this survey is not rigorous, it does suggest that oil and energy companies have access to
relatively cheap borrowing in the corporate bond market. Hence the borrowing costs
while waiting for arbitrage to take eect in energy commodity markets, should be fairly
small, and not act as a barrier to arbitrage.
Thus we are left with information asymmetry, inattention in the case of the EU
emissions market, and position limits as the remaining mechanisms to explain the eect
of sentiment. It is certainly the case that oil companies have a much better estimate
of reserves and production levels than others in the oil market, so there is information
asymmetry. As for the EU ETS, the future availability of allowances in the short term
is known but regulatory risk is a major concern in this market and certainly produces
information uncertainty. There would also seem to be a degree of inattention in the EU
emissions markets as is seen from Chapter 3 when the market's response to European
Parliament decisions is larger when the market is surprised. That is, when there is little
media attention and the decisions are instigated from non-party political sources, the
market reaction is larger. From the point of view of the limits imposed by portfolio
managers on traders, we can assume that there is a likelihood that these limits will
1This used https://www.moodys.com/ for the ratings and http://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/ and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_companies_by_revenue
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reduce the eciency of arbitrage as suggested by Acharya et al. (2013). This is likely to
be the case also in the EU ETS which is much smaller and slower than the oil markets.
We therefore conclude that information asymmetry, inattention in the EU emissions
market, and position limits are sucient factors to explain the inuence of sentiment
in the oil and emissions markets. This suggests that sentiment will always be part
of the energy markets as it is not conceivable that energy companies will allow free
access to their private information or that portfolio managers will allow traders to take
arbitrarily large positions. What we have demonstrated is that the lack of noise traders
and the preponderance of professional traders does not prevent sentiment inuencing
the oil and emissions markets.
5.3 Limitations
We examine the limitations of this research in terms of data availability, event date
choice, missing variables, model accuracy and the accuracy of the sentiment analysis.
5.3.1 Data Availability
In adapting the method of Baker and Wurgler (2006) we use similar variables from the
energy commodity market as Baker and Wurgler (2006) use from the equity market.
These variables are carefully chosen in Sections 2.2.1 and 3.2.3. Unfortunately there
are limitations as to data availability, the principle limitation for Chapter 2 was for the
speculation indicator which used the CFTC Commitment of Trader data. This data
records whether a futures position is held for hedging a real position in the oil market,
or whether it is held for speculative purposes. This data is not available before April
2008 for Brent, so we use the WTI gures for both oils, however since the price of the
two oils was very similar during that period, this substitution is not a major concern.
In Chapter 2 we deal with data covering 144 months, and so it will be unconvincing to
attempt to examine long-run relationships or changes in PCA weights. This is because
the literature proposes several possible years for structural breaks in the development
of the oil price; Hamilton (2009b) proposes 2005, Elder et al. (2014) propose 2008
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and Chen, Huang and Yi (2015) propose 2010. There would be a very small sample
size to work with if these breaks were to be incorporated, though of course if data
were available a long-run relationship model would be an interesting topic for further
research. In Chapter 3 we needed to compromise between the length of the estimation
windows and the number of events available for analysis. The decision to use a 5 day
post-event window is reasonable because the EU ETS futures market has on average
2,000 trades per day (during 2013). The data suggests that the eect of decisions lasts
as long as 5 days, however the aim of the tests is to discover whether there is an eect
due to sentiment, rather than to test how long the eect endures. This would be an
interesting extension to the work but is not realistic for the data available.
5.3.2 Event Date Choice
A more important limitation for Chapter 3 is that the date chosen for the event study is
taken from the European Parliament Legislative Observatory's record of the Decision
by Parliament. While this is the obvious choice for the study, it is possible that the
outcome of some decisions of the EP are anticipated clearly at an earlier time.
5.3.3 Missing Variables
A common comment about a proposed sentiment eect, is that the observed eect is
actually due to missing variables. It is impossible to prove that there are no missing
variables. All that can be done is to show that the literature supports the models,
which it does. This is of course a limitation to the thesis.
5.3.4 Model Accuracy
Our testing method throughout this thesis is to compare a model of price or volatility
before and after adding a sentiment component. When proposing that sentiment has
an eect on price or volatility we must ask whether the new information adds to the
existing models. This raises the problem of deciding which of the existing models to
choose for the comparison. It would be interesting for further research to be conducted
into the interactions between volatility and sentiment, perhaps by using a dierent
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selection of GARCH models; in this investigation GARCH (1,1) and Threshold GARCH
(1,1) are used for the EUA volatility analysis. A GARCH in the mean model, where
the conditional variance is added as a regressor in the mean equation of a standard
GARCH model, is one of many options. A further development of the research on the
interaction of sentiment and volatility in the EU ETS might be to use a fractionally
integrated generalized auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (FIGARCH) model
which has been found to have some success in modelling equities and currencies, see
Baillie et al. (1996) and Bentes (2014). The focus of this research is to examine the
eect of sentiment in professionally traded futures markets rather than examining the
volatility itself as a phenomenon. The question of the long memory of volatility, or
volatility persistence, would be an interesting extension of this work. As a measure of
model t, the sum of the GARCH coecients was close to one for the GARCH analyses
in Chapters 3 and 4, and a little less for the Threshold GARCH analysis in Chapter 4
indicating a better t for the Threshold GARCH model.
Naturally we cannot exhaustively check every model which attempts to throw light
on price and volatility in the oil and carbon markets; there are simply too many. All
that we can hope for is that we compare the addition of sentiment information to an
existing model which is rmly based in the literature, and that we test it taking account
of the likelihood that the inevitable improvement in goodness of t, is more than would
be expected by random chance. Nazi and Milunovich (2010) and Chen et al. (2017)
fail to nd evidence for long-run relationships in the carbon market, so the omission of a
VECM model which takes long-run relationships into account, is not such a restriction
to the present work. The assumption of constancy for the PCA weights may be a of
the limitation of the research, however we follow Baker and Wurgler (2006), who do
assume constancy of weights.
5.3.5 Sentiment Analysis Accuracy
The measurement of sentiment is perhaps the largest limitation in this thesis. We
use two methods to evaluate sentiment, an index, based on Baker and Wurgler (2006)
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amongst others, and the sentiment analysis of DataSift, a leading social media analysis
company. The use of nancial data to produce a sentiment signal in Chapters 2 and 3
following Baker and Wurgler (2006) amongst many others, has become an established
practice. In this nancial data method, we are limited by the extent to which the data
available in the futures market, is substitutable for the sentiment proxies used in the
equities market. For example there is no futures market equivalent of the closed end
fund discount, however the other proxies are very close to their equivalent in equity
research.
The use of language processing and sentiment engines to measure sentiment ex-
pressed in text in Chapter 4 is relatively new and unfamiliar to many. The use of social
media itself has a short history compared with the timescale over which we have access
to nancial data in the markets. Thus a limitation of the present work is the sentiment
analysis of Twitter. We can expect that this analysis will improve as more work is
carried out and the technology improves. This is a limitation of the thesis but given
the consistency of results from DataSift we nd no reason to doubt their accuracy. It
would be interesting to repeat the analysis using some other platform such as Facebook
or LinkedIn.
5.4 Contribution
The rst contribution of this thesis is that it demonstrates the inuence of sentiment
in professionally traded markets, thus violating the Ecient Market Hypothesis. Sen-
timent is seen to have an important eect on prices and volatility of oil and emission
allowances. A second contribution is in Chapter 3 where we see that the EU emissions
market reaction to European Parliament decisions depends on the origin of the deci-
sion, market sentiment and news exposure. The EU emissions market is, according to
Mizrach and Otsubo (2014) and Grin et al. (2015), a professionally traded market. A
third contribution of this work is that it is one of only a few studies of sentiment in the
energy commodity markets2. A fourth contribution is that it is the rst study of the
2Maslyuk et al. (2013) uses the cumulative sentiment index from Thomson Reuters News Analytics to examine price
discontinuities in energy spot and futures and Borovkova (2011) uses the same source to examine the shape of the forward
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eect of energy and equity market inuence on emissions at intra-day frequency. While
there have been intra-day studies of EUA prices, for example Daskalakis and Markellos
(2009), Bredin et al. (2014), Mizrach and Otsubo (2014), Chevallier and Sevi (2014)
and Ibikunle et al. (2016), this is the rst study using intra-day data for oil, coal, gas,
FTSE, sentiment and EUAs. Finally it is also one of very few studies to use a multi-
ple hypothesis testing (MHT) framework to take account of the multiple comparisons
problem.
This contribution of this thesis is recognized in the rst two publications which ow
from this work, Deeney, Cummins, Dowling and Bermingham (2015) and Deeney et al.
(2016a). The rst publication has been cited in Chen, He and Yu (2015), Maslyuk-
Escobedo et al. (2016), Lee and Ko (2016), Yin and Yang (2016), Batten et al. (2017),
Hung (2017) and Byrne et al. (2017). The second publication has been cited in Zhu
et al. (2015), Chang et al. (2017) and Lou et al. (2017).
5.5 Implications for Practitioners Including Technical Insights
for Researchers Trying to Replicate these Measures
The methods used in Chapters 2 and 3 are replicable using publicly available data, the
methods used to process the data are given in these chapters. A limitation for both is
that they are not predictive and so they may be of little use to practitioners. There is
evidence in Chapter 4 that Twitter sentiment predicts EUA volatility and price level,
so this might be of interest to practitioners. The use of Twitter in Chapter 4 relies
on methods which are not available outside the DataSift company; we discuss this in
detail.
Our reliance on DataSift, a data analysis company based in California, is a strength
of this research in that it provides highly reliable, commercially valuable information
for our analysis of the emissions market (see Section 4.2.3). The use of a commercial
rm to provide this analysis is a method which may be followed by emissions traders,
practitioners and other researchers. There are many companies which provide such
curve for oil futures prices, and Lechthaler and Leinert (2012) uses this source for oil markets.
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information from many social media sources, for example OptiRisk and RavenPack.
DataSift itself was one of the three companies who had access to the whole Twitter re
hose, meaning the entire set of all tweets. 3 Since 13th August 2015 only Gnip had
access to the Twitter re hose. Twitter which had an IPO earlier, had bought Gnip
for this purpose. DataSift has continued as an analysis company and has an exclusive
deal with Facebook. DataSift continues to analyse tweets but cannot supply them,
thus to repeat the analysis done in Chapter 4 rst one would need to purchase the
tweets from Gnip and then pay DataSift to analyse them. If a developer wanted to
analyse Twitter sentiment in the future, rather than historical data, it is possible to use
an Application Programming Interface (API) to request that Twitter pushes selected
tweets to particular developers. This method was considered for Chapter 4 but the
Twitter API typically supplies between 1% and 40%4 of the re hose and furthermore,
the problem of sentiment analysis would have remained. Therefore an API would not
provide the same information as was available from DataSift, but it might be a cost-
eective way for practitioners to gain insight into the emission allowance market.
The second large data set used in Chapter 4 was the tick data from the futures
markets provided by the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). This data is available for
purchase from the exchange. Due to licensing agreements with both DataSift and ICE
it is not possible to publish either the DataSift or ICE data sets, however they are both
available from their vendors.
5.6 Future Research
Baker and Wurgler (2007) dene sentiment as beliefs about future cash ows and in-
vestment risks which are not justied by the facts at hand. Baker and Wurgler (2006),
and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) use an orthogonalization technique to express
their belief that sentiment indices should not be associated with fundamental economic
data, though this is criticized by Hu and Chi (2012). Sentiment has been considered as
3Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) and Gnip being the other two with access to the whole re hose.
4https://brightplanet.com/2013/06/twitter-rehose-vs-twitter-api-whats-the-dierence-and-why-should-you-care/
accessed on 24th April 2017
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an error term and dened as randomly held beliefs by Tetlock (2007).
This outlook on sentiment has been changing. Simon and Wiggins III (2001) use the
VIX, the put-call ratio and the trading index5 as proxies of sentiment with which to
predict the S&P 500 futures. Schmeling (2009) uses consumer condence as a proxy for
individual investor sentiment and nds it forecasts stock returns negatively. Lechthaler
and Leinert (2012) use the sentiment measure from Thomson Reuters News Analytics
similarly and apply it to the oil market. Thomson Reuters News Analytics is used
by Smales (2014) who shows negative news has greater impact than positive news.
In Koch et al. (2014) the economic outlook is used to examine EU emissions prices,
where economic outlook is proxied by the monthly Eurostat Economic Sentiment Index.
Sentiment is found to have an eect in equity markets by Harding and He (2016). We
therefore detect that an acceptance of the use of sentiment is growing.
In this thesis we add the emissions markets to the areas aected by sentiment and
we conrm the eect of sentiment in the oil markets. This is been done by measur-
ing sentiment using proxies from within the market and using sentiment derived from
tweets. In both cases we nd that there is an important association between asset prices
and volatility, and sentiment. It is of great importance that these two very dierent
methods come to the same conclusions.
Future questions remain regarding the methods by which sentiment inuences the
energy futures markets. Is it the case that the preponderance of professional traders
promotes herd behaviour? Is it possible that sentiment contains a mixture of funda-
mental information and noise? Is this possibly a reason it is rational to use sentiment
as a source of information when other sources are unavailable or unreliable? Much is
still to be tested and there are good reasons to do such testing.
Oil is the world's most traded commodity and any insight into its behaviour is im-
portant. Concerning the emissions market, the world's second largest economy, China,
is about to form a national emissions trading scheme from the pilot schemes which have
been running since 2013. What has been learned from the EU ETS is being used to
5The trading index, or TRIN, is the number of advancing stocks scaled by volume divided by the number of declining
stocks scaled by volume. It is reported by the NYSE.
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form this new trading scheme, for example China's ETS is not planning to set limits as
far into the future as the EU ETS did, and the limits are set in terms of carbon intensity
rather than the absolute quantity of CO2 (Zhang et al.; 2014). It is not beyond the
bounds of possibility that emissions will become a globally traded commodity, much
like oil; at present the prices in the Chinese pilots and the EU ETS are not incompatible
with each other6. In both areas of oil and emissions trading, the research in this thesis
has made a contribution showing that sentiment at monthly, daily and intra-day fre-
quency adds to the existing understanding of professionally traded commodity futures
markets.
6The price of an EUA December 2017 futures contract on 24th April 2017 is ¿4.68 while the average price of the
equivalent tonne of CO2 in the Chinese pilots is approximately 40 yuan or ¿5.35.
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Appendix A
Multiple Hypothesis Testing
A.1 Multiple Hypothesis Testing
A type I error is the false rejection of a true null hypothesis in a single test. If many
true null hypotheses are tested simultaneously, with a conventional p-value of say 0.05,
then it is likely that there will be approximately 5% of these tests rejected. These false
rejections are the result of performing hundreds of simultaneous hypothesis tests while
using the p-value calculated for a single test. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 we perform 120, 468
and 5,388 tests respectively. To correct for this, a multiple hypothesis testing (MHT)
method is used in this thesis. Under consideration are four MHT testing methods,
Bonferroni, Holm, Generalized Bonferroni and Generalized Holm, see Holm (1979) and
Cummins (2013b,a). We now explain the method to calculate the individual thresholds
for each hypothesis tested.
The family-wise error rate, (FWER), is the probability that at least one true null
hypothesis, H0; i in a family of tests will be rejected, namely
FWER = P [reject at least one null hypothesis H0; i; which is true]
where H0; i; i = 1; ::s, is the set of null hypotheses in the family. A signicance level
 is chosen so that FWER  .
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The Bonferroni test rejects the hypothesis H0; i i pi  s , where pi is the p-value
of the ith test, and s is the number of hypotheses tested. This is a very conservative
measure because it is a single step procedure and takes no account of the distribution
of the hypothesis test results (
s
does not change with i).
Holm's method requires that the hypothesis test results, pi are arranged in sequence
starting with the lowest value, re-labelling the hypotheses H0; i as required. Holm's
method is step-wise, in that the test rejects H0 i i pi  s i+1 for i = 1; ::; s. This is a
more powerful test than the Bonferroni test because the threshold value for signicance
pi increases with i. It is still a conservative test because it tolerates only one falsely
rejected null hypothesis.
There is a generalization of FWER, where we are prepared to accept k or more
false discoveries. This is particularly important if we have to work with hundreds
of simultaneous hypothesis tests, in which case, the possibility of one or two false
discoveries will not obscure the overall conclusion of the investigation. kFWER is
dened as follows,
kFWER = P [reject at least k null hypotheses; H0; i which are true] :
As before the signicance level  is set so that kFWER 5 , the two methods
Generalized Bonferonni and Generalized Holm produce p-values for the hypothesis tests
which achieve this. In the generalized Bonferonni test H0; i is rejected i pi ks where k
is the number of false positives tolerated,  is the condence level, and s is the number
of hypotheses under consideration. This is robust to the dependence structure of the
hypotheses tested but is still a single step procedure and as such is not very powerful
Romano et al. (2010).
Generalized Holm is a similar extension to Holm's method. Again the pi are arranged
in sequence and H0; i is rejected if pi  ks if i  k, or H0; i is rejected if pi  ks+k i , if
i > k. The increase of i will cause pi to increase sequentially, hence the increase in this
method's power. This test is also robust to the dependence structure of the hypothesis
tests. (Note that it is entirely possible that the pi will increase in steps smaller than the
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Chapter No of Tests p-value *
2 120 0.00753
3 468 0.00606
4 5,388 0.00544
The table presents the threshold p-values for the Generalized Holm MHT procedure for Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
*Note that, as is frequently the case with real data, there is a unique p-value which acts as a threshold for all
of the tests.
Table A.1: Threshold values using Generalized Holm MHT for Chapters 2, 3 and 4
increase in the threshold, thus it is possible that a null hypothesis H0;r with a p-value
of pr would not be rejected but H0; r+1 with a larger p-value of pr+1 would be rejected.
This is not seen in practice very often as the gaps between the pi are usually larger
than the gaps between successive threshold values.)
Using the hypothesis tests in each chapter as three families of hypotheses, the MHT
procedures are carried out using the most powerful of the MHT procedures, the Gen-
eralized Holm procedure. The results for the Generalized Holm procedure are given in
Table A.1. The application of the Generalized Holm procedure used a condence level
of  = 0:1 that there are fewer than 5% false hypotheses rejected among the hypotheses
tested. This considerably reduces the number of claimed discoveries and yields results
which are much more reliable.
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Appendix B
VAR Results for Emissions Market
Sentiment
B.1 Introduction to VAR Results
The following tables for emissions market sentiment present the results of the VAR
analysis, results for climate change sentiment are found in Appendix D. In this ap-
pendix, which deals with emissions market sentiment, for each combination of includ-
ing/excluding outliers and for each of the ve sentiment measures there are three tables
making a total of thirty tables. This large number of tables is because there are 11 lags
considered for each of the VAR results. For each combination of sentiment measure
and choice of including or excluding outliers the rst table has the results of the VAR
test for that sentiment measure and for Brent oil, the next table concerns Coal and
the FTSE and nally the third table concerns Gas and EUA. The energy variables and
the FTSE are log returns, the sentiment is rst-dierenced and standardized. In the
sample shown in Table B.1 the rst equation is,
Brentt =  0:001  0:118SumPost 1   0:114SumPost 2   :::::+ 0:010SumPost 11
 0:016Brentt 1 + 0:008Brentt 2   ::::+ 0:014Brentt 11
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+0:015Coalt 1   ::::+ 0:003Coalt 11 + 0:043FTSEt 1 + ::::  0:017FTSEt 11
+0:007Gast 1   ::::  0:033Gast 11 + 0:018EUAt 1 + ::::+ 0:014EUAt 11
where the p-value of the Sum Pos rst lag coecient is 0.1904, the p-value of the
Sum Pos second lag coecient is 0.1904 and the p-value of the Count Pos eleventh lag
coecient is 0.0.9153. The value of  is found further down the table along with the
R2 statistic. Note that none of these coecients in this sample table is signicantly
dierent from zero except for FTSE(-1) and Gas(-11).
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Brent Coal FTSE
Sum Pos(-1) -0.118 0.029 0.068
0.1904 0.7543 0.4534
Sum Pos(-2) -0.114 0.006 0.098
0.1904 0.9457 0.2621
. . .
Sum Pos(-11) 0.010 -0.015 -0.124
0.9153 0.8682 0.1721
Brent(-1) -0.016 0.007 0.019
0.4285 0.7303 0.3558
Brent(-2) 0.008 0.030 0.000
0.6972 0.1491 0.9973
. . .
Brent(-11) 0.014 0.006 -0.004
0.5055 0.7578 0.8315
C -0.001 -0.002 0.000
0.9574 0.9339 0.9876
Coal(-1) 0.015 -0.011 0.008
0.4470 0.5838 0.7024
. . .
Coal(-11) 0.003 0.002 -0.010
0.8869 0.9255 0.6281
FTSE(-1) 0.043 0.016 -0.019
0.0348 0.4362 0.3462
. . .
FTSE(-11) -0.017 0.007 -0.023
0.4229 0.7557 0.2642
Gas(-1) 0.007 0.001 -0.016
0.7124 0.9574 0.4143
. . .
Gas(-11) -0.033 0.005 -0.024
0.0973 0.7993 0.2413
EUA(-1) 0.018 0.003 -0.017
0.4247 0.8797 0.4498
. . .
EUA(-11) 0.014 0.007 0.001
0.5335 0.7747 0.9585
The text explains the layout of the following tables of VAR results.
Table B.1: Sample Layout of VAR Result Tables
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B.2 VAR Results for Emissions Market Excluding Outliers
B.2.1 No Outliers Emissions Market Sum Positive
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Pos
Sum Pos(-1) -0.118 0.029 0.068 0.097 -0.025 0.165
0.1904 0.7543 0.4534 0.2879 0.7594 0.0000
Sum Pos(-2) -0.114 0.006 0.098 -0.061 0.125 -0.017
0.1904 0.9457 0.2621 0.4894 0.1107 0.3717
Sum Pos(-3) -0.055 -0.026 -0.148 -0.043 -0.089 -0.074
0.5194 0.7611 0.0827 0.6186 0.2487 0.0001
Sum Pos(-4) -0.237 0.076 0.235 0.129 0.011 -0.063
0.0055 0.3792 0.0059 0.1351 0.8883 0.0008
Sum Pos(-5) 0.039 -0.012 0.191 0.011 -0.075 0.026
0.6467 0.8898 0.0263 0.8964 0.3287 0.1639
Sum Pos(-6) 0.026 0.031 -0.019 -0.028 -0.057 0.047
0.7645 0.7189 0.8219 0.7430 0.4553 0.0133
Sum Pos(-7) 0.329 0.006 0.128 0.017 -0.118 -0.068
0.0001 0.9468 0.1352 0.8466 0.1247 0.0003
Sum Pos(-8) -0.115 0.000 0.119 0.119 0.055 -0.042
0.1799 0.9958 0.1648 0.1695 0.4769 0.0273
Sum Pos(-9) -0.095 0.048 0.105 -0.111 0.128 -0.185
0.2645 0.5783 0.2209 0.1983 0.0963 0.0000
Sum Pos(-10) 0.056 -0.011 0.045 0.037 -0.144 0.324
0.5239 0.9048 0.6076 0.6752 0.0670 0.0000
Sum Pos(-11) 0.010 -0.015 -0.124 -0.091 0.082 -0.143
0.9153 0.8682 0.1721 0.3205 0.3147 0.0000
Brent(-1) -0.016 0.007 0.019 0.010 0.010 -0.006
0.4285 0.7303 0.3558 0.6302 0.5980 0.2044
Brent(-2) 0.008 0.030 0.000 -0.007 0.029 0.015
0.6972 0.1491 0.9973 0.7333 0.1241 0.0012
Brent(-3) -0.043 0.005 -0.006 -0.044 -0.023 0.000
0.0386 0.8099 0.7672 0.0351 0.2199 0.9592
Brent(-4) 0.004 0.014 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.004
0.8590 0.5148 0.6031 0.8161 0.8019 0.3631
Brent(-5) 0.003 0.011 -0.038 0.012 -0.006 0.000
0.8858 0.5967 0.0679 0.5805 0.7480 0.9915
Brent(-6) 0.019 0.009 0.007 -0.010 0.026 -0.010
0.3550 0.6677 0.7345 0.6151 0.1587 0.0295
Brent(-7) 0.011 0.004 0.027 -0.028 -0.001 0.000
0.5939 0.8539 0.1948 0.1844 0.9709 0.9389
Brent(-8) -0.014 -0.008 -0.007 -0.021 -0.017 0.000
0.4817 0.6975 0.7163 0.3100 0.3549 0.9554
Brent(-9) 0.038 -0.020 -0.018 0.004 -0.006 -0.007
0.0636 0.3507 0.3822 0.8303 0.7653 0.1328
Brent(-10) 0.030 -0.011 -0.021 -0.018 0.007 0.000
0.1429 0.6043 0.3023 0.3937 0.6934 0.9610
Brent(-11) 0.014 0.006 -0.004 0.006 -0.008 -0.003
0.5055 0.7578 0.8315 0.7803 0.6734 0.5466
C -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000
0.9574 0.9339 0.9876 0.9295 0.6962 0.9983
R2 0.0462 0.0120 0.0318 0.0280 0.0388 0.1895
Table B.2: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Positive No Outliers - Sum Pos and
Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Pos
Coal(-1) 0.015 -0.011 0.008 0.011 0.008 -0.007
0.4470 0.5838 0.7024 0.5823 0.6554 0.1009
Coal(-2) -0.022 -0.003 0.010 -0.017 0.006 0.000
0.2770 0.9007 0.6030 0.4033 0.7447 0.9973
Coal(-3) -0.047 0.012 0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.000
0.0181 0.5541 0.7604 0.7636 0.9471 0.9877
Coal(-4) 0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.030 -0.023 0.001
0.6078 0.6506 0.7158 0.1320 0.1982 0.8495
Coal(-5) -0.090 -0.006 0.028 -0.019 0.020 0.001
0.0000 0.7495 0.1562 0.3315 0.2520 0.7462
Coal(-6) -0.011 -0.003 -0.012 -0.016 0.003 0.002
0.5875 0.8926 0.5629 0.4350 0.8880 0.6526
Coal(-7) -0.001 0.013 0.027 -0.026 0.000 0.001
0.9435 0.5255 0.1815 0.1909 0.9983 0.8442
Coal(-8) -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.016 -0.002 -0.001
0.9496 0.9378 0.9088 0.4278 0.8945 0.7803
Coal(-9) 0.027 0.009 0.017 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
0.1780 0.6449 0.3891 0.9034 0.9177 0.9402
Coal(-10) -0.008 0.012 0.008 -0.016 -0.008 0.000
0.6795 0.5466 0.6796 0.4313 0.6466 0.9636
Coal(-11) 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.013 0.005 0.000
0.8869 0.9255 0.6281 0.5274 0.7912 0.9343
FTSE(-1) 0.043 0.016 -0.019 -0.004 -0.011 0.003
0.0348 0.4362 0.3462 0.8597 0.5673 0.5052
FTSE(-2) 0.038 0.017 -0.022 -0.018 -0.006 0.004
0.0664 0.4159 0.2959 0.3955 0.7638 0.3928
FTSE(-3) 0.016 0.045 0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.002
0.4472 0.0325 0.7566 0.9731 0.7966 0.6867
FTSE(-4) 0.011 -0.028 -0.014 0.005 0.021 -0.007
0.5920 0.1780 0.4943 0.8267 0.2633 0.1130
FTSE(-5) 0.023 -0.011 0.010 0.024 -0.007 -0.010
0.2711 0.5952 0.6133 0.2427 0.6934 0.0225
FTSE(-6) 0.008 0.041 -0.011 0.006 -0.007 0.001
0.7111 0.0536 0.5823 0.7675 0.6969 0.8337
FTSE(-7) -0.036 -0.012 -0.014 0.049 -0.005 -0.004
0.0839 0.5636 0.4916 0.0186 0.7785 0.4287
FTSE(-8) 0.038 -0.009 -0.055 0.028 0.018 -0.005
0.0652 0.6572 0.0077 0.1822 0.3265 0.2342
FTSE(-9) -0.051 0.001 0.002 0.060 -0.019 0.009
0.0133 0.9539 0.9352 0.0039 0.2977 0.0454
FTSE(-10) 0.015 -0.001 -0.035 0.028 0.020 0.003
0.4605 0.9630 0.0862 0.1726 0.2819 0.5108
FTSE(-11) -0.017 0.007 -0.023 0.038 0.015 -0.002
0.4229 0.7557 0.2642 0.0671 0.4199 0.7072
Table B.3: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Positive No Outliers - Coal and FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Pos
Gas(-1) 0.007 0.001 -0.016 -0.017 0.020 -0.002
0.7124 0.9574 0.4143 0.4151 0.2728 0.7238
Gas(-2) -0.027 0.000 -0.050 -0.012 -0.004 0.004
0.1869 0.9901 0.0127 0.5461 0.8157 0.3775
Gas(-3) 0.023 -0.005 -0.016 -0.003 -0.003 0.000
0.2540 0.7907 0.4145 0.8764 0.8864 0.9537
Gas(-4) -0.009 0.001 -0.043 -0.022 0.015 -0.002
0.6546 0.9528 0.0342 0.2781 0.3962 0.6263
Gas(-5) 0.020 0.005 0.031 0.000 0.041 0.002
0.3195 0.8104 0.1258 0.9867 0.0224 0.6186
Gas(-6) -0.004 -0.001 0.012 0.013 -0.017 0.000
0.8414 0.9484 0.5636 0.5073 0.3362 0.9219
Gas(-7) -0.022 -0.003 -0.026 0.064 -0.007 0.001
0.2678 0.8708 0.1936 0.0015 0.6936 0.7575
Gas(-8) -0.001 -0.007 0.011 -0.006 0.003 -0.005
0.9578 0.7231 0.5893 0.7851 0.8691 0.2862
Gas(-9) -0.026 0.022 -0.012 0.006 -0.002 -0.002
0.1976 0.2740 0.5534 0.7824 0.8917 0.6539
Gas(-10) 0.002 0.040 0.016 -0.062 -0.028 -0.010
0.9216 0.0510 0.4250 0.0021 0.1186 0.0321
Gas(-11) -0.033 0.005 -0.024 0.016 -0.002 0.008
0.0973 0.7993 0.2413 0.4379 0.8934 0.0693
EUA(-1) 0.018 0.003 -0.017 0.025 -0.013 0.002
0.4247 0.8797 0.4498 0.2672 0.5182 0.7414
EUA(-2) 0.023 0.007 0.002 -0.013 0.032 -0.010
0.3075 0.7643 0.9406 0.5568 0.1096 0.0403
EUA(-3) 0.004 -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003
0.8655 0.7270 0.6355 0.8332 0.9397 0.5081
EUA(-4) -0.025 -0.004 0.003 -0.031 0.019 -0.006
0.2716 0.8781 0.8799 0.1716 0.3568 0.2605
EUA(-5) 0.004 0.024 -0.017 0.019 0.093 -0.007
0.8446 0.2898 0.4371 0.3944 0.0000 0.1700
EUA(-6) -0.021 0.014 -0.027 0.023 0.052 0.004
0.3414 0.5315 0.2323 0.3199 0.0108 0.4664
EUA(-7) -0.014 0.017 -0.007 -0.014 0.033 0.009
0.5365 0.4603 0.7408 0.5353 0.1062 0.0864
EUA(-8) 0.035 0.015 0.003 0.006 0.019 0.013
0.1189 0.5228 0.9100 0.7850 0.3473 0.0067
EUA(-9) 0.030 -0.003 0.013 -0.002 -0.008 0.001
0.1830 0.8993 0.5494 0.9251 0.7006 0.7989
EUA(-10) -0.014 -0.016 -0.039 0.008 -0.088 0.004
0.5270 0.4708 0.0852 0.7227 0.0000 0.4687
EUA(-11) 0.014 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.028 0.004
0.5335 0.7747 0.9585 0.9819 0.1671 0.3996
Table B.4: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Positive No Outliers - Gas and EUA
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B.2.2 No Outliers Emissions Market Sum of Negative
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Neg
Sum Neg(-1) -0.119 -0.019 -0.181 -0.005 -0.148 -0.275
0.1625 0.8278 0.0341 0.9541 0.0805 0.0000
Sum Neg(-2) 0.080 -0.019 -0.060 0.014 -0.193 0.047
0.3257 0.8169 0.4662 0.8656 0.0174 0.0134
Sum Neg(-3) 0.169 0.034 0.107 0.020 0.126 0.047
0.0386 0.6799 0.1916 0.8059 0.1191 0.0138
Sum Neg(-4) 0.060 0.006 -0.133 -0.016 -0.109 -0.040
0.4624 0.9400 0.1035 0.8406 0.1793 0.0348
Sum Neg(-5) -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.035 0.252 0.078
0.9345 0.9639 0.8477 0.6663 0.0018 0.0000
Sum Neg(-6) 0.027 -0.058 0.170 -0.001 0.043 0.189
0.7307 0.4691 0.0319 0.9926 0.5882 0.0000
Sum Neg(-7) -0.128 -0.004 0.026 -0.055 0.028 -0.098
0.1092 0.9593 0.7420 0.4917 0.7251 0.0000
Sum Neg(-8) 0.028 -0.003 -0.184 -0.147 0.023 0.041
0.7314 0.9703 0.0228 0.0682 0.7736 0.0298
Sum Neg(-9) 0.170 -0.019 0.070 0.028 0.203 0.071
0.0347 0.8170 0.3882 0.7288 0.0112 0.0002
Sum Neg(-10) -0.005 0.007 0.018 -0.004 0.341 -0.410
0.9529 0.9302 0.8218 0.9620 0.0000 0.0000
Sum Neg(-11) 0.029 -0.023 0.028 -0.077 -0.047 0.244
0.7313 0.7904 0.7368 0.3608 0.5717 0.0000
Brent(-1) -0.017 0.007 0.017 0.011 0.002 -0.001
0.4082 0.7459 0.4034 0.5976 0.9329 0.8956
Brent(-2) 0.010 0.031 0.001 -0.010 0.018 0.008
0.6178 0.1431 0.9779 0.6411 0.3717 0.1068
Brent(-3) -0.043 0.005 -0.015 -0.041 -0.021 0.005
0.0350 0.8265 0.4695 0.0470 0.2933 0.3077
Brent(-4) 0.001 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.014 -0.002
0.9450 0.5322 0.9176 0.8618 0.4834 0.6632
Brent(-5) -0.003 0.009 -0.044 0.011 -0.019 0.009
0.9005 0.6730 0.0323 0.5969 0.3464 0.0662
Brent(-6) 0.014 0.010 -0.002 -0.010 0.039 -0.008
0.5015 0.6360 0.9092 0.6267 0.0574 0.0936
Brent(-7) 0.009 0.005 0.034 -0.027 0.023 -0.014
0.6757 0.8098 0.0988 0.1958 0.2527 0.0025
Brent(-8) -0.015 -0.008 -0.003 -0.020 -0.017 0.002
0.4727 0.7121 0.8837 0.3274 0.4098 0.6283
Brent(-9) 0.042 -0.019 -0.018 0.005 -0.006 0.002
0.0394 0.3681 0.3686 0.8074 0.7581 0.6057
Brent(-10) 0.029 -0.011 -0.020 -0.022 0.002 0.007
0.1581 0.5824 0.3297 0.2932 0.9357 0.1258
Brent(-11) 0.012 0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.008 -0.008
0.5738 0.8008 0.8521 0.8863 0.6970 0.1108
C 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.9900 0.9439 0.9795 0.9524 0.9977 0.9915
R2 0.03867 0.011512 0.033311 0.026845 0.049684 0.306667
Table B.5: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Negative No Outliers - Sum Neg and
Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Neg
Coal(-1) 0.016 -0.011 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.000
0.4147 0.5881 0.7060 0.5881 0.6431 0.9698
Coal(-2) -0.020 -0.003 0.007 -0.017 0.007 0.002
0.3030 0.8977 0.7340 0.3836 0.7053 0.6324
Coal(-3) -0.043 0.012 0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001
0.0293 0.5595 0.7876 0.7575 0.9351 0.7531
Coal(-4) 0.011 -0.009 -0.005 -0.030 -0.023 -0.001
0.5853 0.6409 0.7836 0.1299 0.2390 0.8728
Coal(-5) -0.089 -0.007 0.028 -0.020 0.018 -0.001
0.0000 0.7345 0.1665 0.3063 0.3664 0.8929
Coal(-6) -0.011 -0.003 -0.012 -0.016 0.003 0.000
0.5970 0.8781 0.5622 0.4341 0.8677 0.9953
Coal(-7) -0.002 0.013 0.025 -0.027 0.000 0.002
0.9297 0.5232 0.2144 0.1858 0.9818 0.6310
Coal(-8) -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.015 0.001 -0.002
0.8488 0.9359 0.9835 0.4508 0.9442 0.7312
Coal(-9) 0.025 0.009 0.014 -0.003 -0.006 0.003
0.2015 0.6566 0.4697 0.8625 0.7483 0.5480
Coal(-10) -0.009 0.012 0.010 -0.015 -0.010 0.002
0.6393 0.5401 0.6288 0.4604 0.6318 0.6641
Coal(-11) 0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.013 0.004 -0.003
0.8532 0.9227 0.7304 0.5196 0.8332 0.5558
FTSE(-1) 0.044 0.015 -0.013 -0.004 -0.017 -0.003
0.0317 0.4688 0.5154 0.8517 0.3958 0.5779
FTSE(-2) 0.036 0.018 -0.015 -0.015 0.013 0.000
0.0752 0.3972 0.4579 0.4691 0.5307 0.9833
FTSE(-3) 0.011 0.044 0.016 -0.004 -0.007 -0.009
0.5861 0.0328 0.4344 0.8417 0.7176 0.0498
FTSE(-4) 0.000 -0.029 -0.013 0.000 0.015 -0.006
0.9966 0.1629 0.5247 0.9921 0.4646 0.2218
FTSE(-5) 0.027 -0.010 0.028 0.024 0.006 -0.005
0.1888 0.6157 0.1710 0.2477 0.7806 0.3180
FTSE(-6) 0.010 0.040 0.006 0.007 -0.013 0.001
0.6354 0.0571 0.7846 0.7337 0.5286 0.7693
FTSE(-7) -0.036 -0.010 -0.011 0.044 -0.005 0.007
0.0761 0.6148 0.5991 0.0309 0.8120 0.1410
FTSE(-8) 0.044 -0.008 -0.063 0.025 0.012 0.010
0.0323 0.7011 0.0023 0.2187 0.5688 0.0348
FTSE(-9) -0.053 0.000 -0.019 0.060 -0.026 0.004
0.0102 0.9940 0.3512 0.0040 0.2050 0.4484
FTSE(-10) 0.012 0.000 -0.034 0.031 0.017 -0.003
0.5584 0.9969 0.0958 0.1391 0.3960 0.4727
FTSE(-11) -0.010 0.006 -0.025 0.038 0.017 -0.001
0.6320 0.7694 0.2269 0.0678 0.3972 0.7784
Table B.6: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Negative No Outliers - Coal and
FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Neg
Gas(-1) 0.009 0.000 -0.019 -0.019 0.025 -0.001
0.6693 0.9974 0.3524 0.3607 0.2211 0.8035
Gas(-2) -0.026 0.000 -0.049 -0.013 -0.004 0.006
0.2038 0.9949 0.0161 0.5143 0.8435 0.1929
Gas(-3) 0.025 -0.005 -0.016 -0.003 -0.006 0.001
0.2199 0.7928 0.4260 0.8768 0.7765 0.8960
Gas(-4) -0.010 0.001 -0.042 -0.022 0.025 -0.003
0.6105 0.9570 0.0370 0.2756 0.2169 0.5539
Gas(-5) 0.022 0.006 0.028 -0.002 0.043 0.002
0.2758 0.7846 0.1700 0.9354 0.0326 0.6166
Gas(-6) -0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.015 -0.020 0.002
0.8633 0.9611 0.7008 0.4596 0.3056 0.7428
Gas(-7) -0.026 -0.003 -0.025 0.064 -0.007 0.003
0.2023 0.8765 0.2076 0.0017 0.7281 0.4957
Gas(-8) -0.005 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 0.001 0.000
0.8198 0.7018 0.6094 0.6853 0.9431 0.9168
Gas(-9) -0.022 0.023 -0.010 0.004 0.000 0.000
0.2676 0.2685 0.6103 0.8306 0.9976 0.9924
Gas(-10) 0.002 0.040 0.011 -0.061 -0.026 -0.012
0.9159 0.0487 0.5728 0.0026 0.1883 0.0108
Gas(-11) -0.031 0.005 -0.018 0.012 -0.004 0.004
0.1254 0.7989 0.3879 0.5463 0.8291 0.3823
EUA(-1) 0.013 0.008 -0.013 0.022 -0.015 -0.030
0.5401 0.7130 0.5447 0.3028 0.4771 0.0000
EUA(-2) 0.024 0.009 -0.004 -0.015 0.037 0.003
0.2466 0.6663 0.8388 0.4771 0.0776 0.6031
EUA(-3) -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.002 -0.010 -0.006
0.9171 0.7621 0.6035 0.9127 0.6458 0.2410
EUA(-4) -0.021 -0.010 0.022 -0.024 0.027 -0.001
0.3192 0.6373 0.3031 0.2467 0.1978 0.8103
EUA(-5) 0.001 0.019 0.003 0.021 0.067 -0.006
0.9476 0.3783 0.8812 0.3169 0.0013 0.2503
EUA(-6) -0.017 0.013 -0.043 0.017 0.048 0.021
0.4033 0.5317 0.0419 0.4305 0.0209 0.0000
EUA(-7) -0.008 0.015 0.015 -0.014 0.026 -0.004
0.6938 0.4904 0.4625 0.4897 0.2164 0.3929
EUA(-8) 0.042 0.011 0.010 0.020 0.008 0.001
0.0426 0.5974 0.6387 0.3330 0.7019 0.8038
EUA(-9) 0.030 -0.001 0.015 0.004 0.006 0.000
0.1487 0.9766 0.4714 0.8340 0.7599 0.9283
EUA(-10) -0.016 -0.015 -0.035 0.007 -0.077 0.010
0.4414 0.4648 0.0951 0.7278 0.0002 0.0360
EUA(-11) 0.015 0.007 0.011 0.007 -0.034 0.010
0.4708 0.7296 0.5992 0.7273 0.1024 0.0373
Table B.7: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Negative No Outliers - Gas and EUA
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B.2.3 No Outliers Emissions Market Count Positive
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Pos)
Count Pos(-1) -0.116 0.024 0.053 0.099 -0.040 0.177
0.2126 0.7992 0.5716 0.2944 0.6359 0.0000
Count Pos(-2) -0.128 0.035 0.106 -0.069 0.151 -0.016
0.1504 0.6996 0.2346 0.4406 0.0595 0.4054
Count Pos(-3) -0.093 -0.039 -0.123 -0.031 -0.075 -0.046
0.2874 0.6593 0.1571 0.7216 0.3355 0.0145
Count Pos(-4) -0.207 0.088 0.243 0.131 0.042 -0.026
0.0173 0.3224 0.0053 0.1353 0.5931 0.1615
Count Pos(-5) 0.024 -0.008 0.175 -0.006 -0.078 0.012
0.7814 0.9303 0.0450 0.9446 0.3173 0.5197
Count Pos(-6) 0.055 0.030 -0.066 -0.045 -0.050 0.005
0.5302 0.7329 0.4497 0.6105 0.5231 0.8073
Count Pos(-7) 0.297 0.007 0.135 0.007 -0.097 -0.069
0.0006 0.9355 0.1211 0.9345 0.2129 0.0002
Count Pos(-8) -0.114 -0.005 0.175 0.118 0.088 -0.028
0.1903 0.9575 0.0451 0.1815 0.2610 0.1418
Count Pos(-9) -0.113 0.047 0.083 -0.108 0.113 -0.203
0.1949 0.5984 0.3411 0.2195 0.1494 0.0000
Count Pos(-10) 0.022 -0.002 0.043 0.046 -0.169 0.343
0.8080 0.9788 0.6342 0.6117 0.0359 0.0000
Count Pos(-11) 0.025 -0.011 -0.060 -0.084 0.122 -0.141
0.7889 0.9040 0.5192 0.3749 0.1480 0.0000
Brent(-1) -0.018 0.008 0.018 0.010 0.010 -0.007
0.3757 0.7143 0.3852 0.6231 0.5978 0.1386
Brent(-2) 0.009 0.031 0.000 -0.008 0.029 0.016
0.6772 0.1454 0.9892 0.7169 0.1163 0.0003
Brent(-3) -0.043 0.005 -0.006 -0.044 -0.022 0.001
0.0378 0.8019 0.7859 0.0334 0.2482 0.7976
Brent(-4) 0.004 0.013 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.003
0.8454 0.5292 0.6316 0.8533 0.7895 0.5507
Brent(-5) 0.004 0.011 -0.038 0.012 -0.007 0.001
0.8541 0.6011 0.0675 0.5657 0.7231 0.8902
Brent(-6) 0.019 0.009 0.007 -0.011 0.026 -0.010
0.3694 0.6697 0.7483 0.5983 0.1604 0.0219
Brent(-7) 0.011 0.004 0.027 -0.027 -0.001 -0.002
0.5838 0.8604 0.1877 0.1865 0.9651 0.6521
Brent(-8) -0.015 -0.008 -0.006 -0.021 -0.017 -0.001
0.4587 0.7128 0.7527 0.3208 0.3576 0.8800
Brent(-9) 0.037 -0.020 -0.016 0.005 -0.005 -0.006
0.0744 0.3497 0.4320 0.8112 0.7994 0.1780
Brent(-10) 0.031 -0.011 -0.022 -0.018 0.007 0.001
0.1355 0.6041 0.2890 0.3886 0.6931 0.8166
Brent(-11) 0.013 0.007 -0.005 0.006 -0.008 -0.002
0.5193 0.7449 0.8099 0.7779 0.6584 0.7161
C -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000
0.9578 0.9337 0.9864 0.9298 0.6965 0.9726
R2 0.0446 0.0121 0.0315 0.0279 0.0393 0.1926
Table B.8: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Positive No Outliers - Sent and
Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Pos
Coal(-1) 0.015 -0.011 0.008 0.011 0.008 -0.007
0.4399 0.5860 0.6901 0.5749 0.6479 0.1009
Coal(-2) -0.022 -0.003 0.010 -0.017 0.006 0.001
0.2794 0.8947 0.6195 0.3989 0.7579 0.8383
Coal(-3) -0.047 0.012 0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.000
0.0181 0.5483 0.7786 0.7585 0.9363 0.9931
Coal(-4) 0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.030 -0.023 0.001
0.6087 0.6473 0.7112 0.1337 0.1955 0.8453
Coal(-5) -0.090 -0.006 0.028 -0.019 0.021 0.003
0.0000 0.7523 0.1539 0.3349 0.2392 0.5547
Coal(-6) -0.011 -0.003 -0.012 -0.016 0.003 0.001
0.5887 0.8921 0.5450 0.4193 0.8775 0.7762
Coal(-7) -0.001 0.013 0.026 -0.026 -0.001 0.002
0.9587 0.5282 0.1970 0.1914 0.9753 0.7246
Coal(-8) -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.016 -0.002 -0.002
0.9420 0.9342 0.9054 0.4232 0.9189 0.6261
Coal(-9) 0.027 0.009 0.017 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
0.1773 0.6465 0.3869 0.8999 0.9201 0.8945
Coal(-10) -0.009 0.012 0.008 -0.016 -0.008 0.000
0.6672 0.5471 0.6825 0.4321 0.6407 0.9681
Coal(-11) 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.013 0.005 -0.002
0.8967 0.9259 0.6290 0.5321 0.7978 0.6776
FTSE(-1) 0.046 0.016 -0.019 -0.003 -0.011 0.001
0.0270 0.4414 0.3484 0.8774 0.5387 0.8106
FTSE(-2) 0.037 0.017 -0.021 -0.017 -0.005 0.002
0.0707 0.4191 0.3095 0.4110 0.7718 0.5876
FTSE(-3) 0.016 0.045 0.006 -0.001 0.004 0.000
0.4458 0.0324 0.7746 0.9758 0.8166 0.9800
FTSE(-4) 0.009 -0.028 -0.015 0.005 0.020 -0.004
0.6480 0.1780 0.4726 0.8152 0.2898 0.3607
FTSE(-5) 0.023 -0.011 0.011 0.024 -0.007 -0.008
0.2649 0.5971 0.5814 0.2479 0.7120 0.0717
FTSE(-6) 0.008 0.040 -0.012 0.006 -0.008 0.001
0.6844 0.0539 0.5559 0.7695 0.6494 0.8521
FTSE(-7) -0.035 -0.012 -0.014 0.049 -0.006 -0.001
0.0855 0.5757 0.4880 0.0179 0.7519 0.7403
FTSE(-8) 0.040 -0.010 -0.054 0.028 0.018 -0.006
0.0503 0.6468 0.0087 0.1793 0.3285 0.1765
FTSE(-9) -0.050 0.001 0.000 0.060 -0.019 0.009
0.0155 0.9468 0.9826 0.0040 0.2958 0.0402
FTSE(-10) 0.015 -0.001 -0.035 0.028 0.021 0.000
0.4784 0.9743 0.0871 0.1782 0.2568 0.9329
FTSE(-11) -0.017 0.006 -0.024 0.038 0.015 -0.002
0.4137 0.7720 0.2471 0.0681 0.4111 0.7234
Table B.9: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Positive No Outliers - Coal and
FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Pos
Gas(-1) 0.008 0.001 -0.016 -0.017 0.020 -0.001
0.6992 0.9621 0.4203 0.4170 0.2749 0.8020
Gas(-2) -0.026 0.000 -0.049 -0.012 -0.004 0.004
0.1888 0.9942 0.0143 0.5516 0.8279 0.3921
Gas(-3) 0.023 -0.005 -0.016 -0.003 -0.003 0.001
0.2598 0.7951 0.4135 0.8785 0.8762 0.7606
Gas(-4) -0.009 0.001 -0.043 -0.022 0.015 -0.002
0.6528 0.9599 0.0327 0.2750 0.3996 0.6757
Gas(-5) 0.021 0.005 0.030 0.000 0.041 0.003
0.2988 0.8096 0.1296 0.9943 0.0228 0.4541
Gas(-6) -0.004 -0.001 0.012 0.013 -0.017 -0.001
0.8500 0.9464 0.5651 0.5096 0.3390 0.7593
Gas(-7) -0.022 -0.004 -0.027 0.064 -0.007 0.002
0.2717 0.8632 0.1786 0.0015 0.6808 0.7004
Gas(-8) -0.001 -0.007 0.011 -0.006 0.003 -0.004
0.9514 0.7262 0.5854 0.7832 0.8594 0.4112
Gas(-9) -0.025 0.022 -0.012 0.005 -0.003 -0.001
0.2113 0.2790 0.5460 0.7868 0.8854 0.8856
Gas(-10) 0.002 0.040 0.015 -0.062 -0.028 -0.008
0.9294 0.0504 0.4563 0.0021 0.1169 0.0713
Gas(-11) -0.033 0.005 -0.024 0.016 -0.002 0.007
0.0998 0.8042 0.2379 0.4451 0.8924 0.1128
EUA(-1) 0.019 0.003 -0.017 0.025 -0.012 0.000
0.3993 0.8819 0.4411 0.2715 0.5428 0.9292
EUA(-2) 0.022 0.007 0.001 -0.014 0.033 -0.012
0.3244 0.7703 0.9719 0.5485 0.1068 0.0127
EUA(-3) 0.003 -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006
0.9074 0.7186 0.6160 0.8390 0.9370 0.2390
EUA(-4) -0.026 -0.003 0.004 -0.031 0.019 -0.005
0.2447 0.8944 0.8580 0.1774 0.3557 0.3066
EUA(-5) 0.003 0.024 -0.016 0.020 0.093 -0.005
0.8975 0.2852 0.4774 0.3812 0.0000 0.2777
EUA(-6) -0.022 0.015 -0.027 0.023 0.052 0.004
0.3337 0.5271 0.2375 0.3173 0.0108 0.3883
EUA(-7) -0.014 0.018 -0.006 -0.014 0.032 0.009
0.5282 0.4418 0.7924 0.5476 0.1078 0.0533
EUA(-8) 0.036 0.014 0.004 0.006 0.019 0.013
0.1052 0.5271 0.8609 0.7801 0.3432 0.0069
EUA(-9) 0.031 -0.003 0.013 -0.002 -0.008 0.001
0.1716 0.9028 0.5653 0.9132 0.7017 0.8764
EUA(-10) -0.013 -0.017 -0.038 0.008 -0.088 0.002
0.5501 0.4618 0.0879 0.7363 0.0000 0.6791
EUA(-11) 0.015 0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.028 0.001
0.5187 0.7776 0.9601 0.9825 0.1678 0.8587
C -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000
0.9578 0.9337 0.9864 0.9298 0.6965 0.9726
R2 0.0446 0.0121 0.0315 0.0279 0.0393 0.1926
Table B.10: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Positive No Outliers - Gas and
EUA
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B.2.4 No Outliers Emissions Market Count of Negative
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Neg
Count Neg(-1) -0.200 0.020 0.012 -0.018 0.015 0.065
0.042 0.844 0.900 0.854 0.863 0.001
Count Neg(-2) -0.181 0.038 -0.044 0.008 0.017 0.022
0.053 0.688 0.641 0.937 0.842 0.261
Count Neg(-3) -0.225 -0.012 -0.025 -0.027 -0.148 0.010
0.013 0.899 0.785 0.772 0.069 0.592
Count Neg(-4) -0.199 0.040 0.132 0.016 -0.006 0.026
0.028 0.667 0.146 0.861 0.939 0.152
Count Neg(-5) 0.052 0.000 0.104 0.024 -0.231 -0.018
0.564 0.997 0.253 0.793 0.004 0.338
Count Neg(-6) 0.084 0.050 -0.111 -0.105 0.008 -0.046
0.352 0.585 0.224 0.252 0.921 0.013
Count Neg(-7) 0.064 0.033 -0.115 -0.067 -0.011 -0.008
0.477 0.717 0.209 0.465 0.891 0.668
Count Neg(-8) -0.097 0.008 0.171 0.120 0.108 -0.073
0.283 0.930 0.060 0.191 0.183 0.000
Count Neg(-9) -0.188 0.044 0.057 -0.010 0.145 -0.257
0.039 0.634 0.535 0.914 0.076 0.000
Count Neg(-10) -0.012 0.029 -0.047 0.026 -0.330 0.304
0.903 0.761 0.624 0.785 0.000 0.000
Count Neg(-11) 0.259 0.019 -0.084 0.058 0.144 -0.099
0.009 0.853 0.396 0.560 0.105 0.000
Brent(-1) -0.022 0.008 0.019 0.012 0.005 -0.005
0.293 0.714 0.365 0.553 0.806 0.224
Brent(-2) 0.009 0.031 0.000 -0.010 0.028 0.011
0.672 0.138 0.984 0.621 0.127 0.008
Brent(-3) -0.043 0.006 -0.010 -0.044 -0.024 0.001
0.036 0.776 0.629 0.037 0.195 0.751
Brent(-4) 0.003 0.014 0.008 0.001 0.007 -0.005
0.883 0.507 0.716 0.978 0.695 0.274
Brent(-5) 0.000 0.011 -0.042 0.011 -0.003 0.005
0.999 0.606 0.043 0.613 0.882 0.210
Brent(-6) 0.015 0.010 0.005 -0.009 0.026 -0.005
0.473 0.636 0.802 0.669 0.157 0.240
Brent(-7) 0.011 0.005 0.029 -0.026 0.000 -0.005
0.582 0.826 0.164 0.215 0.981 0.253
Brent(-8) -0.014 -0.007 -0.010 -0.019 -0.020 0.003
0.488 0.738 0.634 0.371 0.285 0.475
Brent(-9) 0.044 -0.019 -0.014 0.008 -0.008 -0.005
0.030 0.368 0.492 0.708 0.673 0.280
Brent(-10) 0.036 -0.012 -0.023 -0.019 0.009 0.004
0.081 0.573 0.260 0.362 0.609 0.374
Brent(-11) 0.014 0.007 -0.006 0.006 -0.011 -0.005
0.506 0.750 0.763 0.759 0.565 0.225
C -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000
0.960 0.933 0.991 0.929 0.695 0.955
R2 0.046 0.012 0.027 0.027 0.048 0.193
Table B.11: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Negative No Outliers - Sent and
Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Neg
Coal(-1) 0.016 -0.011 0.009 0.011 0.008 -0.001
0.430 0.574 0.662 0.587 0.640 0.886
Coal(-2) -0.021 -0.003 0.009 -0.018 0.005 0.001
0.288 0.889 0.647 0.377 0.765 0.873
Coal(-3) -0.045 0.012 0.006 -0.006 0.000 0.000
0.023 0.560 0.757 0.775 0.995 0.939
Coal(-4) 0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.030 -0.022 0.000
0.639 0.650 0.765 0.138 0.209 0.986
Coal(-5) -0.089 -0.007 0.028 -0.021 0.020 0.001
0.000 0.738 0.164 0.301 0.254 0.713
Coal(-6) -0.011 -0.003 -0.013 -0.016 0.003 0.001
0.576 0.893 0.513 0.432 0.883 0.824
Coal(-7) -0.002 0.013 0.026 -0.027 0.000 0.002
0.913 0.532 0.199 0.180 1.000 0.544
Coal(-8) -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.016 0.000 -0.003
0.859 0.940 0.911 0.431 0.982 0.511
Coal(-9) 0.027 0.009 0.016 -0.004 -0.002 0.000
0.177 0.649 0.428 0.855 0.909 0.940
Coal(-10) -0.008 0.012 0.007 -0.015 -0.009 0.001
0.682 0.541 0.714 0.461 0.624 0.755
Coal(-11) 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.013 0.005 0.000
0.869 0.928 0.606 0.534 0.775 0.908
FTSE(-1) 0.043 0.016 -0.017 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004
0.036 0.447 0.399 0.847 0.597 0.372
FTSE(-2) 0.033 0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.002 -0.002
0.110 0.381 0.425 0.428 0.913 0.709
FTSE(-3) 0.012 0.044 0.011 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
0.553 0.034 0.609 0.989 0.957 0.683
FTSE(-4) 0.004 -0.027 -0.012 0.005 0.020 -0.001
0.852 0.196 0.571 0.818 0.270 0.872
FTSE(-5) 0.025 -0.011 0.016 0.023 -0.009 0.000
0.217 0.612 0.442 0.270 0.613 0.944
FTSE(-6) 0.010 0.040 -0.012 0.005 -0.011 0.003
0.637 0.054 0.568 0.802 0.563 0.496
FTSE(-7) -0.034 -0.011 -0.015 0.046 -0.006 0.002
0.098 0.597 0.453 0.027 0.737 0.617
FTSE(-8) 0.043 -0.010 -0.051 0.028 0.018 -0.001
0.038 0.638 0.014 0.172 0.325 0.764
FTSE(-9) -0.049 0.001 -0.001 0.058 -0.016 -0.004
0.018 0.965 0.949 0.005 0.389 0.383
FTSE(-10) 0.013 0.000 -0.036 0.030 0.018 -0.001
0.534 0.983 0.081 0.155 0.340 0.862
FTSE(-11) -0.017 0.006 -0.025 0.038 0.019 0.003
0.414 0.762 0.226 0.071 0.310 0.484
Table B.12: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Negative No Outliers - Coal and
FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Neg
Gas(-1) 0.008 0.001 -0.015 -0.018 0.021 -0.003
0.701 0.959 0.455 0.384 0.249 0.502
Gas(-2) -0.027 0.000 -0.049 -0.012 -0.003 0.003
0.182 0.982 0.015 0.554 0.850 0.464
Gas(-3) 0.023 -0.005 -0.015 -0.002 -0.004 0.004
0.253 0.812 0.448 0.912 0.817 0.294
Gas(-4) -0.008 0.001 -0.041 -0.021 0.015 -0.002
0.699 0.965 0.041 0.290 0.413 0.578
Gas(-5) 0.022 0.005 0.029 -0.001 0.044 0.002
0.279 0.811 0.146 0.953 0.015 0.596
Gas(-6) -0.003 -0.001 0.013 0.015 -0.019 0.000
0.894 0.953 0.525 0.459 0.294 0.937
Gas(-7) -0.023 -0.004 -0.026 0.064 -0.006 0.004
0.262 0.849 0.195 0.002 0.742 0.365
Gas(-8) -0.002 -0.007 0.009 -0.007 0.004 0.000
0.930 0.727 0.644 0.746 0.810 0.917
Gas(-9) -0.022 0.022 -0.010 0.006 -0.005 0.004
0.274 0.290 0.612 0.760 0.787 0.328
Gas(-10) 0.003 0.040 0.015 -0.062 -0.026 -0.012
0.874 0.053 0.471 0.002 0.142 0.005
Gas(-11) -0.034 0.005 -0.025 0.013 -0.003 0.011
0.091 0.796 0.227 0.513 0.871 0.006
EUA(-1) 0.023 0.004 -0.020 0.024 -0.008 -0.009
0.318 0.872 0.379 0.301 0.676 0.041
EUA(-2) 0.018 0.008 0.000 -0.014 0.031 -0.005
0.430 0.743 0.995 0.540 0.120 0.265
EUA(-3) 0.001 -0.008 -0.011 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007
0.958 0.723 0.627 0.778 0.945 0.125
EUA(-4) -0.031 -0.002 0.000 -0.032 0.020 -0.005
0.173 0.916 0.995 0.162 0.314 0.251
EUA(-5) 0.002 0.025 -0.012 0.023 0.086 0.001
0.945 0.268 0.586 0.318 0.000 0.825
EUA(-6) -0.020 0.015 -0.025 0.024 0.052 0.000
0.383 0.528 0.274 0.283 0.010 0.939
EUA(-7) -0.014 0.018 -0.011 -0.016 0.028 0.009
0.541 0.419 0.621 0.491 0.164 0.039
EUA(-8) 0.042 0.015 0.004 0.008 0.017 0.013
0.060 0.521 0.845 0.724 0.398 0.004
EUA(-9) 0.030 -0.003 0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
0.187 0.884 0.583 0.920 0.938 0.352
EUA(-10) -0.018 -0.016 -0.039 0.005 -0.087 -0.010
0.421 0.484 0.087 0.810 0.000 0.033
EUA(-11) 0.014 0.007 -0.001 0.002 -0.027 0.001
0.535 0.769 0.979 0.942 0.186 0.873
Table B.13: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Negative No Outliers - Gas and
EUA
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B.2.5 No Outliers Emissions Market Count All Tweets
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count All
Count All(-1) -0.204 -0.005 0.166 0.033 -0.105 0.087
0.0739 0.9681 0.1469 0.7772 0.3063 0.0000
Count All(-2) -0.174 0.029 0.140 -0.080 0.169 0.008
0.0833 0.7778 0.1630 0.4324 0.0599 0.6627
Count All(-3) -0.120 -0.017 -0.076 -0.007 -0.038 0.025
0.2245 0.8691 0.4417 0.9448 0.6677 0.1503
Count All(-4) -0.347 0.121 0.160 0.053 0.000 -0.024
0.0004 0.2260 0.1056 0.5914 0.9969 0.1743
Count All(-5) 0.007 0.012 -0.056 0.034 -0.167 0.012
0.9440 0.9059 0.5669 0.7351 0.0590 0.4806
Count All(-6) 0.102 0.038 -0.172 -0.026 -0.049 -0.018
0.2992 0.7004 0.0812 0.7956 0.5776 0.2962
Count All(-7) 0.185 0.012 0.007 0.018 -0.107 -0.069
0.0595 0.9035 0.9417 0.8576 0.2251 0.0001
Count All(-8) -0.058 0.018 0.283 0.179 0.046 -0.060
0.5549 0.8562 0.0042 0.0720 0.5991 0.0005
Count All(-9) -0.218 0.038 0.101 -0.102 0.145 -0.163
0.0271 0.7055 0.3068 0.3047 0.1010 0.0000
Count All(-10) -0.073 0.016 0.101 0.058 -0.288 0.483
0.4682 0.8787 0.3159 0.5640 0.0014 0.0000
Count All(-11) 0.139 0.037 0.067 -0.032 0.282 -0.116
0.2243 0.7525 0.5563 0.7807 0.0061 0.0000
Brent(-1) -0.020 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.001
0.3368 0.7128 0.4592 0.5900 0.6505 0.8236
Brent(-2) 0.009 0.032 -0.003 -0.009 0.032 0.014
0.6666 0.1319 0.8926 0.6536 0.0892 0.0001
Brent(-3) -0.042 0.006 -0.012 -0.043 -0.023 0.002
0.0423 0.7788 0.5627 0.0407 0.2222 0.5913
Brent(-4) 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.000
0.7685 0.5252 0.7772 0.7956 0.7948 0.9601
Brent(-5) 0.002 0.011 -0.042 0.011 -0.007 0.002
0.9177 0.6154 0.0410 0.6074 0.7122 0.6746
Brent(-6) 0.019 0.009 0.005 -0.009 0.023 -0.005
0.3565 0.6810 0.8014 0.6662 0.2111 0.1748
Brent(-7) 0.012 0.004 0.034 -0.027 0.003 -0.003
0.5461 0.8643 0.1023 0.2018 0.8707 0.4480
Brent(-8) -0.018 -0.008 -0.003 -0.021 -0.017 0.004
0.3779 0.6999 0.8969 0.3144 0.3685 0.2798
Brent(-9) 0.040 -0.019 -0.012 0.005 -0.004 -0.001
0.0525 0.3564 0.5603 0.7914 0.8200 0.8659
Brent(-10) 0.032 -0.011 -0.022 -0.020 0.009 0.001
0.1181 0.5955 0.2956 0.3361 0.6377 0.7462
Brent(-11) 0.014 0.007 -0.008 0.006 -0.010 -0.002
0.4866 0.7514 0.7010 0.7784 0.6054 0.6137
C -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000
0.9618 0.9319 0.9851 0.9309 0.6950 0.9644
R2 0.0452 0.0122 0.0302 0.0275 0.0451 0.3000
Table B.14: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count All Tweets No Outliers - Sent and
Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count All
Coal(-1) 0.016 -0.011 0.009 0.011 0.008 -0.002
0.4311 0.5779 0.6586 0.5890 0.6361 0.5671
Coal(-2) -0.022 -0.003 0.010 -0.018 0.006 -0.001
0.2755 0.8839 0.6196 0.3786 0.7470 0.7230
Coal(-3) -0.046 0.012 0.006 -0.006 0.001 -0.001
0.0199 0.5574 0.7551 0.7736 0.9775 0.8400
Coal(-4) 0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.031 -0.023 0.001
0.6342 0.6533 0.7118 0.1288 0.2068 0.7094
Coal(-5) -0.089 -0.007 0.027 -0.020 0.020 0.000
0.0000 0.7441 0.1796 0.3143 0.2531 0.9500
Coal(-6) -0.011 -0.003 -0.014 -0.016 0.004 -0.002
0.5723 0.8938 0.4877 0.4317 0.8429 0.6326
Coal(-7) -0.003 0.013 0.025 -0.026 -0.001 0.003
0.8835 0.5289 0.2069 0.1924 0.9612 0.3598
Coal(-8) -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.016 -0.001 -0.002
0.8672 0.9428 0.9582 0.4244 0.9503 0.6382
Coal(-9) 0.027 0.009 0.016 -0.003 -0.003 0.000
0.1729 0.6459 0.4225 0.8850 0.8663 0.9312
Coal(-10) -0.008 0.012 0.009 -0.015 -0.009 0.000
0.6800 0.5465 0.6638 0.4593 0.6334 0.9043
Coal(-11) 0.003 0.002 -0.009 -0.013 0.005 -0.001
0.8706 0.9332 0.6381 0.5315 0.7922 0.7620
FTSE(-1) 0.048 0.016 -0.018 -0.003 -0.014 -0.004
0.0190 0.4455 0.3724 0.8889 0.4334 0.2157
FTSE(-2) 0.040 0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.005 -0.003
0.0514 0.4069 0.4261 0.4191 0.7890 0.4606
FTSE(-3) 0.017 0.044 0.010 -0.001 0.004 -0.004
0.4211 0.0372 0.6167 0.9808 0.8425 0.2205
FTSE(-4) 0.003 -0.028 -0.011 0.004 0.021 -0.005
0.8826 0.1872 0.6039 0.8526 0.2472 0.1576
FTSE(-5) 0.021 -0.010 0.019 0.023 -0.007 -0.002
0.2990 0.6257 0.3588 0.2580 0.6969 0.5816
FTSE(-6) 0.008 0.040 -0.012 0.004 -0.006 0.002
0.7111 0.0569 0.5514 0.8387 0.7469 0.6129
FTSE(-7) -0.035 -0.011 -0.017 0.047 -0.008 0.004
0.0881 0.5864 0.4056 0.0223 0.6781 0.2861
FTSE(-8) 0.043 -0.009 -0.054 0.029 0.017 -0.002
0.0357 0.6625 0.0082 0.1675 0.3623 0.4946
FTSE(-9) -0.048 0.001 -0.004 0.059 -0.020 0.003
0.0193 0.9576 0.8423 0.0050 0.2806 0.3939
FTSE(-10) 0.017 -0.001 -0.039 0.030 0.019 -0.002
0.4182 0.9769 0.0602 0.1560 0.3175 0.5906
FTSE(-11) -0.016 0.006 -0.023 0.039 0.015 0.003
0.4333 0.7780 0.2670 0.0634 0.4091 0.3827
Table B.15: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count All Tweets No Outliers - Coal and
FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count All
Gas(-1) 0.008 0.001 -0.015 -0.017 0.019 -0.001
0.7040 0.9735 0.4491 0.4053 0.3019 0.8368
Gas(-2) -0.027 0.000 -0.050 -0.013 -0.003 0.005
0.1866 0.9950 0.0141 0.5368 0.8552 0.1784
Gas(-3) 0.024 -0.005 -0.017 -0.003 -0.004 0.003
0.2334 0.7996 0.3980 0.8871 0.8305 0.4095
Gas(-4) -0.008 0.001 -0.044 -0.021 0.015 -0.003
0.7030 0.9686 0.0309 0.2923 0.4041 0.3689
Gas(-5) 0.021 0.005 0.030 -0.001 0.041 0.001
0.3003 0.8001 0.1318 0.9611 0.0220 0.7445
Gas(-6) -0.001 -0.002 0.012 0.014 -0.018 0.004
0.9452 0.9256 0.5480 0.4772 0.3188 0.2196
Gas(-7) -0.022 -0.004 -0.027 0.064 -0.005 0.001
0.2769 0.8460 0.1794 0.0017 0.7886 0.7026
Gas(-8) -0.002 -0.007 0.010 -0.006 0.002 -0.002
0.9015 0.7331 0.6036 0.7700 0.8996 0.6669
Gas(-9) -0.023 0.022 -0.011 0.006 -0.003 0.003
0.2588 0.2821 0.5911 0.7674 0.8644 0.4146
Gas(-10) 0.004 0.039 0.012 -0.064 -0.027 -0.012
0.8460 0.0563 0.5603 0.0017 0.1357 0.0008
Gas(-11) -0.033 0.005 -0.023 0.015 -0.004 0.006
0.1022 0.8202 0.2555 0.4510 0.8048 0.0755
EUA(-1) 0.020 0.004 -0.017 0.025 -0.009 -0.010
0.3707 0.8595 0.4537 0.2779 0.6492 0.0170
EUA(-2) 0.020 0.007 0.000 -0.013 0.031 -0.009
0.3846 0.7763 0.9890 0.5562 0.1298 0.0249
EUA(-3) 0.002 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007
0.9352 0.6992 0.7311 0.8295 0.9185 0.0809
EUA(-4) -0.032 -0.002 0.008 -0.031 0.020 -0.008
0.1543 0.9157 0.7355 0.1680 0.3189 0.0449
EUA(-5) 0.000 0.025 -0.011 0.021 0.090 0.001
0.9987 0.2671 0.6281 0.3575 0.0000 0.8819
EUA(-6) -0.022 0.015 -0.026 0.022 0.053 0.003
0.3223 0.5123 0.2494 0.3408 0.0090 0.3968
EUA(-7) -0.014 0.019 -0.010 -0.014 0.031 0.008
0.5266 0.4155 0.6698 0.5338 0.1262 0.0552
EUA(-8) 0.039 0.016 0.004 0.009 0.019 0.013
0.0853 0.4926 0.8604 0.6908 0.3395 0.0007
EUA(-9) 0.029 -0.002 0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002
0.1979 0.9187 0.7572 0.9117 0.7606 0.5814
EUA(-10) -0.014 -0.016 -0.041 0.009 -0.092 0.003
0.5220 0.4789 0.0684 0.6977 0.0000 0.4229
EUA(-11) 0.017 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.027 0.001
0.4641 0.7787 0.8670 0.9324 0.1817 0.7831
Table B.16: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count All Tweets No Outliers - Gas and
EUAs
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B.3 VAR Results for Emissions Market Sentiment With Out-
liers
197
B.3.1 With Outliers Emissions Market Sum Positive
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Pos
Sum Pos(-1) 0.102 0.054 0.048 0.077 -0.047 0.197
0.1929 0.4974 0.5353 0.3291 0.553 0
Sum Pos(-2) -0.022 0.019 0.156 -0.056 0.15 0.024
0.7616 0.801 0.0343 0.4469 0.0424 0.2096
Sum Pos(-3) -0.051 -0.026 -0.125 -0.018 -0.073 -0.033
0.4894 0.7258 0.089 0.8123 0.3254 0.0752
Sum Pos(-4) -0.101 0.02 0.237 0.104 0.126 0.043
0.168 0.786 0.0013 0.1619 0.0881 0.0216
Sum Pos(-5) 0.041 -0.025 -0.014 -0.027 -0.155 -0.062
0.5812 0.7433 0.8472 0.7209 0.0362 0.0009
Sum Pos(-6) -0.045 0.025 -0.232 -0.006 -0.073 -0.189
0.5353 0.7348 0.0013 0.9324 0.3115 0
Sum Pos(-7) 0.278 0 0.214 0.064 -0.084 -0.063
0.0002 0.9961 0.0037 0.386 0.2549 0.0008
Sum Pos(-8) -0.095 0.007 0.12 0.119 0.009 -0.009
0.1968 0.9299 0.1024 0.1097 0.9061 0.6487
Sum Pos(-9) -0.127 0.045 0.073 -0.068 0.038 -0.066
0.0856 0.5499 0.3191 0.3576 0.6029 0.0005
Sum Pos(-10) 0.032 -0.018 0.104 0.078 -0.064 0.388
0.6682 0.8062 0.1583 0.2939 0.3881 0
Sum Pos(-11) -0.074 -0.021 0.064 -0.061 0.009 -0.154
0.3465 0.79 0.4135 0.4414 0.9061 0
Brent(-1) -0.014 0.007 0.02 0.009 0.007 -0.001
0.498 0.7542 0.34 0.6504 0.7378 0.882
Brent(-2) 0.009 0.029 -0.003 -0.01 0.018 0.006
0.6658 0.1584 0.8762 0.643 0.3878 0.2186
Brent(-3) -0.042 0.003 -0.012 -0.044 -0.022 0.003
0.0417 0.8674 0.5568 0.0324 0.2833 0.5452
Brent(-4) 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.004
0.9713 0.552 0.8959 0.8501 0.3987 0.4464
Brent(-5) -0.006 0.009 -0.045 0.01 -0.018 -0.005
0.7593 0.6575 0.0281 0.6331 0.3892 0.3538
Brent(-6) 0.015 0.01 -0.001 -0.009 0.043 -0.011
0.4704 0.6286 0.9442 0.6473 0.0352 0.041
Brent(-7) 0.009 0.005 0.032 -0.027 0.025 -0.006
0.6447 0.794 0.1131 0.1872 0.2324 0.2821
Brent(-8) -0.015 -0.007 -0.004 -0.02 -0.02 0.001
0.4505 0.7298 0.8606 0.33 0.3233 0.8676
Brent(-9) 0.042 -0.019 -0.02 0.006 -0.01 0.003
0.0408 0.372 0.3354 0.788 0.6131 0.5176
Brent(-10) 0.028 -0.011 -0.019 -0.019 -0.001 0.003
0.1645 0.6127 0.3659 0.3472 0.9725 0.5258
Brent(-11) 0.013 0.006 -0.005 0.004 -0.009 -0.005
0.5252 0.7738 0.8031 0.8404 0.6438 0.3326
C 0 -0.001 0 0.001 0 0
0.9908 0.944 0.9808 0.9516 0.9948 0.9844
R2 0.0414 0.0116 0.0399 0.0277 0.0336 0.2646
Table B.17: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Pos With Outliers - Sent and Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Pos
Coal(-1) 0.016 -0.011 0.006 0.011 0.009 -0.007
0.4308 0.5914 0.7576 0.582 0.6682 0.1933
Coal(-2) -0.019 -0.002 0.008 -0.016 0.007 0.005
0.3349 0.9076 0.699 0.4101 0.7331 0.3118
Coal(-3) -0.044 0.012 0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002
0.0266 0.561 0.7672 0.7367 0.9663 0.7669
Coal(-4) 0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.031 -0.025 0
0.5934 0.6412 0.7353 0.1264 0.2129 0.9498
Coal(-5) -0.09 -0.007 0.028 -0.02 0.019 -0.001
0 0.7339 0.1538 0.3242 0.3483 0.8266
Coal(-6) -0.01 -0.003 -0.012 -0.016 0.003 0.003
0.6238 0.8689 0.5459 0.4137 0.8847 0.5406
Coal(-7) -0.002 0.013 0.024 -0.027 0 -0.001
0.9017 0.5188 0.2311 0.1853 0.9865 0.8701
Coal(-8) -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.015 -0.001 0
0.9347 0.9275 0.9788 0.4476 0.9652 0.9478
Coal(-9) 0.024 0.009 0.015 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001
0.2323 0.6499 0.4575 0.9025 0.7982 0.9053
Coal(-10) -0.009 0.012 0.01 -0.016 -0.01 -0.001
0.6492 0.5374 0.6246 0.4373 0.6255 0.9009
Coal(-11) 0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.012 0.005 -0.001
0.869 0.9185 0.7609 0.5448 0.8137 0.7784
FTSE(-1) 0.045 0.016 -0.014 -0.004 -0.018 -0.004
0.0281 0.443 0.492 0.8422 0.3738 0.3923
FTSE(-2) 0.038 0.017 -0.019 -0.015 0.007 0.005
0.0636 0.4213 0.3508 0.466 0.7302 0.3808
FTSE(-3) 0.008 0.046 0.014 -0.004 0 -0.013
0.7029 0.0289 0.5095 0.8506 0.9993 0.0122
FTSE(-4) 0.004 -0.028 -0.011 0.002 0.013 -0.016
0.8332 0.175 0.6082 0.9061 0.5167 0.0016
FTSE(-5) 0.026 -0.01 0.024 0.025 -0.002 -0.011
0.1988 0.6435 0.2464 0.2275 0.9058 0.0341
FTSE(-6) 0.013 0.041 0.006 0.005 -0.013 0.004
0.5111 0.0502 0.7734 0.8047 0.5327 0.4618
FTSE(-7) -0.034 -0.011 -0.006 0.048 -0.004 0.007
0.0974 0.607 0.7699 0.0205 0.8619 0.1603
FTSE(-8) 0.039 -0.008 -0.06 0.025 0.013 0.003
0.0554 0.7099 0.0032 0.2228 0.5398 0.5347
FTSE(-9) -0.054 0 -0.018 0.059 -0.026 0.01
0.0093 0.9836 0.3901 0.0042 0.2057 0.0586
FTSE(-10) 0.013 -0.001 -0.035 0.029 0.023 -0.006
0.5133 0.9528 0.0875 0.1573 0.2666 0.2787
FTSE(-11) -0.009 0.005 -0.026 0.038 0.017 -0.013
0.6684 0.7944 0.2155 0.0666 0.4219 0.0123
Table B.18: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Pos With Outliers - Coal and FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Pos
Gas(-1) 0.009 0 -0.02 -0.017 0.022 -0.002
0.653 0.9892 0.3177 0.4028 0.2732 0.6908
Gas(-2) -0.026 0.001 -0.047 -0.013 -0.006 0.006
0.2011 0.9744 0.0186 0.5288 0.7555 0.2141
Gas(-3) 0.023 -0.005 -0.017 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002
0.2538 0.7951 0.3922 0.873 0.8169 0.6761
Gas(-4) -0.011 0.001 -0.044 -0.022 0.025 0.001
0.5832 0.9527 0.0284 0.2793 0.2124 0.8206
Gas(-5) 0.022 0.005 0.03 -0.001 0.041 0.001
0.2838 0.7911 0.1368 0.9783 0.0429 0.8419
Gas(-6) -0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.014 -0.022 -0.003
0.8557 0.9666 0.7881 0.4781 0.2795 0.5845
Gas(-7) -0.025 -0.002 -0.026 0.065 -0.006 -0.002
0.2061 0.918 0.2027 0.0014 0.7749 0.6752
Gas(-8) -0.002 -0.008 0.013 -0.007 0.001 -0.003
0.9145 0.7076 0.509 0.7462 0.9625 0.4958
Gas(-9) -0.026 0.023 -0.012 0.005 0 0
0.1998 0.2614 0.5662 0.8156 0.9852 0.9677
Gas(-10) 0.002 0.04 0.014 -0.061 -0.029 -0.009
0.9196 0.0482 0.4941 0.0024 0.1501 0.095
Gas(-11) -0.033 0.005 -0.02 0.014 -0.009 0.004
0.1027 0.7955 0.3117 0.4771 0.6514 0.3818
EUA(-1) 0.003 0.005 -0.018 0.018 -0.015 -0.014
0.8878 0.8019 0.3737 0.365 0.4667 0.0057
EUA(-2) 0.024 0.007 -0.015 -0.016 0.019 -0.01
0.2428 0.7441 0.4636 0.4376 0.3524 0.0558
EUA(-3) 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 0 -0.008 0.001
0.6861 0.8363 0.8305 0.9965 0.7036 0.7822
EUA(-4) -0.006 -0.008 0.021 -0.026 0.025 -0.013
0.7613 0.7001 0.2984 0.1935 0.2229 0.0124
EUA(-5) 0.002 0.021 -0.007 0.021 0.08 -0.003
0.9163 0.3166 0.7462 0.2977 0.0001 0.5382
EUA(-6) -0.013 0.01 -0.027 0.015 0.058 0.005
0.5172 0.6167 0.18 0.4551 0.0042 0.3164
EUA(-7) -0.014 0.012 0.028 -0.015 0.032 0.009
0.4915 0.5434 0.1644 0.4499 0.1166 0.0662
EUA(-8) 0.035 0.012 0.002 0.008 0.011 0.004
0.0858 0.5689 0.9097 0.6987 0.575 0.4058
EUA(-9) 0.035 -0.004 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.005
0.0792 0.852 0.6683 0.8765 0.6874 0.3395
EUA(-10) -0.014 -0.016 -0.03 0.008 -0.046 -0.005
0.4791 0.4368 0.1367 0.6858 0.0227 0.3422
EUA(-11) 0.017 0.006 0.014 0.005 -0.032 0.009
0.394 0.7536 0.4856 0.7982 0.1119 0.0674
Table B.19: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Pos With Outliers - Gas and EUAs
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B.3.2 With Outliers Emissions Market Sum of Negative
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Neg
Sum Neg(-1) -0.1192 -0.0188 -0.1813 -0.0049 -0.1483 -0.2753
0.1625 0.8278 0.0341 0.9541 0.0805 0
Sum Neg(-2) 0.0803 -0.0192 -0.0597 0.0139 -0.1933 0.0472
0.3257 0.8169 0.4662 0.8656 0.0174 0.0134
Sum Neg(-3) 0.1687 0.0341 0.1067 0.0201 0.1263 0.0469
0.0386 0.6799 0.1916 0.8059 0.1191 0.0138
Sum Neg(-4) 0.06 0.0062 -0.1331 -0.0165 -0.1089 -0.0402
0.4624 0.94 0.1035 0.8406 0.1793 0.0348
Sum Neg(-5) -0.0067 -0.0037 -0.0156 -0.0352 0.2521 0.0781
0.9345 0.9639 0.8477 0.6663 0.0018 0
Sum Neg(-6) 0.0272 -0.058 0.1701 -0.0007 0.0426 0.1889
0.7307 0.4691 0.0319 0.9926 0.5882 0
Sum Neg(-7) -0.1285 -0.0041 0.0264 -0.0554 0.028 -0.098
0.1092 0.9593 0.742 0.4917 0.7251 0
Sum Neg(-8) 0.0276 -0.003 -0.1837 -0.1474 0.023 0.0408
0.7314 0.9703 0.0228 0.0682 0.7736 0.0298
Sum Neg(-9) 0.1701 -0.0189 0.0696 0.028 0.2032 0.0706
0.0347 0.817 0.3882 0.7288 0.0112 0.0002
Sum Neg(-10) -0.0048 0.0072 0.0182 -0.0039 0.3411 -0.4101
0.9529 0.9302 0.8218 0.962 0 0
Sum Neg(-11) 0.0288 -0.0225 0.0282 -0.0769 -0.0471 0.2441
0.7313 0.7904 0.7368 0.3608 0.5717 0
Brent(-1) -0.017 0.0068 0.0173 0.0109 0.0017 -0.0006
0.4082 0.7459 0.4034 0.5976 0.9329 0.8956
Brent(-2) 0.0103 0.0306 0.0006 -0.0096 0.0183 0.0078
0.6178 0.1431 0.9779 0.6411 0.3717 0.1068
Brent(-3) -0.0434 0.0046 -0.0149 -0.041 -0.0215 0.0049
0.035 0.8265 0.4695 0.047 0.2933 0.3077
Brent(-4) 0.0014 0.013 0.0021 0.0036 0.0143 -0.0021
0.945 0.5322 0.9176 0.8618 0.4834 0.6632
Brent(-5) -0.0026 0.0088 -0.0441 0.0109 -0.0192 0.0088
0.9005 0.673 0.0323 0.5969 0.3464 0.0662
Brent(-6) 0.0138 0.0099 -0.0024 -0.01 0.0389 -0.0081
0.5015 0.636 0.9092 0.6267 0.0574 0.0936
Brent(-7) 0.0086 0.005 0.0339 -0.0266 0.0233 -0.0145
0.6757 0.8098 0.0988 0.1958 0.2527 0.0025
Brent(-8) -0.0148 -0.0077 -0.003 -0.0202 -0.0168 0.0023
0.4727 0.7121 0.8837 0.3274 0.4098 0.6283
Brent(-9) 0.0423 -0.0187 -0.0185 0.005 -0.0063 0.0025
0.0394 0.3681 0.3686 0.8074 0.7581 0.6057
Brent(-10) 0.0289 -0.0114 -0.02 -0.0217 0.0016 0.0073
0.1581 0.5824 0.3297 0.2932 0.9357 0.1258
Brent(-11) 0.0115 0.0052 -0.0038 0.0029 -0.0079 -0.0076
0.5738 0.8008 0.8521 0.8863 0.697 0.1108
0.4708 0.7296 0.5992 0.7273 0.1024 0.0373
C 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0001 0
0.99 0.9439 0.9795 0.9524 0.9977 0.9915
R2 0.0387 0.0115 0.0333 0.0268 0.0497 0.3067
Table B.20: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Neg With Outliers - Sent and Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Neg
Coal(-1) 0.0162 -0.0109 0.0075 0.0108 0.0092 -0.0002
0.4147 0.5881 0.706 0.5881 0.6431 0.9698
Coal(-2) -0.0205 -0.0026 0.0068 -0.0174 0.0075 0.0022
0.303 0.8977 0.734 0.3836 0.7053 0.6324
Coal(-3) -0.0434 0.0118 0.0054 -0.0062 -0.0016 -0.0015
0.0293 0.5595 0.7876 0.7575 0.9351 0.7531
Coal(-4) 0.0109 -0.0094 -0.0055 -0.0303 -0.0233 -0.0007
0.5853 0.6409 0.7836 0.1299 0.239 0.8728
Coal(-5) -0.0887 -0.0068 0.0276 -0.0204 0.0179 -0.0006
0 0.7345 0.1665 0.3063 0.3664 0.8929
Coal(-6) -0.0106 -0.0031 -0.0116 -0.0157 0.0033 0
0.597 0.8781 0.5622 0.4341 0.8677 0.9953
Coal(-7) -0.0018 0.0129 0.0249 -0.0266 -0.0005 0.0022
0.9297 0.5232 0.2144 0.1858 0.9818 0.631
Coal(-8) -0.0038 -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0151 0.0014 -0.0016
0.8488 0.9359 0.9835 0.4508 0.9442 0.7312
Coal(-9) 0.0255 0.009 0.0145 -0.0035 -0.0064 0.0028
0.2015 0.6566 0.4697 0.8625 0.7483 0.548
Coal(-10) -0.0094 0.0124 0.0097 -0.0148 -0.0095 0.002
0.6393 0.5401 0.6288 0.4604 0.6318 0.6641
Coal(-11) 0.0037 0.002 -0.0069 -0.0129 0.0042 -0.0027
0.8532 0.9227 0.7304 0.5196 0.8332 0.5558
FTSE(-1) 0.044 0.015 -0.0134 -0.0038 -0.0173 -0.0027
0.0317 0.4688 0.5154 0.8517 0.3958 0.5779
FTSE(-2) 0.0365 0.0176 -0.0152 -0.0149 0.0128 0.0001
0.0752 0.3972 0.4579 0.4691 0.5307 0.9833
FTSE(-3) 0.0112 0.0444 0.0161 -0.0041 -0.0074 -0.0094
0.5861 0.0328 0.4344 0.8417 0.7176 0.0498
FTSE(-4) 0.0001 -0.029 -0.0131 -0.0002 0.0149 -0.0058
0.9966 0.1629 0.5247 0.9921 0.4646 0.2218
FTSE(-5) 0.0269 -0.0104 0.0281 0.0238 0.0057 -0.0048
0.1888 0.6157 0.171 0.2477 0.7806 0.318
FTSE(-6) 0.0097 0.0395 0.0056 0.007 -0.0128 0.0014
0.6354 0.0571 0.7846 0.7337 0.5286 0.7693
FTSE(-7) -0.0363 -0.0104 -0.0108 0.0444 -0.0048 0.007
0.0761 0.6148 0.5991 0.0309 0.812 0.141
FTSE(-8) 0.0439 -0.008 -0.0626 0.0253 0.0116 0.0101
0.0323 0.7011 0.0023 0.2187 0.5688 0.0348
FTSE(-9) -0.0529 0.0002 -0.0192 0.0596 -0.0259 0.0036
0.0102 0.994 0.3512 0.004 0.205 0.4484
FTSE(-10) 0.0121 -0.0001 -0.0344 0.0306 0.0174 -0.0035
0.5584 0.9969 0.0958 0.1391 0.396 0.4727
FTSE(-11) -0.0099 0.0061 -0.0249 0.0378 0.0173 -0.0014
0.632 0.7694 0.2269 0.0678 0.3972 0.7784
Table B.21: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Neg With Outliers - Coal and FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Neg
Gas(-1) 0.0086 0.0001 -0.0188 -0.0185 0.0245 -0.0012
0.6693 0.9974 0.3524 0.3607 0.2211 0.8035
Gas(-2) -0.0256 0.0001 -0.0486 -0.0132 -0.004 0.0061
0.2038 0.9949 0.0161 0.5143 0.8435 0.1929
Gas(-3) 0.0247 -0.0054 -0.0161 -0.0031 -0.0057 0.0006
0.2199 0.7928 0.426 0.8768 0.7765 0.896
Gas(-4) -0.0103 0.0011 -0.0421 -0.022 0.0247 -0.0028
0.6105 0.957 0.037 0.2756 0.2169 0.5539
Gas(-5) 0.0219 0.0056 0.0276 -0.0016 0.0427 0.0024
0.2758 0.7846 0.17 0.9354 0.0326 0.6166
Gas(-6) -0.0035 -0.001 0.0077 0.0149 -0.0205 0.0015
0.8633 0.9611 0.7008 0.4596 0.3056 0.7428
Gas(-7) -0.0257 -0.0032 -0.0254 0.0635 -0.007 0.0032
0.2023 0.8765 0.2076 0.0017 0.7281 0.4957
Gas(-8) -0.0046 -0.0078 0.0103 -0.0082 0.0014 -0.0005
0.8198 0.7018 0.6094 0.6853 0.9431 0.9168
Gas(-9) -0.0223 0.0226 -0.0103 0.0043 0.0001 0
0.2676 0.2685 0.6103 0.8306 0.9976 0.9924
Gas(-10) 0.0021 0.0402 0.0114 -0.061 -0.0263 -0.012
0.9159 0.0487 0.5728 0.0026 0.1883 0.0108
Gas(-11) -0.031 0.0052 -0.0175 0.0123 -0.0043 0.0041
0.1254 0.7989 0.3879 0.5463 0.8291 0.3823
EUA(-1) 0.0127 0.0077 -0.0126 0.0215 -0.0147 -0.0302
0.5401 0.713 0.5447 0.3028 0.4771 0
EUA(-2) 0.0242 0.0091 -0.0043 -0.0149 0.0367 0.0025
0.2466 0.6663 0.8388 0.4771 0.0776 0.6031
EUA(-3) -0.0022 -0.0064 -0.0109 -0.0023 -0.0096 -0.0057
0.9171 0.7621 0.6035 0.9127 0.6458 0.241
EUA(-4) -0.0208 -0.01 0.0216 -0.0243 0.0268 -0.0012
0.3192 0.6373 0.3031 0.2467 0.1978 0.8103
EUA(-5) 0.0014 0.0187 0.0031 0.021 0.0671 -0.0056
0.9476 0.3783 0.8812 0.3169 0.0013 0.2503
EUA(-6) -0.0175 0.0132 -0.0426 0.0165 0.048 0.0208
0.4033 0.5317 0.0419 0.4305 0.0209 0
EUA(-7) -0.0082 0.0146 0.0154 -0.0145 0.0257 -0.0042
0.6938 0.4904 0.4625 0.4897 0.2164 0.3929
EUA(-8) 0.0423 0.0112 0.0098 0.0203 0.0079 0.0012
0.0426 0.5974 0.6387 0.333 0.7019 0.8038
EUA(-9) 0.0301 -0.0006 0.0151 0.0044 0.0063 0.0004
0.1487 0.9766 0.4714 0.834 0.7599 0.9283
EUA(-10) -0.016 -0.0154 -0.0348 0.0073 -0.0771 0.0102
0.4414 0.4648 0.0951 0.7278 0.0002 0.036
EUA(-11) 0.015 0.0073 0.011 0.0073 -0.0338 0.0101
0.4708 0.7296 0.5992 0.7273 0.1024 0.0373
Table B.22: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Neg With Outliers - Gas and EUAs
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B.3.3 With Outliers Emissions Market Count Positive
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Pos
Count Pos(-1) 0.102 0.051 0.029 0.068 -0.048 0.228
0.1984 0.5284 0.7156 0.3930 0.5446 0.0000
Count Pos(-2) -0.026 0.037 0.167 -0.062 0.167 0.026
0.7303 0.6235 0.0251 0.4117 0.0259 0.1631
Count Pos(-3) -0.069 -0.044 -0.108 -0.001 -0.081 -0.023
0.3544 0.5582 0.1492 0.9944 0.2818 0.2212
Count Pos(-4) -0.079 0.028 0.244 0.107 0.159 0.058
0.2895 0.7110 0.0011 0.1554 0.0334 0.0017
Count Pos(-5) 0.022 -0.022 -0.017 -0.038 -0.170 -0.089
0.7723 0.7752 0.8227 0.6174 0.0241 0.0000
Count Pos(-6) -0.025 0.024 -0.258 -0.014 -0.070 -0.194
0.7390 0.7513 0.0005 0.8546 0.3399 0.0000
Count Pos(-7) 0.252 0.003 0.211 0.055 -0.075 -0.027
0.0008 0.9656 0.0047 0.4692 0.3206 0.1439
Count Pos(-8) -0.095 0.006 0.164 0.117 0.041 -0.003
0.2032 0.9382 0.0283 0.1194 0.5855 0.8516
Count Pos(-9) -0.132 0.039 0.054 -0.057 0.023 -0.073
0.0775 0.6069 0.4682 0.4522 0.7560 0.0001
Count Pos(-10) 0.025 -0.013 0.099 0.080 -0.086 0.401
0.7440 0.8643 0.1848 0.2874 0.2530 0.0000
Count Pos(-11) -0.062 -0.021 0.108 -0.062 0.022 -0.191
0.4336 0.7950 0.1752 0.4377 0.7844 0.0000
Brent(-1) -0.015 0.007 0.019 0.010 0.006 -0.002
0.4596 0.7511 0.3491 0.6310 0.7552 0.6638
Brent(-2) 0.010 0.030 -0.002 -0.010 0.018 0.008
0.6418 0.1567 0.9186 0.6322 0.3889 0.0992
Brent(-3) -0.043 0.003 -0.012 -0.044 -0.022 0.004
0.0384 0.8668 0.5584 0.0315 0.2910 0.4230
Brent(-4) 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.017 0.003
0.9860 0.5610 0.9134 0.8654 0.4065 0.6006
Brent(-5) -0.005 0.009 -0.045 0.011 -0.018 -0.004
0.7923 0.6650 0.0285 0.6065 0.3849 0.4660
Brent(-6) 0.015 0.010 -0.002 -0.010 0.043 -0.011
0.4759 0.6238 0.9146 0.6306 0.0378 0.0382
Brent(-7) 0.009 0.005 0.032 -0.027 0.024 -0.007
0.6476 0.7944 0.1176 0.1841 0.2355 0.1817
Brent(-8) -0.015 -0.007 -0.003 -0.020 -0.020 0.001
0.4541 0.7360 0.8857 0.3369 0.3223 0.8475
Brent(-9) 0.041 -0.019 -0.018 0.006 -0.010 0.004
0.0438 0.3718 0.3669 0.7763 0.6364 0.4759
Brent(-10) 0.029 -0.011 -0.019 -0.020 0.000 0.005
0.1570 0.6110 0.3612 0.3431 0.9848 0.3748
Brent(-11) 0.013 0.006 -0.006 0.004 -0.010 -0.005
0.5296 0.7747 0.7790 0.8409 0.6427 0.2872
C 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.9911 0.9439 0.9806 0.9516 0.9948 0.9719
R2 0.0398 0.0117 0.0420 0.0276 0.0347 0.2758
Table B.23: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Pos With Outliers - Sent and
Brent
204
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Pos
Coal(-1) 0.016 -0.011 0.007 0.011 0.009 -0.006
0.4242 0.5930 0.7385 0.5771 0.6504 0.2049
Coal(-2) -0.019 -0.002 0.007 -0.017 0.006 0.006
0.3337 0.9052 0.7242 0.4008 0.7503 0.2368
Coal(-3) -0.044 0.012 0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002
0.0261 0.5575 0.7793 0.7344 0.9763 0.7382
Coal(-4) 0.011 -0.010 -0.006 -0.030 -0.025 0.000
0.5857 0.6317 0.7470 0.1294 0.2076 0.9705
Coal(-5) -0.090 -0.007 0.028 -0.020 0.019 0.000
0.0000 0.7408 0.1521 0.3251 0.3353 0.9613
Coal(-6) -0.010 -0.003 -0.012 -0.017 0.003 0.002
0.6104 0.8667 0.5342 0.4023 0.8936 0.6571
Coal(-7) -0.002 0.013 0.023 -0.026 0.000 0.000
0.9197 0.5195 0.2397 0.1891 0.9964 0.9746
Coal(-8) -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.015 -0.001 0.000
0.9209 0.9240 0.9600 0.4433 0.9778 0.9958
Coal(-9) 0.024 0.009 0.015 -0.003 -0.005 0.000
0.2277 0.6483 0.4654 0.8970 0.8060 0.9720
Coal(-10) -0.009 0.012 0.009 -0.016 -0.010 -0.001
0.6407 0.5395 0.6452 0.4366 0.6167 0.8447
Coal(-11) 0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.012 0.005 -0.003
0.8560 0.9187 0.7585 0.5466 0.8207 0.5273
FTSE(-1) 0.047 0.016 -0.015 -0.004 -0.019 -0.006
0.0235 0.4435 0.4517 0.8407 0.3692 0.2661
FTSE(-2) 0.038 0.017 -0.018 -0.015 0.008 0.004
0.0671 0.4128 0.3783 0.4622 0.6890 0.4927
FTSE(-3) 0.008 0.045 0.013 -0.004 0.000 -0.013
0.6853 0.0292 0.5112 0.8628 0.9825 0.0104
FTSE(-4) 0.003 -0.028 -0.012 0.003 0.013 -0.013
0.8801 0.1743 0.5604 0.8932 0.5431 0.0124
FTSE(-5) 0.026 -0.009 0.026 0.024 -0.001 -0.009
0.1996 0.6501 0.2111 0.2380 0.9544 0.0955
FTSE(-6) 0.013 0.041 0.005 0.005 -0.013 0.003
0.5267 0.0510 0.8068 0.8166 0.5204 0.6163
FTSE(-7) -0.034 -0.011 -0.007 0.048 -0.004 0.006
0.0958 0.6088 0.7275 0.0195 0.8453 0.2045
FTSE(-8) 0.041 -0.008 -0.059 0.026 0.013 0.002
0.0464 0.7060 0.0040 0.2108 0.5245 0.7227
FTSE(-9) -0.053 0.000 -0.018 0.059 -0.026 0.010
0.0099 0.9976 0.3762 0.0043 0.2073 0.0569
FTSE(-10) 0.013 -0.001 -0.035 0.029 0.023 -0.006
0.5374 0.9613 0.0871 0.1607 0.2623 0.2697
FTSE(-11) -0.009 0.005 -0.025 0.038 0.017 -0.011
0.6488 0.8067 0.2242 0.0671 0.4194 0.0307
Table B.24: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Pos With Outliers - Coal and
FTSE
205
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Pos)
Gas(-1) 0.009 0.000 -0.020 -0.017 0.022 -0.002
0.6451 0.9916 0.3099 0.4011 0.2769 0.6937
Gas(-2) -0.026 0.001 -0.047 -0.013 -0.006 0.007
0.2035 0.9726 0.0197 0.5340 0.7746 0.1918
Gas(-3) 0.023 -0.005 -0.017 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001
0.2572 0.7989 0.4001 0.8789 0.8166 0.8601
Gas(-4) -0.011 0.001 -0.045 -0.022 0.025 0.001
0.5692 0.9633 0.0261 0.2768 0.2172 0.8125
Gas(-5) 0.022 0.006 0.029 -0.001 0.041 0.002
0.2791 0.7855 0.1418 0.9691 0.0427 0.6779
Gas(-6) -0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.014 -0.022 -0.003
0.8496 0.9604 0.7640 0.4791 0.2820 0.4912
Gas(-7) -0.025 -0.002 -0.027 0.065 -0.006 -0.001
0.2114 0.9152 0.1866 0.0014 0.7651 0.8639
Gas(-8) -0.003 -0.008 0.013 -0.007 0.001 -0.003
0.8913 0.7107 0.5138 0.7404 0.9581 0.5819
Gas(-9) -0.025 0.023 -0.011 0.005 0.000 0.001
0.2102 0.2648 0.5751 0.8175 0.9831 0.8325
Gas(-10) 0.002 0.040 0.013 -0.061 -0.029 -0.007
0.9362 0.0479 0.5120 0.0024 0.1514 0.1621
Gas(-11) -0.033 0.005 -0.021 0.014 -0.009 0.003
0.1030 0.8022 0.3033 0.4884 0.6459 0.4980
EUA(-1) 0.004 0.006 -0.017 0.019 -0.014 -0.014
0.8488 0.7867 0.3875 0.3588 0.4931 0.0071
EUA(-2) 0.023 0.006 -0.014 -0.016 0.019 -0.011
0.2574 0.7565 0.4859 0.4207 0.3449 0.0328
EUA(-3) 0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.000 -0.007 -0.001
0.6782 0.8448 0.7822 0.9911 0.7138 0.9126
EUA(-4) -0.007 -0.008 0.022 -0.026 0.025 -0.012
0.7341 0.7080 0.2713 0.2042 0.2244 0.0138
EUA(-5) 0.003 0.020 -0.006 0.021 0.080 -0.002
0.8924 0.3205 0.7814 0.2933 0.0001 0.6874
EUA(-6) -0.014 0.011 -0.028 0.015 0.058 0.007
0.4938 0.6081 0.1638 0.4638 0.0041 0.1891
EUA(-7) -0.013 0.012 0.029 -0.015 0.032 0.009
0.5193 0.5438 0.1470 0.4652 0.1184 0.0707
EUA(-8) 0.035 0.011 0.002 0.009 0.011 0.001
0.0863 0.5799 0.9167 0.6730 0.5937 0.8526
EUA(-9) 0.035 -0.003 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.005
0.0790 0.8777 0.6705 0.8919 0.6747 0.3111
EUA(-10) -0.013 -0.016 -0.029 0.008 -0.046 -0.004
0.5059 0.4309 0.1425 0.6925 0.0216 0.4011
EUA(-11) 0.016 0.006 0.014 0.005 -0.032 0.006
0.4185 0.7542 0.4969 0.7989 0.1134 0.2192
Table B.25: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Pos With Outliers - Gas and EUAs
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B.3.4 With Outliers Emissions Market Count of Negative
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Neg
Count Neg (-1) 0.118 0.027 0.158 0.001 0.125 0.268
0.1709 0.7613 0.0677 0.9947 0.1480 0.0000
Count Neg (-2) -0.073 0.019 0.076 0.000 0.185 -0.029
0.3733 0.8227 0.3527 0.9987 0.0228 0.1236
Count Neg (-3) -0.180 -0.049 -0.097 -0.011 -0.090 -0.041
0.0275 0.5547 0.2339 0.8939 0.2684 0.0282
Count Neg (-4) -0.089 0.019 0.122 0.016 0.110 0.049
0.2730 0.8193 0.1359 0.8497 0.1740 0.0091
Count Neg (-5) 0.033 0.006 0.023 0.033 -0.228 -0.091
0.6865 0.9408 0.7761 0.6886 0.0049 0.0000
Count Neg (-6) -0.034 0.051 -0.177 0.008 -0.033 -0.204
0.6679 0.5216 0.0255 0.9199 0.6721 0.0000
Count Neg (-7) 0.140 0.010 -0.018 0.055 -0.048 0.097
0.0799 0.9003 0.8196 0.4919 0.5472 0.0000
Count Neg (-8) -0.027 -0.003 0.193 0.163 -0.020 -0.031
0.7366 0.9665 0.0169 0.0431 0.8066 0.0978
Count Neg (-9) -0.187 0.015 -0.051 -0.040 -0.182 -0.064
0.0200 0.8582 0.5278 0.6166 0.0228 0.0005
Count Neg (-10) -0.014 0.004 -0.007 0.022 -0.326 0.424
0.8654 0.9620 0.9287 0.7819 0.0001 0.0000
Count Neg (-11) -0.024 0.017 -0.009 0.056 0.038 -0.251
0.7746 0.8463 0.9165 0.5099 0.6496 0.0000
Brent(-1) -0.017 0.007 0.018 0.011 0.002 0.000
0.4000 0.7386 0.3872 0.5948 0.9043 0.9486
Brent(-2) 0.010 0.031 0.000 -0.010 0.019 0.007
0.6247 0.1398 0.9926 0.6366 0.3666 0.1257
Brent(-3) -0.043 0.005 -0.015 -0.041 -0.022 0.005
0.0378 0.8286 0.4550 0.0449 0.2871 0.3006
Brent(-4) 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.014 -0.001
0.9182 0.5454 0.9073 0.8440 0.4854 0.8726
Brent(-5) -0.003 0.009 -0.044 0.011 -0.020 0.007
0.8837 0.6705 0.0312 0.5980 0.3365 0.1561
Brent(-6) 0.014 0.010 -0.002 -0.010 0.038 -0.007
0.4876 0.6359 0.9261 0.6236 0.0620 0.1198
Brent(-7) 0.009 0.005 0.034 -0.027 0.023 -0.016
0.6739 0.8162 0.0967 0.1945 0.2538 0.0010
Brent(-8) -0.015 -0.008 -0.003 -0.020 -0.018 0.002
0.4678 0.7188 0.8819 0.3233 0.3861 0.6549
Brent(-9) 0.042 -0.019 -0.018 0.005 -0.006 0.003
0.0396 0.3636 0.3841 0.8042 0.7701 0.4671
Brent(-10) 0.028 -0.012 -0.020 -0.022 0.002 0.007
0.1702 0.5744 0.3283 0.2881 0.9249 0.1591
Brent(-11) 0.011 0.006 -0.004 0.003 -0.007 -0.007
0.5867 0.7852 0.8435 0.8873 0.7230 0.1220
C 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.9900 0.9438 0.9800 0.9525 0.9972 0.9846
R2 0.0395 0.0115 0.0329 0.0270 0.0466 0.3214
Table B.26: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Neg With Outliers - Sent and
Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Neg
Coal(-1) 0.016 -0.011 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.000
0.4183 0.5897 0.7112 0.5936 0.6361 0.9320
Coal(-2) -0.020 -0.003 0.007 -0.017 0.007 0.003
0.3085 0.8960 0.7193 0.3860 0.7083 0.5532
Coal(-3) -0.044 0.012 0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002
0.0283 0.5610 0.7925 0.7562 0.9414 0.7253
Coal(-4) 0.011 -0.009 -0.006 -0.031 -0.024 0.000
0.5836 0.6418 0.7640 0.1263 0.2341 0.9289
Coal(-5) -0.088 -0.007 0.028 -0.020 0.018 -0.001
0.0000 0.7365 0.1650 0.3093 0.3577 0.8977
Coal(-6) -0.011 -0.003 -0.011 -0.016 0.004 -0.001
0.5986 0.8735 0.5667 0.4320 0.8540 0.9112
Coal(-7) -0.002 0.013 0.025 -0.027 -0.001 0.003
0.9266 0.5235 0.2160 0.1853 0.9716 0.5685
Coal(-8) -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.015 0.001 -0.002
0.8542 0.9382 0.9859 0.4480 0.9422 0.7308
Coal(-9) 0.026 0.009 0.014 -0.003 -0.006 0.003
0.1990 0.6578 0.4709 0.8626 0.7524 0.5570
Coal(-10) -0.009 0.012 0.010 -0.015 -0.009 0.001
0.6378 0.5414 0.6290 0.4602 0.6354 0.7503
Coal(-11) 0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.013 0.004 -0.003
0.8485 0.9252 0.7346 0.5186 0.8396 0.4536
FTSE(-1) 0.044 0.015 -0.014 -0.004 -0.017 -0.003
0.0302 0.4604 0.5079 0.8443 0.3915 0.5828
FTSE(-2) 0.037 0.017 -0.015 -0.015 0.012 0.000
0.0718 0.3994 0.4516 0.4613 0.5489 0.9870
FTSE(-3) 0.011 0.044 0.016 -0.004 -0.007 -0.009
0.5977 0.0346 0.4227 0.8548 0.7458 0.0553
FTSE(-4) -0.001 -0.029 -0.013 0.000 0.015 -0.006
0.9709 0.1660 0.5348 0.9980 0.4750 0.2310
FTSE(-5) 0.027 -0.010 0.028 0.023 0.005 -0.006
0.1882 0.6307 0.1754 0.2550 0.8229 0.1949
FTSE(-6) 0.010 0.039 0.006 0.007 -0.012 0.001
0.6230 0.0586 0.7888 0.7301 0.5518 0.7884
FTSE(-7) -0.037 -0.010 -0.010 0.045 -0.004 0.007
0.0726 0.6196 0.6114 0.0286 0.8493 0.1276
FTSE(-8) 0.043 -0.008 -0.063 0.025 0.012 0.010
0.0338 0.7109 0.0023 0.2158 0.5622 0.0415
FTSE(-9) -0.053 0.000 -0.019 0.059 -0.026 0.003
0.0100 0.9957 0.3469 0.0041 0.2056 0.5543
FTSE(-10) 0.012 0.000 -0.034 0.031 0.018 -0.003
0.5519 0.9984 0.0995 0.1343 0.3831 0.5810
FTSE(-11) -0.010 0.006 -0.025 0.038 0.017 -0.001
0.6267 0.7630 0.2209 0.0662 0.4174 0.8326
Table B.27: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Pos With Outliers - Coal and
FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Neg
Gas(-1) 0.009 0.000 -0.019 -0.019 0.024 -0.002
0.6556 0.9971 0.3485 0.3611 0.2233 0.7041
Gas(-2) -0.025 0.000 -0.049 -0.013 -0.004 0.005
0.2085 0.9951 0.0151 0.5050 0.8579 0.2785
Gas(-3) 0.025 -0.005 -0.016 -0.003 -0.005 0.002
0.2135 0.7940 0.4336 0.8802 0.8030 0.7417
Gas(-4) -0.010 0.001 -0.042 -0.022 0.025 -0.005
0.6026 0.9650 0.0365 0.2753 0.2156 0.3249
Gas(-5) 0.022 0.006 0.027 -0.002 0.042 0.003
0.2780 0.7804 0.1734 0.9270 0.0358 0.5031
Gas(-6) -0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.015 -0.021 0.002
0.8811 0.9543 0.6890 0.4555 0.3032 0.6895
Gas(-7) -0.026 -0.003 -0.026 0.064 -0.007 0.003
0.1936 0.8722 0.2022 0.0016 0.7273 0.5330
Gas(-8) -0.005 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 0.001 -0.001
0.8127 0.7124 0.6109 0.6802 0.9417 0.8848
Gas(-9) -0.022 0.023 -0.010 0.004 -0.001 0.000
0.2756 0.2703 0.6154 0.8245 0.9764 0.9171
Gas(-10) 0.002 0.040 0.011 -0.061 -0.027 -0.012
0.9272 0.0484 0.5847 0.0025 0.1834 0.0103
Gas(-11) -0.031 0.005 -0.018 0.012 -0.005 0.004
0.1275 0.7952 0.3661 0.5448 0.7885 0.3357
EUA(-1) 0.012 0.008 -0.013 0.021 -0.016 -0.027
0.5650 0.6989 0.5364 0.3166 0.4515 0.0000
EUA(-2) 0.024 0.009 -0.004 -0.015 0.034 0.004
0.2545 0.6667 0.8380 0.4672 0.1010 0.4366
EUA(-3) -0.003 -0.008 -0.010 -0.001 -0.009 -0.005
0.8964 0.7071 0.6496 0.9494 0.6576 0.3365
EUA(-4) -0.023 -0.009 0.022 -0.024 0.029 -0.002
0.2795 0.6696 0.2875 0.2445 0.1632 0.7077
EUA(-5) 0.002 0.020 0.003 0.021 0.070 -0.008
0.9176 0.3410 0.9045 0.3237 0.0008 0.0961
EUA(-6) -0.016 0.013 -0.043 0.016 0.051 0.020
0.4377 0.5386 0.0416 0.4410 0.0134 0.0000
EUA(-7) -0.008 0.014 0.017 -0.014 0.027 -0.005
0.7094 0.4971 0.4076 0.5156 0.1897 0.3146
EUA(-8) 0.042 0.011 0.010 0.020 0.007 0.006
0.0450 0.6101 0.6318 0.3298 0.7338 0.2451
EUA(-9) 0.029 0.000 0.014 0.004 0.005 0.001
0.1680 0.9846 0.5012 0.8646 0.8140 0.8927
EUA(-10) -0.015 -0.016 -0.034 0.008 -0.076 0.009
0.4624 0.4492 0.1040 0.6906 0.0002 0.0517
EUA(-11) 0.015 0.008 0.012 0.007 -0.033 0.007
0.4786 0.7201 0.5528 0.7251 0.1067 0.1594
Table B.28: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count Pos With Outliers - Gas and EUA
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B.3.5 With Outliers Emissions Market Count All Tweets
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count All
Count All(-1) 0.196 0.029 0.170 0.045 0.017 0.250
0.0353 0.7578 0.0680 0.6293 0.8527 0.0000
Count All(-2) -0.032 0.022 0.176 -0.057 0.162 -0.020
0.6922 0.7867 0.0296 0.4793 0.0441 0.2362
Count All(-3) -0.067 -0.049 -0.0788 0.0288 -0.2143 0.0428
0.4044 0.548 0.3272 0.7217 0.0077 0.0111
Count All(-4) -0.156 0.0584 0.1531 0.0518 0.2545 0
0.0527 0.4743 0.0572 0.5217 0.0016 0.9997
Count All(-5) -0.005 -0.0199 -0.0548 -0.0019 -0.2165 -0.1007
0.9518 0.8082 0.4972 0.9811 0.0073 0
Count All(-6) 0.008 0.0262 -0.2422 0.0299 -0.1588 -0.1444
0.9183 0.7454 0.0024 0.7085 0.0458 0
Count All(-7) 0.223 -0.0051 0.0945 0.0613 -0.0783 -0.0004
0.0054 0.9499 0.2382 0.4467 0.328 0.98
Count All(-8) -0.030 0.0246 0.2582 0.179 -0.1297 0.0362
0.7055 0.7614 0.0013 0.0261 0.1048 0.0307
Count All(-9) -0.183 0.0247 -0.029 -0.0495 -0.0114 -0.0755
0.0230 0.7618 0.7183 0.5398 0.8871 0
Count All(-10) -0.002 0.0053 -0.0468 0.0738 -0.1357 0.5443
0.9853 0.9483 0.561 0.3617 0.0915 0
Count All(-11) -0.112 0.0097 0.047 -0.0017 -0.0162 -0.2672
0.2250 0.9176 0.6116 0.9852 0.8605 0
Brent(-1) -0.018 0.0066 0.0138 0.0099 0.0065 0.001
0.3901 0.753 0.5027 0.6314 0.7539 0.8209
Brent(-2) 0.009 0.0304 -0.0033 -0.0099 0.0187 0.0101
0.6549 0.1461 0.874 0.631 0.3622 0.019
Brent(-3) -0.043 0.0032 -0.0139 -0.0432 -0.022 0.0007
0.0355 0.8773 0.4976 0.0365 0.2849 0.8726
Brent(-4) 0.002 0.0121 0.0026 0.0043 0.0132 0.0008
0.9296 0.5603 0.898 0.8342 0.5192 0.854
Brent(-5) -0.004 0.0093 -0.0456 0.0098 -0.0166 0
0.8342 0.6563 0.0264 0.6338 0.419 0.9951
Brent(-6) 0.015 0.0099 -0.0026 -0.0105 0.0433 -0.0082
0.4595 0.6342 0.8992 0.6124 0.0348 0.0558
Brent(-7) 0.010 0.0048 0.0357 -0.0271 0.0261 -0.0085
0.6224 0.816 0.0809 0.1882 0.2019 0.0488
Brent(-8) -0.015 -0.0078 -0.0014 -0.0212 -0.0172 0.0027
0.4602 0.7088 0.9463 0.3051 0.4014 0.5343
Brent(-9) 0.041 -0.0187 -0.0175 0.0043 -0.0091 0.0038
0.0438 0.3679 0.394 0.8335 0.6573 0.3764
Brent(-10) 0.029 -0.0107 -0.0196 -0.0217 0.002 0.0029
0.1635 0.6072 0.338 0.2915 0.9234 0.5052
Brent(-11) 0.012 0.0058 -0.007 0.0032 -0.0065 -0.0068
0.5561 0.7788 0.7308 0.8753 0.7509 0.1136
C 0.000 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0001
0.9904 0.944 0.9808 0.952 0.9963 0.9868
R2 0.0403 0.0117 0.04 0.028 0.0433 0.4107
Table B.29: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count All Tweets With Outliers - Sent
and Brent
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count All
Coal(-1) 0.016 -0.0107 0.007 0.0112 0.0097 -0.0018
0.4163 0.597 0.7258 0.5759 0.6252 0.6697
Coal(-2) -0.020 -0.0027 0.0081 -0.0172 0.0079 0.0022
0.3176 0.8915 0.6843 0.389 0.6921 0.6023
Coal(-3) -0.044 0.0117 0.0051 -0.0062 -0.0023 -0.0015
0.0268 0.5627 0.7987 0.7553 0.9089 0.722
Coal(-4) 0.011 -0.0094 -0.0067 -0.0308 -0.024 0.0003
0.5866 0.641 0.7345 0.1233 0.2271 0.9399
Coal(-5) -0.089 -0.0067 0.028 -0.0202 0.0187 -0.0024
0.0000 0.7407 0.1595 0.3126 0.3457 0.5661
Coal(-6) -0.010 -0.0035 -0.0111 -0.0162 0.0036 -0.0011
0.6098 0.8634 0.5767 0.4196 0.8563 0.7878
Coal(-7) -0.002 0.0131 0.0244 -0.0266 0.0004 0.0039
0.9357 0.5191 0.2208 0.185 0.9853 0.346
Coal(-8) -0.004 -0.0018 0 -0.0156 0.0004 -0.0013
0.8463 0.93 0.9995 0.4365 0.9833 0.7573
Coal(-9) 0.025 0.0092 0.0146 -0.0031 -0.0056 0.0012
0.2122 0.6508 0.4639 0.8777 0.7765 0.7692
Coal(-10) -0.009 0.0121 0.0096 -0.0152 -0.0092 -0.0003
0.6412 0.5489 0.6305 0.449 0.6442 0.9461
Coal(-11) 0.004 0.0019 -0.0071 -0.0125 0.0031 -0.0037
0.8407 0.924 0.7206 0.5312 0.8751 0.3722
FTSE(-1) 0.047 0.0156 -0.0146 -0.0031 -0.019 -0.0077
0.0233 0.4545 0.476 0.8798 0.3552 0.0749
FTSE(-2) 0.040 0.0176 -0.0116 -0.0152 0.009 -0.0022
0.0544 0.3975 0.5734 0.4626 0.6622 0.6069
FTSE(-3) 0.013 0.0441 0.0167 -0.0037 -0.0043 -0.0097
0.5445 0.0345 0.4157 0.8587 0.8327 0.0241
FTSE(-4) 0.001 -0.0285 -0.0121 0.0013 0.0166 -0.006
0.9518 0.1709 0.5557 0.9488 0.4181 0.1609
FTSE(-5) 0.025 -0.0091 0.0322 0.0233 0.0043 -0.0049
0.2171 0.6635 0.1164 0.2593 0.8339 0.2579
FTSE(-6) 0.010 0.0391 0.0056 0.0047 -0.0136 0.0024
0.6164 0.0602 0.7846 0.8183 0.5056 0.5806
FTSE(-7) -0.035 -0.011 -0.0117 0.0457 -0.0047 0.0081
0.0907 0.5975 0.5674 0.0264 0.8188 0.0591
FTSE(-8) 0.042 -0.0073 -0.062 0.026 0.0117 0.0025
0.0403 0.7253 0.0025 0.2075 0.5666 0.5554
FTSE(-9) -0.054 0.0003 -0.0202 0.059 -0.0264 0.0025
0.0091 0.9869 0.3251 0.0043 0.1988 0.5666
FTSE(-10) 0.014 -0.001 -0.0388 0.0314 0.0201 -0.0054
0.5127 0.9607 0.0601 0.1293 0.3287 0.2097
FTSE(-11) -0.008 0.0058 -0.0252 0.04 0.0139 0.0012
0.6945 0.7832 0.2215 0.0537 0.4986 0.7898
Table B.30: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count All Tweets With Outliers -Coal
and FTSE
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Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count All
Gas(-1) 0.010 -0.0002 -0.02 -0.0182 0.0221 -0.001
0.6311 0.9913 0.3211 0.3678 0.2713 0.8107
Gas(-2) -0.026 0.0005 -0.0478 -0.0138 -0.0039 0.0048
0.2006 0.9816 0.0175 0.4954 0.8476 0.2512
Gas(-3) 0.024 -0.0056 -0.0165 -0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0006
0.2295 0.7847 0.4126 0.8681 0.8259 0.8855
Gas(-4) -0.011 0.0007 -0.0445 -0.0216 0.0239 -0.0032
0.5907 0.9733 0.027 0.2845 0.2338 0.4485
Gas(-5) 0.022 0.0059 0.0283 -0.0017 0.0428 0.0017
0.2701 0.7728 0.1589 0.9324 0.0327 0.684
Gas(-6) -0.002 -0.0013 0.0084 0.0149 -0.0228 0.0038
0.9074 0.9494 0.6746 0.4594 0.2553 0.3661
Gas(-7) -0.027 -0.0027 -0.0267 0.0637 -0.0055 -0.0004
0.1846 0.8934 0.1845 0.0016 0.7857 0.9318
Gas(-8) -0.004 -0.0076 0.0109 -0.0074 0.0035 -0.0002
0.8253 0.711 0.5869 0.7145 0.862 0.9669
Gas(-9) -0.024 0.0228 -0.0099 0.0044 -0.0006 0.002
0.2322 0.2636 0.6228 0.8276 0.9769 0.642
Gas(-10) 0.002 0.0397 0.0094 -0.0625 -0.0285 -0.0144
0.9384 0.052 0.6409 0.002 0.1559 0.0007
Gas(-11) -0.029 0.0053 -0.0183 0.0139 -0.0081 0.0048
0.1518 0.7971 0.3655 0.4929 0.687 0.2544
EUA(-1) 0.008 0.008 -0.0133 0.022 -0.014 -0.0215
0.7024 0.6992 0.5122 0.2823 0.4907 0
EUA(-2) 0.026 0.0074 -0.0027 -0.015 0.0211 0.004
0.2046 0.7217 0.8928 0.4647 0.3006 0.3436
EUA(-3) 0.004 -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0011 -0.0148 -0.0018
0.8320 0.8005 0.7854 0.9586 0.4687 0.6701
EUA(-4) -0.013 -0.0074 0.023 -0.0233 0.0293 -0.0059
0.5259 0.7209 0.2598 0.2554 0.1503 0.1677
EUA(-5) 0.001 0.021 0.0009 0.0224 0.0775 -0.0032
0.9593 0.3086 0.9648 0.2733 0.0001 0.45
EUA(-6) -0.018 0.0104 -0.0393 0.0134 0.053 0.0147
0.3802 0.6131 0.0535 0.5116 0.0092 0.0006
EUA(-7) -0.009 0.012 0.0227 -0.0142 0.0253 0.0042
0.6477 0.5625 0.2647 0.4868 0.2128 0.3215
EUA(-8) 0.037 0.0115 0.0065 0.0163 0.003 0.0062
0.0696 0.5772 0.7494 0.4267 0.8808 0.1446
EUA(-9) 0.028 -0.0006 0.0097 0.0016 0.0127 -0.0017
0.1624 0.9754 0.6348 0.9384 0.5325 0.695
EUA(-10) -0.011 -0.0173 -0.0366 0.0097 -0.0593 0.0116
0.5922 0.4005 0.0722 0.6339 0.0035 0.0066
EUA(-11) 0.015 0.0073 0.0146 0.0066 -0.0291 0.0108
0.4736 0.7251 0.4743 0.7456 0.1528 0.0116
Table B.31: Results of VAR for Emissions Market Sentiment Count All Tweets With Outliers - Gas
and EUAs
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Appendix C
Granger Causality Results for
Emissions Market Sentiment
C.1 Introduction to Granger Causality Results
The results of the Granger causality tests excluding the outliers are given in the main text of the thesis
in Tables 4.14 on page 123 and 4.15 on page 124. This introduction applies to the Granger causality
test results for the emissions market and for climate change sentiment in Appendix E.
The following table (C.1) indicates the 2 statistic from the Granger causality test and the asso-
ciated p-value. For example the rst entry indicates that the 2 statistic for the null hypothesis that
Brent returns do not Granger-cause EUA returns is 10.989 with an associated p-value of 0.4442. This
indicates that there is no evidence that changes in the price of Brent crude oil Granger-causes EU
emission allowance (EUA) returns. Next we see the 2 statistic for the null hypothesis that coal does
not Granger-cause EUAs is 3.115 and that the associated p-value is 0.9891, indicating that there is
no evidence that coal returns Granger causes EUA returns. Similarly at the bottom of that section of
the table we see that there is only weak evidence with a p-value of 0.1017, that the Sum of Positive
emissions market sentiment measure Granger-causes EUA returns.
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C.2 Emissions Market Sentiment Measures With Outliers
Sum Pos Count Pos
EUAs FTSE EUAs FTSE
Brent 10.989 Brent 10.384 Brent 10.762 Brent 10.175
0.4442 0.4962 0.4634 0.5147
Coal 3.115 Coal 5.137 Coal 3.205 Coal 5.051
0.9891 0.9243 0.9877 0.9287
FTSE 5.634 Gas 18.382 FTSE 5.716 Gas 18.497
0.8966 0.0731 0.8917 0.0707
Gas 10.352 EUA 9.338 Gas 10.284 EUA 9.591
0.4991 0.5907 0.5050 0.5675
Sum Pos 17.170 Sum Pos 38.707 Count Pos 20.027 Count Pos 44.087
0.1029 0.0001 0.0450 0.0000
Brent Gas Brent Gas
Coal 29.390 Brent 8.981 Coal 29.531 Brent 9.133
0.0020 0.6237 0.0019 0.6096
FTSE 25.278 Coal 8.229 FTSE 25.679 Coal 8.239
0.0083 0.6927 0.0072 0.6917
Gas 11.058 FTSE 21.508 Gas 10.959 FTSE 21.495
0.4384 0.0285 0.4467 0.0286
EUA 9.958 EUA 5.928 EUA 9.781 EUA 5.900
0.5342 0.8781 0.5502 0.8800
Sum Pos 21.809 Sum Pos 8.140 Count of Pos 17.538 Count Pos 7.878
0.0259 0.7007 0.0929 0.7242
Coal Sum Pos Coal Count Pos
Brent 4.189 Brent 10.645 Brent 4.185 Brent 13.119
0.9641 0.4734 0.9642 0.2856
FTSE 12.672 Coal 3.397 FTSE 12.632 Coal 3.810
0.3153 0.9844 0.3181 0.9751
Gas 5.435 FTSE 35.312 Gas 5.422 FTSE 28.232
0.9083 0.0002 0.9090 0.0030
EUA 3.094 Gas 6.816 EUA 3.065 Gas 5.680
0.9894 0.8138 0.9898 0.8938
Sum Pos 1.314 EUA 27.083 Count Pos 1.557 EUA 25.043
0.9998 0.0045 0.9995 0.0090
Table C.1: Results of Granger Causality for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Positive and Count
Positive Including Outliers
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Count Neg Sum Neg
EUA Coal EUA Coal
Count Neg 50.947 Count Neg 1.093 Sum Neg 59.048 Sum Neg 1.030
0.0000 0.9999 0.0000 0.9999
Brent 9.403 Brent 4.447 Brent 9.416 Brent 4.401
0.5848 0.9550 0.5836 0.9567
Coal 3.043 EUA 3.455 Coal 2.983 EUA 3.296
0.9901 0.9833 0.9910 0.9862
FTSE 5.569 FTSE 12.218 FTSE 5.755 FTSE 12.410
0.9005 0.3475 0.8892 0.3336
Gas 10.410 Gas 5.391 Gas 10.536 Gas 5.396
0.4940 0.9108 0.4829 0.9105
Brent FTSE Brent FTSE
Count Neg 16.904 Count Neg 20.539 Sum Neg 14.704 Sum Neg 21.693
0.1108 0.0385 0.1965 0.0269
Coal 29.046 Coal 5.053 Coal 29.138 Coal 5.043
0.0022 0.9286 0.0022 0.9290
FTSE 26.105 Brent 10.510 FTSE 25.886 Brent 10.371
0.0063 0.4852 0.0067 0.4974
Gas 10.514 Gas 17.179 Gas 10.497 Gas 16.977
0.4849 0.1027 0.4863 0.1086
EUA 10.280 EUA 10.337 EUA 10.597 EUA 10.320
0.5054 0.5003 0.4776 0.5019
Count Neg Gas Sum Neg Gas
Brent 23.902 Brent 8.784 Brent 24.547 Brent 8.633
0.0132 0.6418 0.0106 0.6558
Coal 2.003 Coal 8.281 Coal 1.646 Coal 8.248
0.9985 0.6879 0.9994 0.6909
FTSE 13.785 FTSE 21.176 FTSE 13.978 FTSE 21.055
0.2451 0.0316 0.2342 0.0328
Gas 11.155 Count Neg 6.296 Gas 10.447 EUA 6.441
0.4304 0.8529 0.4907 0.8424
EUA 63.918 EUA 6.341 EUA 72.489 Sum Neg 6.015
0.0000 0.8497 0.0000 0.8724
Table C.2: Results of Granger Causality for Emissions Market Sentiment Sum Negative and Count
Negative Including Outliers
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Count of Tweets
Brent Coal
Coal 29.259 Brent 4.301
0.0021 0.9603
FTSE 26.444 FTSE 12.124
0.0056 0.3544
Gas 10.600 Gas 5.314
0.4774 0.9150
EUA 9.219 EUA 3.308
0.6017 0.9860
Count of Tweets 18.877 Count of Tweets 1.396
0.0633 0.9997
EUAs FTSE
FTSE 5.726 EUA 11.043
0.8910 0.4397
Brent 10.499 Brent 10.680
0.4861 0.4704
Coal 3.110 Coal 5.127
0.9892 0.9249
Gas 10.705 Gas 17.830
0.4683 0.0856
Count of Tweets 42.238 Count of Tweets 39.093
0.0000 0.0001
Count of Tweets Gas
Gas 16.690 Count of Tweets 8.971
0.1174 0.6246
Brent 17.058 Brent 9.152
0.1062 0.6079
Coal 2.893 Coal 8.386
0.9921 0.6784
FTSE 17.608 FTSE 21.561
0.0911 0.0280
EUA 57.603 EUA 6.335
0.0000 0.8501
Table C.3: Results of Granger Causality for Emissions Market Sentiment Count of All Tweets Including
Outliers
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Appendix D
VAR Results for Climate Change
Sentiment
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D.1 VAR Results for Climate Change Sentiment No Outliers
D.1.1 No Outliers Climate Change Sum Positive
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Positive
Brent (-1) -0.015 0.018 0.013 0.015 0.030 1.531
0.4686 0.6941 0.4081 0.5789 0.8529 0.8347
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.009 0.002 0.006 0.033 -2.509
0.4782 0.6588 0.7992 0.6191 0.6413 0.4307
FTSE (-1) 0.055 0.041 -0.010 -0.014 -0.228 2.846
0.0368 0.4889 0.6291 0.6894 0.2788 0.7630
Gas (-1) 0.013 -0.002 -0.010 -0.013 0.151 0.487
0.4043 0.9639 0.3950 0.5117 0.2172 0.9296
EUA (-1) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.009 1.534
0.8875 0.6987 0.3687 0.3562 0.6362 0.0884
Sum Positive (-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.326
0.0387 0.4859 0.3889 0.8523 0.3647 0.0000
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0690 0.5511 0.3537 0.8672 0.5302 0.9801
R2 0.0040 0.0007 0.0013 0.0008 0.0016 0.1079
Table D.1: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Sum Positive No Outliers
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D.1.2 No Outliers Climate Change Sum Negative
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Negative
Brent (-1) -0.015 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.030 4.519
0.4708 0.7085 0.3412 0.5553 0.8568 0.5152
Brent (-2) 0.017 0.067 0.004 -0.007 0.191 1.912
0.3964 0.1442 0.8242 0.7997 0.2428 0.7828
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.010 0.002 0.006 0.031 1.609
0.5263 0.6283 0.7733 0.6074 0.6642 0.5927
Coal (-2) -0.008 -0.004 0.002 -0.009 0.030 -0.651
0.3392 0.8412 0.7344 0.4286 0.6727 0.8288
FTSE (-1) 0.054 0.041 -0.012 -0.014 -0.230 6.028
0.0390 0.4929 0.5547 0.6801 0.2750 0.4994
FTSE (-2) 0.038 0.045 -0.017 -0.026 0.014 6.382
0.1499 0.4440 0.3914 0.4542 0.9462 0.4749
Gas (-1) 0.012 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012 0.146 -4.403
0.4438 0.9639 0.3189 0.5471 0.2340 0.3987
Gas (-2) -0.025 0.001 -0.029 -0.006 -0.041 2.374
0.0962 0.9878 0.0157 0.7739 0.7375 0.6486
EUA (-1) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 -1.301
0.8585 0.6830 0.3861 0.3657 0.6191 0.1265
EUA (-2) 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.028 -1.431
0.3378 0.7341 0.4778 0.3576 0.1685 0.0928
Sum Negative (-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.305
0.8699 0.9691 0.8950 0.7405 0.0801 0.0000
Sum Negative (-2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.233
0.6995 0.8056 0.6510 0.3721 0.3025 0.0000
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
0.9279 0.8468 0.8973 0.7696 0.6816 0.9710
R2 0.0054 0.0019 0.0042 0.0020 0.0040 0.2054
Table D.2: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Sum Negative No Outliers
219
D.1.3 No Outliers Climate Change Count Positive
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Positive
Brent (-1) -0.015 0.018 0.013 0.015 0.030 1.377
0.4687 0.6939 0.4082 0.5794 0.8531 0.8489
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.009 0.002 0.006 0.033 -1.574
0.4767 0.6577 0.7984 0.6150 0.6391 0.0020
FTSE (-1) 0.055 0.041 -0.010 -0.014 -0.226 6.182
0.0356 0.4868 0.6257 0.6910 0.2821 0.0020
Gas (-1) 0.013 -0.001 -0.010 -0.013 0.152 -1.484
0.4001 0.9678 0.3922 0.5078 0.2166 0.0030
EUA (-1) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.009 1.439
0.8752 0.6968 0.3666 0.3536 0.6426 01045
Count Positive (-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.367
0.1255 0.6967 0.5988 0.8657 0.4419 0.0000
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
0.1527 0.7113 0.4976 0.9210 0.2968 0.9753
R2 0.0032 0.0005 0.0011 0.0007 0.0015 0.1357
Table D.3: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Count Positive No Outliers
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D.1.4 No Outliers Climate Change Count Negative
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Negative
Brent (-1) -0.015 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.029 -5.240
0.4730 0.7092 0.3405 0.5510 0.8613 0.4440
Brent (-2) 0.017 0.067 0.004 -0.007 0.190 -1.120
0.3939 0.1443 0.8208 0.8041 0.2444 0.8698
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.010 0.002 0.006 0.031 -1.849
0.5265 0.6283 0.7734 0.6076 0.6643 0.5330
Coal (-2) -0.008 -0.004 0.002 -0.009 0.030 1.103
0.3392 0.8413 0.7329 0.4301 0.6755 0.7100
FTSE (-1) 0.054 0.041 -0.012 -0.014 -0.230 -5.396
0.0392 0.4930 0.5528 0.6802 0.2750 0.5396
FTSE (-2) 0.038 0.045 -0.017 -0.026 0.015 -7.543
0.1497 0.4441 0.3913 0.4555 0.9445 0.3916
Gas (-1) 0.012 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012 0.147 4.387
0.4439 0.9633 0.3162 0.5463 0.2316 0.3937
Gas (-2) -0.026 0.000 -0.029 -0.006 -0.041 -3.985
0.0958 0.9885 0.0154 0.7720 0.7388 0.4378
EUA (-1) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 1.208
0.8499 0.6838 0.3907 0.3599 0.6155 0.1502
EUA (-2) 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.028 1.504
0.3331 0.7350 0.4796 0.3582 0.1686 0.0732
Count Negative (-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.327
0.9121 0.9758 0.7847 0.5958 0.0679 0.0000
Count Negative (-2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.232
0.9314 0.8426 0.6259 0.4344 0.2703 0.0000
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
0.8181 0.8561 0.9867 0.8714 0.6497 0.9663
R2 0.0053 0.0019 0.0043 0.0019 0.0041 0.2276
Table D.4: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Count Negative No Outliers
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D.1.5 No Outliers Climate Change Count of Tweets
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count of Tweets
Brent (-1) -0.014 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.028 -4.884
0.4807 0.7129 0.3455 0.5505 0.8640 0.4691
Brent (-2) 0.018 0.067 0.003 -0.007 0.191 -1.041
0.3851 0.1438 0.8273 0.8066 0.2442 0.8772
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.010 0.002 0.006 0.029 -0.799
0.5231 0.6262 0.7744 0.6065 0.6740 0.7845
Coal (-2) -0.008 -0.004 0.002 -0.009 0.031 -0.463
0.3417 0.8424 0.7340 0.4268 0.6651 0.8741
FTSE (-1) 0.054 0.041 -0.012 -0.014 -0.232 -8.505
0.0387 0.4927 0.5569 0.6770 0.2706 0.3265
FTSE (-2) 0.038 0.046 -0.017 -0.026 0.012 -9.044
0.1451 0.4401 0.3947 0.4544 0.9543 0.2972
Gas (-1) 0.011 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012 0.151 -0.384
0.4603 0.9574 0.3154 0.5423 0.2197 0.9395
Gas (-2) -0.025 0.0001 -0.029 -0.006 -0.047 -5.108
0.0963 0.9971 0.0155 0.7758 0.7037 0.3128
EUA (-1) 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.011 2.437
0.8188 0.6716 0.3882 0.3519 0.5974 0.0033
EUA (-2) 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.029 0.319
0.364 0.7322 0.4718 0.3670 0.1470 0.7001
Count of Tweets (-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.418
0.3624 0.8325 0.7790 0.7733 0.0653 0.0000
Count of Tweets (-2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.137
0.5439 0.7459 0.8334 0.8430 0.1714 0.0000
Constant 0.000 -0.0001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
0.6304 0.6228 0.9096 0.9591 0.6679 0.9723
R2 0.0056 0.0020 0.0042 0.0017 0.0042 0.2505
Table D.5: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Count of Tweets No Outliers
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D.2 VAR Results for Climate Change Sentiment With Outliers
D.2.1 With Outliers Climate Change Sum Positive
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Positive
Brent (-1) -0.019 0.021 0.015 0.018 0.041 0.903
0.3611 0.6470 0.3286 0.4949 0.7982 0.8997
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.009 0.002 0.005 0.032 -2.305
0.4909 0.6554 0.7938 0.6514 0.6475 0.4605
FTSE (-1) 0.050 0.041 -0.014 -0.014 -0.227 0.915
0.0539 0.4902 0.5020 0.6824 0.2752 0.9210
Gas (-1) 0.011 -0.002 -0.012 -0.013 0.145 0.081
0.4549 0.9490 0.3247 0.5192 0.2326 0.9880
EUA (-1) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 1.668
0.8836 0.7029 0.3408 0.3607 0.6215 0.0589
Sum Positive (-1) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.372
0.0699 0.3660 0.3239 0.9697 0.4188 0.0000
Constant -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.011
0.1022 0.4757 0.3023 0.9662 0.8899 0.979
R2 0.0033 0.0008 0.0016 0.0008 0.0015 0.1400
Table D.6: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Sum Positive With Outliers
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D.2.2 With Outliers Climate Change Sum Negative
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Sum Negative
Brent (-1) -0.018 0.021 0.017 0.019 0.044 -0.246
0.3633 0.6474 0.2766 0.4765 0.7859 0.9678
Brent (-2) 0.016 0.065 0.001 -0.009 0.177 1.026
0.4246 0.1520 0.9417 0.7234 0.2741 0.8663
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.010 0.002 0.006 0.030 2.368
0.5299 0.6182 0.7719 0.6319 0.6678 0.3725
Coal (-2) -0.008 -0.004 0.004 -0.010 0.031 -0.495
0.3551 0.8392 0.6931 0.4032 0.6616 0.8520
FTSE (-1) 0.049 0.040 -0.016 -0.014 -0.234 9.128
0.0593 0.4991 0.4382 0.6745 0.2613 0.2448
FTSE (-2) 0.042 0.045 -0.017 -0.030 0.007 4.342
0.1120 0.4410 0.40985 0.3753 0.9726 0.5803
Gas (-1) 0.010 -0.002 -0.013 -0.012 0.141 -3.093
0.4968 0.9467 0.2576 0.5536 0.2493 0.5010
Gas (-2) -0.024 0.002 -0.030 -0.006 -0.036 1.933
0.1136 0.9616 0.0112 0.7543 0.7670 0.6735
EUA (-1) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 -1.444
0.8533 0.6826 0.3522 0.3688 0.6142 0.0547
EUA (-2) 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.028 -1.322
0.3475 0.7103 0.5079 0.3543 0.1666 0.0786
Sum Negative (-1) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.434
0.8711 0.7839 0.9250 0.4580 0.0902 0.000
Sum Negative (-2) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.251
0.6567 0.6916 0.7289 0.1869 0.1455 0.000
Constant -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.9160 0.7014 0.7486 0.7825 0.8014 0.9804
R2 0.0052 0.0020 0.0046 0.0025 0.0038 0.3801
Table D.7: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Sum Negative With Outliers
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D.2.3 With Outliers Climate Change Count Positive
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Positive
Brent (-1) -0.018 0.021 0.015 0.018 0.041 0.148
0.3616 0.6472 0.3288 0.4959 0.7987 0.9831
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.009 0.002 0.005 0.032 -1.315
0.4910 0.6565 0.7939 0.6486 0.6457 0.6667
FTSE (-1) 0.050 0.041 -0.014 -0.014 -0.226 4.827
0.0536 0.4878 0.5009 0.6865 0.2775 0.5925
Gas (-1) 0.012 -0.002 -0.012 -0.013 0.146 -1.795
0.4477 0.9522 0.3215 0.5157 0.2318 0.7336
EUA (-1) 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 1.638
0.8773 0.6984 0.3388 0.3579 0.6266 0.0579
Count Positive (-1) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.421
0.2455 0.4967 0.5315 0.8081 0.4939 0.0000
Constant -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
0.2451 0.5811 0.4428 0.8600 0.8899 0.9731
R2 0.0025 0.0007 0.0014 0.0008 0.0014 0.1777
Table D.8: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Count Positive With Outliers
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D.2.4 With Outliers Climate Change Count Negative
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Negative
Brent (-1) -0.018 0.021 0.017 0.019 0.043 0.494
0.3655 0.6485 0.2770 0.4723 0.7885 0.9310
Brent (-2) 0.016 0.065 0.001 -0.009 0.178 0.392
0.4233 0.1523 0.9416 0.7242 0.2728 0.9452
Coal (-1) 0.005 -0.010 0.002 0.005 0.030 -2.505
0.5314 0.6184 0.7722 0.6343 0.6685 0.3127
Coal (-2) -0.008 -0.004 0.003 -0.010 0.030 0.835
0.3534 0.8396 0.6930 0.4057 0.6656 0.7365
FTSE (-1) 0.049 0.040 -0.0157 -0.014 -0.235 -8.378
0.0595 0.4990 0.4382 0.6775 0.2594 0.2534
FTSE (-2) 0.042 0.045 -0.017 -0.030 0.007 -4.113
0.1115 0.4412 0.4103 0.3783 0.9716 0.5752
Gas (-1) 0.010 -0.002 -0.013 -0.012 0.141 2.022
0.4960 0.9442 0.2569 0.5528 0.2488 0.6379
Gas (-2) -0.024 0.002 -0.030 -0.006 -0.037 -3.176
0.1126 0.9626 0.0111 0.7549 0.7615 0.4590
EUA (-1) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 1.310
0.8479 0.6839 0.3521 0.3633 0.6133 0.0620
EUA (-2) 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.028 1.284
0.3439 0.7105 0.5072 0.3528 0.1661 0.0674
Count Negative (-1) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.495
0.8743 0.7943 0.9498 0.3147 0.0823 0.0000
Count Negative (-2) -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.239
0.8638 0.7409 0.7507 0.1923 0.1109 0.0000
Constant -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.8309 0.7017 0.7648 0.8717 0.8307 0.9807
R2 0.0051 0.0020 0.0046 0.0025 0.0039 0.4584
Table D.9: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Count Negative With Outliers
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D.2.5 With Outliers Climate Change Count of Tweets
Brent Coal FTSE Gas EUA Count Tweets
Brent (-1) -0.018 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.045 -3.387
0.3669 0.6553 0.2784 0.4714 0.7830 0.5415
Brent (-2) 0.016 0.065 0.001 -0.009 0.173 2.169
0.4166 0.1532 0.9411 0.7372 0.2863 0.6956
Coal (-1) 0.006 -0.010 0.002 0.006 0.029 -0.360
0.5297 0.6174 0.7649 0.6338 0.6807 0.8814
Coal (-2) -0.008 -0.004 0.003 -0.010 0.033 -0.868
0.3543 0.8371 0.6876 0.3923 0.6432 0.7192
FTSE (-1) 0.049 0.040 -0.016 -0.014 -0.237 -9.589
0.0583 0.4944 0.4424 0.6740 0.2564 0.17921
FTSE (-2) 0.042 0.0460 -0.017 -0.030 0.007 -3.796
0.1087 0.4346 0.4111 0.3767 0.9739 0.5951
Gas (-1) 0.010 -0.003 -0.013 -0.012 0.143 -1.892
0.5049 0.9393 0.2558 0.5488 0.2408 0.6509
Gas (-2) -0.024 0.002 -0.030 -0.006 -0.042 -3.185
0.1139 0.9636 0.0115 0.76416 0.7307 0.4455
EUA (-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 2.321
0.6202 0.6948 0.7968 0.5397 0.1727 0.0007
EUA (-2) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.301
0.5554 0.7747 0.7078 0.5137 0.1861 0.6604
Count Tweets (-1) 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.586
0.8319 0.6774 0.3517 0.3546 0.0864 0.0000
Count Tweets (-2) 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.149
0.3670 0.7153 0.4845 0.3559 0.1861 0.0000
Constant -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.8146 0.5173 0.6480 0.9729 0.8875 0.9792
R2 0.0051 0.0021 0.0046 0.0020 0.0039 0.4873
Table D.10: Results of VAR for Climate Change Sentiment Count of Tweets With Outliers
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Appendix E
Granger Causality Results for Climate
Change Sentiment
228
E.1 No Outliers Climate Change Sentiment Measures
Sum Pos Count Pos
EUAs FTSE EUAs FTSE
Brent 0.034 Brent 0.685 Brent 0.034 Brent 0.684
0.8528 0.408 0.8531 0.4082
Coal 0.217 Coal 0.065 Coal 0.220 Coal 0.065
0.6412 0.7992 0.6391 0.7984
FTSE 1.174 Gas 0.724 FTSE 1.157 Gas 0.733
0.2787 0.3949 0.282 0.3921
Gas 1.524 EUA 0.808 Gas 1.528 EUA 0.815
0.217 0.3686 0.2164 0.3666
Sum Pos 0.822 Sum Pos 0.743 Count Pos 0.592 Count Pos 0.277
0.3646 0.3888 0.4418 0.5987
Brent Gas Brent Gas
Coal 0.503 Brent 0.308 Coal 0.506 Brent 0.307
0.4781 0.5789 0.4767 0.5794
FTSE 4.366 Coal 0.247 FTSE 4.423 Coal 0.253
0.0367 0.6191 0.0355 0.6150
Gas 0.696 FTSE 0.160 Gas 0.708 FTSE 0.158
0.4042 0.6894 0.400 0.691
EUA 0.020 EUA 0.852 EUA 0.025 EUA 0.861
0.8875 0.3561 0.8752 0.3535
Sum Pos 4.278 Sum Pos 0.035 Count of Pos 2.348 Count Pos 0.029
0.0386 0.8523 0.1254 0.8657
Coal Sum Pos Coal Count Pos
Brent 0.155 Brent 0.044 Brent 0.155 Brent 0.036
0.694 0.8347 0.6939 0.8488
FTSE 0.479 Coal 0.621 FTSE 0.484 Coal 0.252
0.4888 0.4307 0.4867 0.6155
Gas 0.002 FTSE 0.091 Gas 0.002 FTSE 0.443
0.9639 0.763 0.9678 0.5057
EUA 0.150 Gas 0.008 EUA 0.152 Gas 0.075
0.6986 0.9295 0.6968 0.7843
Sum Pos 0.486 EUA 2.906 Count Pos 0.152 EUA 2.638
0.4858 0.0883 0.6966 0.1043
Table E.1: Results of Granger Causality for Climate Change Sentiment Sum Positive and Count
Positive No Outliers
229
Sum Neg Count Neg
EUAs FTSE EUAs FTSE
Brent 1.390 Brent 0.948 Brent 1.379 Brent 0.952
0.499 0.6225 0.5018 0.6212
Coal 0.364 Coal 0.196 Coal 0.360 Coal 0.198
0.8337 0.9065 0.8351 0.9059
FTSE 1.199 Gas 6.766 FTSE 1.200 Gas 6.810
0.549 0.0339 0.5489 0.0332
Gas 1.543 EUA 1.242 Gas 1.557 EUA 1.224
0.4624 0.5374 0.4592 0.5424
Sum Neg 3.199 Sum Neg 0.320 Count Neg 3.465 Count Neg 0.520
0.202 0.8521 0.1768 0.771
Brent Gas Brent Gas
Coal 1.326 Brent 0.418 Coal 1.326 Brent 0.423
0.5152 0.8113 0.5153 0.8094
FTSE 6.242 Coal 0.898 FTSE 6.235 Coal 0.894
0.0441 0.6382 0.0443 0.6396
Gas 3.398 FTSE 0.720 Gas 3.405 FTSE 0.717
0.1829 0.6976 0.1822 0.6987
EUA 0.947 EUA 1.684 EUA 0.969 EUA 1.702
0.6227 0.4309 0.616 0.427
Sum Neg 0.268 Sum Neg 0.798 Count Neg 0.034 Count Neg 0.659
0.8744 0.6711 0.9832 0.7193
Coal Sum Neg Coal Count Neg
Brent 2.254 Brent 0.493 Brent 2.252 Brent 0.608
0.324 0.7816 0.3243 0.7378
FTSE 1.039 Coal 0.335 FTSE 1.039 Coal 0.531
0.5948 0.8457 0.5949 0.7667
Gas 0.002 FTSE 0.951 Gas 0.002 FTSE 1.093
0.9988 0.6216 0.9988 0.5789
EUA 0.279 Gas 0.933 EUA 0.278 Gas 1.352
0.8697 0.6272 0.8704 0.5086
Sum Neg 0.065 EUA 5.107 Count Neg 0.043 EUA 5.226
0.9682 0.0778 0.9787 0.0733
Table E.2: Results of Granger Causality for Climate Change Sentiment Sum Negative and Count
Negative No Outliers
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Count of Tweets
EUAs FTSE
Brent 1.379 Brent 0.930
0.5018 0.628
Coal 0.361 Coal 0.196
0.8348 0.9067
FTSE 1.220 Gas 6.798
0.5434 0.0334
Gas 1.667 EUA 1.251
0.4345 0.5351
Count of Tweets 3.695 Count of Tweets 0.235
0.1576 0.889
Brent Gas
Coal 1.323 Brent 0.422
0.516 0.8097
FTSE 6.303 Coal 0.905
0.0428 0.6362
Gas 3.355 FTSE 0.723
0.1869 0.6966
EUA 0.873 EUA 1.697
0.6463 0.4281
Count of Tweets 0.866 Count of Tweets 0.087
0.6485 0.9572
Coal Count of Tweets
Brent 2.254 Brent 0.544
0.324 0.7618
FTSE 1.050 Coal 0.099
0.5917 0.9516
Gas 0.003 FTSE 2.016
0.9986 0.3649
EUA 0.294 Gas 1.023
0.8632 0.5997
Count of Tweets 0.282 Count of Tweets 8.801
0.8684 0.0123
Table E.3: Results of Granger Causality for Climate Change Sentiment Count of All Tweets No Outliers
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E.2 With Outliers Climate Change Sentiment Measures
Sum Pos Count Pos
EUAs FTSE EUAs FTSE
Brent 0.065 Brent 0.955 Brent 0.065 Brent 0.954
0.7982 0.3285 0.7987 0.3287
Coal 0.209 Coal 0.068 Coal 0.211 Coal 0.068
0.6475 0.7938 0.6457 0.7938
FTSE 1.192 Gas 0.970 FTSE 1.180 Gas 0.983
0.2750 0.3246 0.2774 0.3214
Gas 1.425 EUA 0.908 Gas 1.430 EUA 0.915
0.2325 0.3407 0.2317 0.3387
Sum Pos 0.654 Sum Pos 0.973 Count Pos 0.468 Count Pos 0.392
0.4187 0.3238 0.4938 0.5314
Brent Gas Brent Gas
Coal 0.475 Brent 0.466 Coal 0.474 Brent 0.464
0.4908 0.4949 0.4909 0.4958
FTSE 3.718 Coal 0.204 FTSE 3.729 Coal 0.208
0.0538 0.6513 0.0535 0.6485
Gas 0.559 FTSE 0.168 Gas 0.577 FTSE 0.163
0.4548 0.6823 0.4477 0.6865
EUA 0.021 EUA 0.836 EUA 0.024 EUA 0.846
0.8836 0.3606 0.8773 0.3578
Sum Pos 3.287 Sum Pos 0.001 Count of Pos 1.349 Count Pos 0.059
0.0698 0.9697 0.2454 0.8081
Coal Sum Pos Coal Count Pos
Brent 0.210 Brent 0.016 Brent 0.210 Brent 0.000
0.6469 0.8997 0.6471 0.9831
FTSE 0.476 Coal 0.545 FTSE 0.482 Coal 0.186
0.4902 0.4604 0.4877 0.6666
Gas 0.004 FTSE 0.010 Gas 0.004 FTSE 0.287
0.9490 0.9210 0.9522 0.5925
EUA 0.146 Gas 0.000 EUA 0.150 Gas 0.116
0.7029 0.9880 0.6984 0.7336
Sum Pos 0.818 EUA 3.570 Count Pos 0.462 EUA 3.601
0.3659 0.0588 0.4966 0.0578
Table E.4: Results of Granger Causality for Climate Change Sentiment Sum Positive and Count
Positive With Outliers
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Sum Neg Count Neg
EUAs FTSE EUAs FTSE
Brent 1.257 Brent 1.187 Brent 1.262 Brent 1.185
0.5334 0.5525 0.5321 0.553
Coal 0.373 Coal 0.238 Coal 0.367 Coal 0.238
0.8300 0.8879 0.8324 0.8879
FTSE 1.266 Gas 7.639 FTSE 1.276 Gas 7.652
0.5311 0.0219 0.5284 0.0218
Gas 1.427 EUA 1.291 Gas 1.434 EUA 1.293
0.4900 0.5244 0.4882 0.5239
Sum Neg 3.209 Sum Neg 0.137 Count Neg 3.393 Count Neg 0.137
0.2009 0.9336 0.1833 0.9338
Brent Gas Brent Gas
Coal 1.263 Brent 0.644 Coal 1.264 Brent 0.653
0.5319 0.7246 0.5315 0.7213
FTSE 5.972 Coal 0.936 FTSE 5.972 Coal 0.925
0.0505 0.6263 0.0505 0.6297
Gas 3.011 FTSE 0.948 Gas 3.018 FTSE 0.935
0.2219 0.6224 0.2211 0.6264
EUA 0.913 EUA 1.685 EUA 0.929 EUA 1.709
0.6334 0.4307 0.6284 0.4255
Sum Neg 0.464 Sum Neg 1.743 Count Neg 0.156 Count Neg 1.743
0.7930 0.4182 0.9249 0.4183
Coal Sum Neg Coal Count Neg
Brent 2.233 Brent 0.030 Brent 2.229 Brent 0.012
0.3274 0.985 0.328 0.994
FTSE 1.031 Coal 0.833 FTSE 1.030 Coal 1.139
0.5973 0.6592 0.5974 0.5657
Gas 0.007 FTSE 1.634 Gas 0.007 FTSE 1.595
0.9966 0.4417 0.9964 0.4505
EUA 0.302 Gas 0.639 EUA 0.300 Gas 0.781
0.8598 0.7263 0.8606 0.6766
Sum Neg 0.541 EUA 6.719 Count Neg 0.503 EUA 6.759
0.7629 0.0348 0.7776 0.0341
Table E.5: Results of Granger Causality for Climate Change Sentiment Sum Negative and Count
Negative With Outliers
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Count of Tweets
EUAs FTSE
Brent 1.200 Brent 1.178
0.5487 0.555
Coal 0.381 Coal 0.249
0.8267 0.8829
FTSE 1.292 Gas 7.598
0.5242 0.0224
Gas 1.508 EUA 0.140
0.4706 0.9322
Count of Tweets 3.415 Count of Tweets 1.345
0.1813 0.5104
Brent Gas
Coal 1.264 Brent 0.643
0.5315 0.7251
FTSE 6.044 Coal 0.967
0.0487 0.6167
Gas 2.979 FTSE 0.944
0.2255 0.6237
EUA 0.363 EUA 0.477
0.834 0.7876
Count of Tweets 0.856 Count of Tweets 1.730
0.6519 0.421
Coal Sum Pos
Brent 2.212 Brent 0.537
0.3309 0.7644
FTSE 1.057 Coal 0.151
0.5896 0.9275
Gas 0.008 FTSE 2.060
0.996 0.357
EUA 0.744 Gas 0.777
0.6893 0.6782
Count of Tweets 0.303 Count of Tweets 11.706
0.8592 0.0029
Table E.6: Results of Granger Causality for Climate Change Sentiment Count of Tweets With Outliers
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